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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on legal rules that allow a court to set aside or modify a 
contract on the basis of a large discrepancy in the value of the respective 
performances. These “fair price” or “just price” rules have been the object of debate 
and disagreement among jurists for centuries.  
Although one such a rule previously formed part of the South African common law 
of contract, the prevailing view is that the price does not have to be fair or reasonable 
for a contract to be valid.  
However, due to changing attitudes to price control both locally and internationally, 
this view might require reconsideration. To this end, the study traces the treatment of 
fair price rules historically and comparatively, and thereafter evaluates the application 
of these rules in the South African context by taking account of certain underlying 
values and principles of the law of contract. 
The historical overview studies the development of the fair price rule from its 
origins in late classical Roman law to its reception and subsequent abolition in 
modern law. The overview shows that jurists during the Middle Ages had a well 
thought-out understanding of the fair price rule as a doctrine aimed at enforcing a 
market-oriented just price in order to avoid the exploitation of weakness, price 
discrimination, fraud, and exceptionally harsh bargains. 
The comparative overview in turn shows that while a variety of different 
approaches to dealing with substantively unfair prices exist, there are signs of an 
increased willingness to engage in price control. It is also evident that more modern 
fair price rules follow a flexible approach to the determination of whether the price is 
fair. This approach does not only take account of the objective disparity in the value 
of the respective contractual performances, but also of the procedural fairness of the 
conclusion of the contract. These modern fair price rules follow a similarly flexible 
approach to restitution, by investing the court with the discretion to adapt the contract 
price, or to avoid the contract and award damages to the disadvantaged party. 
Building on the comparative and historical analysis, the thesis concludes that it 
would be both desirable and suitable that a modern fair price rule, which follows a 
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flexible approach to the determination of fairness, should be introduced into South 
African common law of contract. This can be achieved through the development of 
the common-law rule that contracts may not be contrary to public policy. It is argued 
that this will lead to a law of contract that is better equipped to provide relief to 
prejudiced contracting parties, and that gives greater effect to a number of 
fundamental values of our law of contract, such as dignity, party autonomy, good 
faith, and Ubuntu. 
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OPSOMMING  
Die fokus van hierdie tesis is gerig op regsreëls wat howe toelaat om ‘n kontrak ter 
syde te stel of te wysig as gevolg van ‘n ernstige wanverhouding tussen die waarde 
van die onderskeie prestasies. Hierdie “billike prys” of “regverdige prys” reëls is reeds 
vir eeue ‘n bron van dispuut onder regsgeleerdes. 
Alhoewel so ‘n reël voorheen deel gevorm het van die Suid Afrikaanse 
kontraktereg, is die heersende mening dat die prys nie regverdig of billik hoef te wees 
vir ‘n kontrak om geldig te wees nie.  
Hierdie posisie verdien egter heroorweging in die lig van veranderende houdings 
jeens prysbeheer in Suid Afrika en die buiteland. Met hierdie doel voor oë begin 
hierdie studie met ‘n regshistoriese en regsvergelykende ondersoek na die 
toepassing van “billike prys” reëls, en evalueer dan die toepassing van hierdie reëls 
in die Suid Afrikaanse konteks met betrekking tot sekere onderliggende waardes en 
beginsels van die kontraktereg. 
Die regshistoriese oorsig ondersoek die ontwikkeling van die “billike prys” reël 
vanaf sy oorsprong in die laat-klassieke Romeinse reg tot sy resepsie en uiteindelike 
afskaffing in die moderne kontraktereg. Die ondersoek toon dat juriste gedurende die 
middeleeue ‘n goeddeurdagte begrip gehad het van die “billike prys” reël as ‘n 
leerstuk gemik op die afdwinging van ‘n markgeoriënteerde prys, ten einde die 
uitbuiting van kwesbaarheid, prysdiskriminasie, bedrog, en uitsonderlike nadelige 
kontrakte te bekamp.  
Die regsvergelykende oorsig toon weer dat, alhoewel ‘n verskeidenheid van 
benaderings tot die bekamping van onregverdige pryse bestaan, ‘n toenemende 
bereidwillligheid om pryse te beheer waargeneem kan word. Dit is verder duidelik dat 
moderne “billike prys” reëls ‘n buigsame benadering volg tot die vastelling van 
wanneer ‘n prys onregverdig is. Hierdie benadering neem nie slegs die objektiewe 
verskil in die waarde van die onderskeie prestasies in terme van die kontrak in ag 
nie, maar ook die prosedurele billikheid van kontraksluiting. Hierdie moderne “billike 
prys” reëls volg ook ‘n buigsame benadering tot restitusie, wat aan die hof die nodige 
bevoegdheid verleen om die prys aan te pas, of om die kontrak ter syde te stel en 
skadevergoeding toe te ken aan die benadeelde party.  
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Op grond van die regsvergelykende en regshistoriese analise, is die tesis se 
gevolgtrekking dat dit beide wenslik en gepas sal wees indien ‘n “billike prys” reël, 
wat ‘n buigsame benadering volg tot die vastelling van wanneer die prys regverdig is, 
deel sou word van die Suid Afrikaanse kontraktereg. Dit kan geskied deur middel van 
die verdere ontwikkeling van die gemeenregtelike reël dat kontrakte nie strydig mag 
wees met die openbare belang nie. Dit word geargumenteer dat so ‘n ontwikkeling 
sal lei tot ‘n kontraktereg wat beter ingerig is om bystand te verleen aan benadeelde 
partye, en wat sterker uiting sal gee aan ‘n aantal grondliggende waardes van ons 
kontraktereg soos menswaardigheid, party-outonomie, goeie trou, en Ubuntu.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1 1 Introduction and problem identification 
The question of whether it is possible for a contract price to be fair or just, and by 
contrast unfair or unjust, has engaged jurists, philosophers, and theologians alike 
through the ages.1 At the centre of this dispute stands the post-classical Roman legal 
doctrine of laesio enormis, which allows a disadvantaged contracting party to rescind 
a contract if the contract price is less than half, or more than double, the fair price or 
iustum pretium of the merx.2  
At times this doctrine and other rules like it seeking to enforce equality in 
exchange have been viewed as cornerstones of the law of contract;3 and at other 
times as relics from the past that are fit for nothing more than ridicule.4 These rules, 
which allow a court to set aside contracts on the basis that a large discrepancy exists 
in the value of the respective performances, can be referred to as “fair price” or “just 
price” rules.5 
Fair price rules are usually said to have fallen out of favour during the 18th and 19th 
century, as legal scholars under the increasing influence of economic liberalism and 
freedom of contract held that the price and contents of a contract depend solely on 
the will of the parties, and that any attempt to impose a iustum pretium would 
therefore infringe on the autonomy of the contracting parties.6 
This narrative holds equally true in South Africa. The doctrine of laesio enormis, 
which was received into our law from Roman-Dutch law, was first abolished in the 
Cape Colony in 1879,7 then in the Free State in 1902,8 and finally in the whole of 
South Africa by the General Law Amendment Act 32 of 1952. The relevant section of 
                                            
1
 See T Finkenauer “Laesio Enormis” in J Basedow, KJ Hopt, R Zimmermann, & A Stier (eds) The 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of European Private Law II (2012) 1029; J Gordley “Equality in Exchange” 
(1981) 69 CLR 1587; H Kötz European Contract Law 2 ed (transl G Mertens & T Weir, 2017) 110-111. 
2
 However, in its original form the remedy was only available to the seller of land; see 2 3 2 below. 
3
 See Gordley (1981) CLR 1587; Zimmermann Obligations 265. 
4
 See Zimmermann Obligations 267; A Perrone “The Just Price Doctrine and Contemporary Contract 
Law: Some Introductory Remarks” (2014) 125 Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali 217 218.  
5
 See for example H Eidenmüller “Justifying Fair Price Rules in Contract Law” (2015) 11 ERCL 220; 
MW Hesselink “Could a Fair Price Rule or its Absence be Unjust?” (2015) 11 ERCL 185.  
6
 See 3 2 below; Zimmermann Obligations 264, 265; Gordley (1981) CLR 1587.  
7
 See s 8 of the General Law Amendment Act 8 of 1879. 
8
 See s 6 of the General Law Amendment Ordinance Act 5 of 1902. 
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the latter declared that no contract shall be void or voidable “merely by reason of 
laesio enormis [i.e. great prejudice] sustained by either of the parties to the 
contract.”9  
Although this legislative abolition was supposedly in reaction to criticism levied 
against the doctrine in Tjollo Ateljees (Eins) Bpk v Small10 (henceforth Tjollo 
Ateljees), South African courts also expressed their disapproval of the working and 
theoretical foundation of the doctrine of laesio enormis in a number of cases.11 The 
doctrine was characterised variously as “crude and wanting” in elasticity,12 virtually 
impossible to apply in practice,13 “inherently arbitrary and preposterous”,14 not in 
harmony with “immanent reason or public policy”,15 hardly in conformity with the 
altered conditions of modern times,16 and “out of place in the modern law of 
contract”.17  
As a consequence the South African common law of contract generally does not 
require that a contract price has to be fair or reasonable for a contract to be valid. 
Traditionally the only requirements are that the contract price must be pecuniary, 
certain, and true.18 Conversely, the common law of contract provides no specific 
remedy to contracting parties seeking to escape the enforcement of a contract on the 
basis that the contract price is unfair.19  
1 2 Equity and fairness in the South African law of contract 
On which grounds might prejudiced contracting parties then be able to avoid the 
enforcement of manifestly unfair contract prices?  
                                            
9
 See s 25 of the Act; see also HR Hahlo & E Kahn “Two Important Changes in the Common Law” 
(1952) 69 SALJ 392 395. 
10 
1949 1 SA 856 (A). 
11 
For an overview of these cases see Hahlo & Kahn (1952) SALJ 393; J Barnard “Unfairness of Price 
and the Doctrine of Laesio Enormis in Consumer Sales” (2013) 76 THRHR 521 524-526; P Aronstam 
Consumer Protection, Freedom of Contract and the Law (1979) 44-45. 
12
 Botha v Assad 1945 TPD 1 4. 
13
 Botha v Assad 1945 TPD 1 8; Tjollo Ateljees (Eins) Bpk v Small 1949 1 SA 856 (A) 860; see also 
the discussion in Cotas v Williams 1947 2 SA 1154 (T). 
14
 Tjollo Ateljees (Eins) Bpk v Small 1949 1 SA 856 (A) 860, 871. 
15
 873. 
16 
Mcgee v Mignon 1903 TS 89 96. 
17
 Tjollo Ateljees (Eins) Bpk v Small 1949 1 SA 856 (A) 860. 
18
 See for example R van den Bergh “The Roman Tradition in the South African Contract of Sale” 
(2012) TSAR 53 72.  
19
 See however the discussion of the public policy rule and section 48(1)(a)(i) of the Consumer 
Protection Act 68 of 2008 in the following section. 
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Historically the exceptio doli generalis, which gave the court an equitable 
discretion to decide cases in terms of fairness and reasonableness, had been used 
by South African courts to promote equitable outcomes.20 However, since it was 
found in Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas21 that the exceptio doli 
does not form part of South African contract law, this avenue is closed to parties 
seeking to escape from a substantively imbalanced contract on equitable grounds.  
Neither could bona fides fulfil such a function. The Supreme Court of Appeal 
confirmed in Brisley v Drotsky22 that the abstract principle of good faith is not an 
independent basis which parties can use to avoid harsh contract terms, but rather 
fulfils an indirect function as a value underlying our law of contract. The same 
arguably holds true for fairness23 and Ubuntu,24 inasmuch as they are values that 
underlie our law of contract, rather than substantive rules that can directly be relied 
on by contracting parties seeking relief from harsh bargains.  
The South African law of contract also does not recognise abuse of circumstances 
of a disadvantaged party as a ground for invalidating a contract.25 While the 
extension of the traditional grounds of procedural unfairness to include the abuse of 
circumstances and other forms of improperly obtained consent could be supported, it 
arguably does not present a complete solution to the problem of unfair contract 
prices. Even validly concluded contracts might still be manifestly unfair, for example 
due to the inexperience or poor bargaining skill of the disadvantaged contracting 
party.26  
If neither direct reliance on equitable values, nor the extension of the traditional 
grounds of procedural fairness is able to provide satisfactory relief to prejudiced 
                                            
20
 R Zimmermann “Good Faith and Equity” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil 
Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 217 218-210; HM Du Plessis The Harmonisation of 
Good Faith and Ubuntu in the South African Common Law of Contract LLD Thesis, University of South 
Africa (2017) 119-122. 
21 
1988 3 SA 580 (A) 605-606.  
22 
2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 22. 
23
 See Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) paras 50-53; African Dawn 
Property Finance 2 (Pty) Ltd v Dreams Travel & Tours CC 2011 3 SA 511 (SCA) para 28; South 
African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 3 SA 323 (SCA) para 27. 
24
 See Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) paras 
22-24. 
25
 JE du Plessis “Illegal Contracts and the Burden of Proof” (2015) 132 SALJ 664 683-684. 
26
 See also the discussion on fair price rules as a mechanism to protect party autonomy at 4 2 6 3 
below.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
   4 
 
contracting parties, it begs the question whether it would not be better to confront the 
problem of substantively unfair prices head-on through introducing a rule which, 
similar to the doctrine of laesio enormis, allows a court to set aside a contract 
because of a manifestly unfair price, i.e. due to the result of the bargaining process 
rather than the process itself.27 
In contrast to the falling out of favour which fair price rules experienced in the 18th 
and 19th century, such rules appear to be undergoing a revival due to changing 
attitudes towards price control both domestically and internationally. This is 
evidenced not only by a resurgence of academic interest in fair price doctrines,28 and 
the inclusion of fair price rules in a number of international contractual regimes,29 but 
also in foreign law where fair price rules have attained prominence in a number of 
jurisdictions through the course of the 20th century,30 either through the 
modernisation of doctrines such as laesio enormis, or through the development of 
doctrines such as public policy in order to provide relief to prejudiced contracting 
parties. 
One manner in which such a rule might therefore be introduced into our law would 
be through the development of the public policy rule.31 In theory any term (including 
the contract price) has to meet the requirement that its content or enforcement should 
not be contrary to public policy. While unfairness as such might not be an 
independent ground on which a contract can be set aside, the judgments in Sasfin 
(Pty) Ltd v Beukes,32 and Barkhuizen v Napier,33 seem to indicate that manifest 
unfairness could result in a contract being declared contrary to public policy. In theory 
at least, it might therefore be possible for a court to set aside a manifestly unfair 
                                            
27
 See for example LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke, & GF Lubbe Contract General Principles 5 ed 
(2016) 126.  
28
 See for example Perrone (2014) Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali 217; Eidenmüller (2015) 
ERCL 220; Hesselink (2015) ERCL 185; T Gutmann “Some Preliminary Remarks on a Liberal Theory 
of Contract” (2013) 76 Law and Contemporary Problems 39.  
29
 See 3 7 below; M Hesselink “Unfair Prices in the Common European Sales Law” in L Gullifer & 
S Vogenauer (eds) English and European Perspectives on Contract and Commercial Law (2014) 225.  
30
 See Finkenauer “Laesio Enormis” in Max Planck Encyclopedia 1031; Kötz Contract Law 110, 111; 
Gordley (1981) CLR 1587-1588. 
31
 This is discussed in more detail at 6 2 below. 
32
 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 14-15; see also GF Lubbe “Taking Fundamental Rights Seriously” (2004) 121 SALJ 
395 398-399; FDJ Brand “The Role of Good Faith, Equity and Fairness in the South African Law of 
Contract: The Influence of the Common Law and the Constitution” (2009) 126 SALJ 71 84-85 
33
 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 49-60.  
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contract price for being contrary to public policy. However, thus far this avenue does 
not seem to be borne out in practice. 
Such a rule could also be introduced by statute. In this regard the South African 
legislature has already introduced a type of a fair price rule in section 48(1)(a)(i) of 
the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (“CPA”). Although this provision might be 
said to signal an increased willingness to engage in price control domestically, it is 
limited in scope to transactions falling within the ambit of the CPA,34 and does not 
appear to have been of great effect thus far; perhaps due to the high hurdles faced 
by disadvantaged contracting parties seeking relief in terms of the CPA.35  
The provision in question would, for example, not apply to transactions between 
certain juristic persons,36 or once-off transactions which are not in the ordinary 
course of business of the supplier.37 It is unclear for our purposes why disadvantaged 
parties who suffer great prejudice from transactions in the ordinary course of 
business are any more deserving of protection than parties who suffer harm from 
other transactions. In principle at least, there also exists no reason why juristic 
persons cannot likewise be prejudiced by manifestly unfair prices, and why they are 
therefore not worthy of protection.38  
Considering that the South African common law of contract currently does not 
seem to be able to provide satisfactory relief to contracting parties prejudiced by 
unfair contract prices, and considering the fact that attitudes towards fair price rules 
are changing internationally, and that a fair price rule limited in scope has already 
entered our law through section 48(1)(a)(i) of the CPA, this study investigates 
whether it would indeed be desirable to introduce a fair price rule to the South African 
common law of contract, and if so, how such a rule should best function.  
                                            
34
 See s 5 of the Act, which sets out its application.  
35
 The CPA is discussed in more detail at 6 3 below.  
36
 Section 5(2)(b). 
37
 See the definition of “transaction” in s 1 of the Act; see also E de Stadler “Section 5” in T Naudé & 
S Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (RS 1 2016) paras 6-7, 39-43. 
38
 See for example JE du Plessis “Grounds for Avoidance” in S Vogenauer (ed) Commentary on the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2 ed (2015) 511. 
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1 3 Methodological approach and overview 
The methodology adopted in this thesis is to trace the treatment of fair price rules 
historically and comparatively, and thereafter to evaluate and consider the application 
of these rules in the South African context by taking into account certain basic legal 
principles and values. 
 The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 commences with an investigation 
into the development of the doctrine of laesio enormis over the course of about a 
millennium, from its inception in late Roman law, to its study by first students of 
Roman law in Bologna, the medieval canon lawyers, the late scholastics, and finally 
to its reception into Roman-Dutch law. The chapter goes further than merely 
explaining how the modern legal position came about by seeking to cast light on the 
different ways in which the doctrine of laesio enormis had been developed, 
understood, and justified throughout these periods.  
However, as enormously influential as the doctrine of laesio enormis may have 
been, it is only one manifestation of the fair price rule. Many of the shortcomings 
criticised by the judges in Tjollo Ateljees, and by detractors of the doctrine in general, 
are not weaknesses of fair price rules as such, but rather of the specific legal 
construct of the laesio enormis. It is also important to appreciate that South African 
law is hardly alone in struggling with these problems, and that a number of foreign 
legal systems have sought the solution in some or other fair price rule.  
To this end, the comparative overview in chapter 3 seeks to provide an overview 
and analysis of the manner in which several modern legal systems approach equality 
in exchange, and more specifically substantive fairness in price.  
The chapter considers the legal position in Germany, Austria, the English common 
law, and in the American state of Louisiana, as well as in a number of international 
model rules. Germany, Austria, and Louisiana were chosen because of the nature 
and prominence of their respective fair price rules, and the rich body of literature that 
is available on the topic. Louisiana has the added advantage of presenting some 
interesting parallels as a mixed legal system. The English common law, by contrast, 
has no one rule which can be described as a fair price rule, but rather regulates 
fairness in price through a number of interrelated, yet completely unsystematic 
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doctrines. In this sense it is much closer to the current position in South Africa, and 
makes for interesting comparison.  
With the lessons learned from the historical and comparative chapters in mind, 
chapter 4 attempts to evaluate the desirability of the introduction of a fair price rule 
measured against a number of values and principles which are considered important 
in South African contract law, such as party autonomy, dignity, economic efficiency, 
and legal certainty.  
Chapter 5, drawing on the findings of the previous chapters, evaluates how a fair 
price rule should best function. As has been referred to above, the doctrine of laesio 
enormis was bedevilled by questions as to how it should be applied correctly. 
However, it is unclear to what extent these problems were unique to that doctrine, or 
if they could be avoided entirely by proper construction of a fair price rule.  
The concluding chapter discusses the possible avenues for the introduction of a 
fair price rule, by legal development or reform, into current South African law of 
contract. Such a rule might be introduced by the legislature adopting a statutory 
remedy, which is to some extent already the case with section 48(1)(a)(i) of the CPA. 
Alternatively, the possibility exists for judicial development of the common law by 
building on judgments such as those in Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes39 and Barkhuizen v 
Napier.40 
                                            
39
 1989 1 SA 1 (A). 
40
 2007 5 SA 323 (CC). 
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CHAPTER 2: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPT OF A FAIR PRICE 
OR IUSTUM PRETIUM  
2 1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the historical origins and subsequent development of the 
fair price rule in Roman, Medieval, and Roman-Dutch law. While the fair price rule 
has to a greater or lesser extent been present during all of these periods, it has 
undergone significant change in its scope, functioning, and purpose. It would be futile 
to attempt to document its entire history in a single chapter, and there is no shortage 
of other sources available that do so in a more comprehensive fashion.1 The chapter 
rather seeks to identify lessons to be learnt from the history of the doctrine, with a 
view to using these lessons in later chapters in order to discuss the application and 
desirability of such a rule in the modern legal context. 
The chapter commences with the position in classical Roman law.2 It becomes 
apparent that while the fair price rule was certainly exceptional in nature, the Roman 
law of contract was not wholly unconcerned with the equality of performances of the 
contracting parties either. From there the study moves on to the establishment and 
subsequent expansion of the fair price rule in late Roman law, early medieval Roman 
law, canon law, and Roman-Dutch law. During this period the fair price rule was 
rationalised, refined, and concretized in such a manner that it became an 
independent legal remedy; in substance adopting the principle proportionality of 
performances.3 The fair price rule was, however, far from an abstract principle. It was 
rather a very real part of everyday life in the market economy of medieval and early 
modern Europe.4 
                                            
1
 See for example JW Baldwin “The Medieval Theories of the Just Price: Romanists, Canonists, and 
Theologians in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries” (1959) 49 TAPS NS 1-92; R Zimmermann The 
Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 255-270; J Hallebeek “Some 
Remarks on Laesio Enormis and Proportionality in Roman-Dutch Law and Calvinistic Commercial 
Ethics” (2015) 21 Fundamina 14 24; IH van Loo Vernietiging van Overeenkomsten op Grond van 
Laesio Enormis, Dwaling, of Misbruik van Omstandigheden LLD Thesis, Open Universiteit (2013); W 
Decock Theologians and Contract Law: The Moral Transformation of the Ius Commune (ca. 1500-
1650) (2013) 507-601; H Kalb Laesio Enormis in Gelehrten Recht (1992).  
2
 See 2 3 1 below. 
3
 See Hallebeek (2015) Fundamina 21. 
4
 See for example Baldwin (1959) TAPS NS 24-25 who discusses the occurrence of clauses 
renouncing the remedy in contracts during the 12
th
 and 13
th
 century; see JW Whitman “The Moral 
Menace of Roman Law and the Making of Commerce: Some Dutch Evidence” (1996) 105 Yale LJ 
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2 2 Classical Roman law  
It was not a requirement in classical Roman law that the purchase price had to be 
fair.5 The three main requirements were that price had to be in money, certain, and 
true.6 However, there were legal mechanisms or doctrines that might have 
contributed to ensuring a fair price. These will be considered, after the three main 
requirements have been briefly explored.  
2 2 1 The price had to be in money. 
The question of whether the price had to be in money is primarily relevant for 
distinguishing between contracts of sale and contracts of exchange.7 Whether a party 
is viewed as the purchaser or vendor comes with a host of substantive considerations 
in contracts of sale, such as the availability of certain remedies.8 It has little bearing 
on the fairness of the price.  
2 2 2 Verum pretium 
The requirement that the price had to be verum, literally translated as “true”, is 
better understood as requiring that the price had to be “real” or “serious”. This did not 
require that price needed to be fair or adequate;9 even a completely unjust price 
would still be verum as long as the contracting party was serious in his intent.10 
2 2 3 Certum pretium 
The final requirement was that the price needed to be certain. Classical Roman 
law did not allow sale at an unspecified “reasonable price”,11 nor did it allow an 
agreement where the price would be determined by the purchaser.12 The price was, 
however, considered to be certain where it was readily ascertainable, in line with the 
                                                                                                                                        
1841 1854, who states that the law of just price in sales was centrally important to the organization of 
pre-modern markets; see also JM Eligedo “Just Price: Three Insights from the Salamanca School” 
(2009) 90 JBE 29-46 for a discussion of the practices in the Spanish late scholastics. 
5
 Zimmermann Obligations 255; J Gordley & AT von Mehren An Introduction to the Comparative Study 
of Private Law – Readings, Cases, Materials (2006) 461; Baldwin (1959) TAPS NS 1 19; P Birks The 
Roman Law of Obligations (2014) 70. 
6
 See Baldwin (1959) TAPS NS 19; Zimmermann Obligations 250-255. 
7
 Birks Roman Law 69. 
8
 See Zimmermann Obligations 251-252; Baldwin (1959) TAPS NS 19; Birks Roman Law 70. 
9
; Zimmermann Obligations 252. 
10
 252. 
11
 Baldwin (1959) TAPS NS 19. 
12
 Zimmermann Obligations 254. 
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maxim certum est quod certum reddi potest.13 Parties did not have to name the 
actual price, but could fix the price with reference to objective criteria.14 The method 
used to determine the price had to ensure that there is no need for further 
negotiation.15  
A question which gave rise to considerable debate among classical writers was 
whether the parties could agree that the price would be determined by an 
independent third party. This position was settled in the post-classical period by 
Justinian, who ruled that such a sale was conditional, becoming effective once the 
third party named the price. If the third party did not name a price the agreement 
would lapse and be void.16 C 4 38 15 indicates that discretion of the third party to 
determine the price has to be exercised with the judgment of a reasonable man (viri 
boni arbitrium).17 Determination of whether this discretion was indeed exercised in a 
reasonable manner requires an assessment of the reasonableness of the price.  
Modern arguments against sale at an unspecified reasonable price tend to point to 
the difficulty of determining a reasonable price, holding such agreements to be void 
for reason of vagueness.18 The Roman legal system however did not balk at 
assessing the value of a thing. There are several instances in which a Roman iudex, 
or alternatively the praetor, were called upon to estimate the value of goods, or the 
fair price thereof.19  
Restitutio in integrum, for example, had its origin as remedy to protect minors who 
had entered into prejudicial contracts. The praetor in this case had to estimate the 
“true value” of the goods in order to restore to the injured minor the difference.20 The 
true value in these cases was an estimate of the value which a regular person would 
place on the merx under normal circumstances: free of price shocks and market 
                                            
13
 Birks Roman Law 69. 
14
 Zimmermann Obligations 253. 
15
 Birks Roman Law 69. 
16
 C 4 38 15; see also Birks Roman Law 69; Zimmermann Obligations 254. 
17
 See Birks Roman Law 70. 
18
 For a discussion of the position in South African law see Genac Properties JHB (Pty) Ltd v NBC 
Administrators CC 1992 1 SA 566 (A). 
19
 Baldwin (1959) TAPS NS 20; see E Koops “Price Setting and other Attempts to Control the 
Economy” in PJ Du Plessis, C Ando, & K Tuori (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Roman Law and 
Society (2016) 609 614-617. 
20
 Baldwin (1959) TAPS NS 19-20; see also the discussion of the Lex Laetoria below at 2 2 4 2. 
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failures, as well as personal sentiment and interest.21 The actio quanti minoris, 
another such example, was an aedilitian action available in the case of latent defects 
or dicta et promissa.22 This remedy allowed the purchaser to claim the difference 
between the actual worth of a thing, and putative worth, had it been free from 
defects, or possessed the promised qualities.23 There is also evidence that the scope 
of this remedy was extended beyond aedilitian actions already in classical Roman 
law, to latent defects under the actio empti, also entitling the purchaser to a reduction 
in price. Both of these cases necessitate some judicial estimation of the actual and 
putative worth of a thing.24 Even if Roman law did not have a fair price rule, it still 
necessitated at times determining a fair price. 
2 2 4 The limits of contractual freedom in Roman law  
While Roman law is usually considered liberal with regards to contractual freedom, 
it nevertheless recognised mechanisms aimed indirectly at ensuring a degree of 
equality in exchange. Three of these mechanisms will be discussed below. The first 
relates to fraud, the second to limitations on contractual capacity, and the third to 
limitations imposed by duty and custom.  
2 2 4 1 Free negotiation short of fraud 
As indicated earlier, Roman law followed a decidedly liberal approach to 
contractual arrangements,25 and did not require that the contract price had to be fair 
or reasonable. According to an important text in the Digest, parties were allowed to 
purchase a thing for more or less than the fair or market price and so attempt to 
outwit or outmanoeuvre each other – invicem se circumscribere.26  
According to this view, parties were allowed to take advantage of each other in 
accordance with natural law.27 Roman law only established a framework within which 
contracts could be concluded,28 and as such the perception is that it was not greatly 
                                            
21
 Koops “Price Setting” in Roman Law and Society 615.  
22
 See Zimmermann Obligations 315  
23
 318. 
24
 See Baldwin (1959) TAPS NS 20; Koops “Price Setting” in Roman Law and Society 612-613. 
25
 Baldwin (1959) TAPS NS 17. 
26
 D 19 2 22 3. 
27
 D 4 4 16 4. 
28
 Zimmermann Obligations 258. 
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concerned with questions of equity or fairness in the contract. This freedom should 
however not be understood as allowing parties to defraud each other.  
The presence of fraud or dolus would give rise to special defences available to the 
affected party. In stricti iuris contracts the defrauded party would be able to include a 
clause in the formula called the exceptio doli, which allowed the court to decide the 
case in terms of fairness and reasonableness. In bonae fidei contracts, such as sale, 
fraud could automatically be raised as a defence or ground of action.29 In contracts 
where no other remedy was available, the defrauded party would be able to raise the 
special action known as the actio doli.30 The relevance of these instruments may not 
be immediately apparent, but they subsequently became of vital importance in acting 
as catalysts for allowing courts to control the enforcement of contracts; for present 
purposes it is of particular interest that this included testing the substantive fairness 
of contracts.31  
2 2 4 2 Restricted contractual capacity 
The non-interventionist approach to contracts set out above might be said to 
reflect the prevailing liberal economic attitudes to the socio-economic structure of the 
Roman household.32 The paterfamilias had almost unfettered authority and would 
have been expected to take care of the business interests of the family as part of his 
duty to protect those under his care.33 Majority was only attained at the completion of 
25 years of age.34 The contractual capacity of women, even those of age, was 
severely restricted. Wives were considered to be in the manus (literally “hand”) of 
their husbands, while all descendants were under the patria potestas, or power of 
their father.35  
                                            
29
 R Zimmermann “Good Faith and Equity” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil 
Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 217 218-219; RW Lee An Introduction to Roman-Dutch 
Law 5 ed (1953) 225. 
30
 Lee Roman-Dutch Law 225. 
31
 See also the discussion of good faith below at 4 2 7 5. 
32
 Zimmermann Obligations 255-256. 
33
 256. 
34
 D 4 4 1; see J Hallebeek “Sacramenta Puberum and Laesio Enormis - The Oath Non Venire Contra 
by a Minor in Contracts of Sale - According to Some Glossators” (1990) 58 LHR 55. 
35
 L Schumaker “Slaves in Roman Society” in M Peachin (ed) The Oxford Handbook of Social 
Relations in the Roman World (2011) 589 590. 
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Only the paterfamilias could dispose of the patrimonium of the Roman family, and 
he held this power until his death over his wife and descendants even after their 
coming of age.36 Irrespective of their age, those under the patria potestas needed the 
permission of the paterfamilias to enter into any contract.37  
The paterfamilias had formal control over all the legal relationships entered into by 
his household.38 Where his consent was absent, he had at his disposal special 
remedies enabling him respectively, to block a condictio seeking the repayment of 
loaned money, to avoid the manumission of a slave by someone less than thirty 
years of age, or to avoid the alienation of certain kinds of property.39 
While still full Roman citizens, children and women were in legal terms, like slaves, 
considered to be alieni iuris, and without legal self-determination.40 Slaves were 
under the power of their masters (potestas dominorum), and consequently were legal 
objects and not legal subjects.41 Women were only to a limited extent able to conduct 
their own business, and only from the late Roman Republican era onwards.42 Sons 
who had been granted a peculium (a type of allowance) could engage in trade and 
enter into contracts, but legally they did not own anything, and would remain subject 
to the control of the paterfamilias.43  
The Lex Laetoria, which was introduced in 192 BCE,44 is an example of the strong 
protection granted to minors. The law allowed someone of less than 25 years to 
recover any inequitable losses arising out of a contract of sale where they were 
mistaken about the contract price,45 or where unfair advantage was taken of their 
inexperience.46 The minor could negate the enforcement of the contract by raising 
                                            
36
 592; see also D 50 16 195 2. 
37
 Hallebeek (1990) LHR 57. 
38
 F Schulz The Principles of Roman Law (1936) 145. 
39
 Hallebeek (1990) LHR 57. 
40
 Schumacher “Slaves” in Social Relations in the Roman World 590. 
41
 591. 
42
 K Milnor “Woman in Roman Society” in Social Relations in the Roman World 609 613. 
43
 J Krause “Children in the Roman Family and Beyond” in Social Relations in the Roman World 623 
630; S Dixon “Family” in Roman Law and Society 461 464-465. 
44
 See 2 3 1 below. 
45
 Baldwin (1959) TAPS NS 18. 
46
 Hallebeek (1990) LHR 55. 
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the exceptio legis Laetoriae,47 or if the contract were already performed recoup his 
losses through the extraordinary praetorian remedy of restitutio in integrum.48  
2 2 4 3 Limitations imposed by custom and duty 
As has been illustrated above, classical Roman law gave great freedom of 
contract to a small subsection of the population, while it was severely restricted for 
the rest. Schulz argues that the liberty on which Roman law granted to this 
subsection of the population was only possible because of the inherent limitations in 
the Roman conception of liberty;49 Roman law needed to be liberal in character 
because of the influence and power of the extra-legal restriction already in place in 
Roman society.50 These extra-legal standards play a role even in modern legal 
systems, but tend to play a far more prominent role in less developed communities 
where law, religion, and morals are usually tightly interwoven.51  
We see for example that even in classical Roman law, the abuse of law was not 
permitted, even if it was not expressly forbidden.52 As indicated earlier, the exceptio 
doli generalis was recognised in Roman law as a mechanism to prevent the abuse of 
legal rules.53 Classical Roman law might thus have allowed parties to conclude a 
harsh bargain, but an exceptionally harsh one might have been remedied by the 
exceptio. 
The restrictions imposed on Roman citizens by societal norms such as pietas, 
fides, humanitas, and officium, to which can be referred to together as the officia or 
duties, played a powerful and active role in the daily lives of Romans.54 Romans were 
“enmeshed in a web of societal restrictions”, the influence and force of which are 
difficult to understand from a modern perspective.55 They were greatly dependent on 
their relatives, in-laws, friends, patrons, and the general public. This had the effect 
                                            
47
 55. 
48
 Baldwin (1959) TAPS NS 18. 
49
 To paraphrase Schulz Principles 140.  
50
 21. 
51
 See Zimmermann Obligations 706-709. 
52
 Schulz Principles 159. 
53
 157. 
54
 See Schulz Principles 158; Zimmermann Obligations 350, 351 (making a similar point in relation to 
locatio conductio). 
55
 Schulz Principles 21.  
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that the extra-legal customs dictating their daily lives were often more powerful than 
any judicial ruling.56 
While custom could not overrule existing law, Constantine would later rule that 
custom could be considered a subsidiary source of law, a decision which was 
apparently prompted by the fact that custom was at times indeed permitted as a 
source of law in the Roman provinces.57 
Plescia has made a similar argument, noting that as post-classical Roman law 
evolved from status to contract, the emancipation of individuals from family groups 
coincided with an increase in public authority.58 So for example the patria potestas, 
declined as the power of the public authority grew, to the extent that it was all but 
irrelevant by the time of Justinian.59 It might therefore be no coincidence that rules 
which restricted the contractual freedom of contracting parties, came into existence at 
the same time that other limitations imposed by custom and duty started falling away.  
2 2 5 Conclusion  
The view that classical Roman law was simply not concerned with questions of 
contractual equity seems at the least, to be incomplete. If anything the law of contract 
could afford to be less concerned with equity because of the manifold restrictions 
already in place.  
It can be argued that due to the economic and societal constraints outlined above, 
the class of citizenry engaging in complex contractual exchanges would have been 
much narrower in classical Rome than in modern society. Determination of price 
could thus be left to the parties, because it was part of the duty of the paterfamilias to 
invest himself in his own interests, and to protect the economically, socially, 
intellectually, and emotionally weaker members of society.60  
One should also be cautious when attempting to compare legal institutions and 
reasoning between Roman law and the modern law of contract, as Roman law 
                                            
56
 22. 
57
 J Plescia “The Development of the Doctrine of Boni Mores in Roman Law” (1987) 34 RIDA 265, 
272-273. 
58
 266-268 
59
 267-268.  
60
 Zimmermann Obligations 256. 
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cannot be understood without an appreciation of the extra-legal institutions which 
accompanied it.61 This has the effect that Roman private legal institutions often 
appear far more liberal than what they really were when the other limitations are 
taken into account.62 
2 3 Post-classical Roman law: The Lex Secunda 
2 3 1 The origin of the Lex Secunda 
In contrast to the Roman Republic, where the formal control of price was limited to 
matters such as the price of grain,63 the late Roman Empire developed into a highly 
regulated and controlled economy, possibly due to a series of internal and external 
crises.64 It is in this era that a fair price rule first entered Roman law.  
It is within book four, subsection 44 of the Codex Justinianus, under the heading 
De rescindenda venditione (On the rescission of a sale) that the rule usually referred 
to as C 4 44 2, or as the Lex Secunda is found. It is contained in a rescript, attributed 
to the emperors Diocletian and Maximian in the year 285 CE:  
Rem maioris pretii si tu vel pater tuus minoris pretii, distraxit, humanum est, ut vel pretium 
te restituente emptoribus fundum venditum recipias auctoritate intercedente iudicis, vel, si 
emptor elegerit, quod deest iusto pretio recipies. Minus autem pretium esse videtur, si nec 
dimidia pars veri pretii soluta sit. 
“If you or your father sold property worth a higher price for a lower price, it is equitable that 
either you get back the land sold through a court order, refunding the price to the 
purchasers, or, if the buyer chooses, you get back what is lacking from the just price. The 
price is deemed to be too low if less than half of the true price has been paid.”65 
2 3 2 The functioning of the Lex Secunda 
The Lex Secunda was a rescript dealing with a specific legal dispute involving a 
certain Aurelius Lupus,66 and it is usually argued that it was therefore not supposed 
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to constitute a general rule or legal principle.67 However, this text laid the foundations 
of a doctrine which the glossators termed laesio enormis,68 and which would be used 
in a variety of circumstances to adjust a lack of equilibrium in performances or, to put 
it differently, to ensure that a fair price is paid.69  
Before these developments are discussed, it is necessary to first consider in 
greater detail the ambit of the Lex Secunda. From the text it is apparent that it only 
applied to contracts for the sale of land, and would accordingly not apply to other 
commercial contracts (e.g. lease or loans), or to the sale of movables. The remedy 
was available only to the seller, who had been inequitably impoverished through 
receiving an inadequate contract price, and not to a buyer who had paid an 
excessive price.70 However, the buyer had the election to pay up to the full just price 
in order to avoid rescission of the contract. 
The one-sided protection granted by the remedy, (and one-sided election) may 
well be explained by the contemporary economic challenges of the late Roman 
Empire. The aim of the law was presumably to protect owners of farmland, forced to 
sell due to dire economic circumstances. The collapse in the price of land coupled 
with severe inflation in the cost of commodities experienced during the reign of 
Diocletian,71 or perhaps the harsh tax regime of Justinian,72 allowed unscrupulous 
purchasers to exploit the dire circumstances of the smallholders in order to buy their 
land at well below market price.73  
The theoretical and practical shortcomings of the remedy become clear when 
considering some examples. Consider the sale of several identical plots of land, all 
with a iustum pretium adjudged to be exactly 100 denarii. A landowner who receives 
51 denarii would have no recourse as more than half of the just price has been paid. 
In contrast to this position a landowner receiving 49 denarii would have this remedy 
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at his disposal, and would thus be able to seek relief under the Lex Secunda. 
Depending on the election of the buyer, the latter seller of land may receive the 
iustum pretium in full, while the former has no recourse at all despite being 
impoverished to an almost identical extent.  
The election of the purchaser to some extent mitigates this position, as the 
purchaser may choose to rescind the sale rather than pay the full just price; this 
position is however not unproblematic either. As the choice lies solely with the 
purchaser, he is able to escape situations where his actions have led to an 
inequitable result. One could even argue that this leaves little incentive for the 
purchaser to offer a just price, as he could, at the worst, elect to be restored to the 
position ex ante. 
There is also an element of arbitrariness in the all-or-nothing nature of the remedy. 
No position of compromise is possible where, for example, the purchaser agrees to 
reimburse the seller anything less than the full amount. Of course any objective 
measure would contain some level or arbitrariness, whether the parties were 
reimbursed in full or not, or whether the inequitable but still acceptable purchase 
price is one half, two-thirds or five-twelfths of the iustum pretium.74 These examples 
all seek to prove the rigidity and bluntness of the Lex Secunda. 
We also have very little evidence of what the measure or guideline for the 
calculation of the iustum pretium would have been when applying the Lex Secunda. 
This question would lead to much fervent debate and much controversy in the 
centuries to follow.75  
2 3 3 Potential influences on the Lex Secunda 
There is some doubt about the authenticity of the Lex Secunda. Some scholars 
argue that it was not an invention of Diocletian, but rather a Justinianic 
interpolation.76  
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The Roman Empire was undergoing considerable change during this era. Early in 
the third century Roman citizenship had been expanded (with some exceptions) to 
the whole free population of the Empire. This had the effect that many people 
formerly governed by local (especially Greek) laws were now suddenly governed by 
Roman law.77 While the foundations of early Roman law do not contain much Greek 
influence, the laws of the late Roman Empire were greatly influenced by Greek laws, 
customs, and philosophy.78 Constantine moved the imperial capital to Byzantium, 
and Christianity became the state religion. With a new religion came a new system of 
ethics, one that was often at odds with the individualistic nature of classical Roman 
law.79 
In this light the Lex Secunda is viewed by some as an attempt by Justinian to 
infuse his laws with Christian values.80 Becker also stresses that the inclusion of the 
doctrine in the Codex might have resulted from a combination of urgent socio-political 
needs of the period, coupled with Justinian’s adherence to Christian moral doctrine.81 
In this framework the Lex Secunda can be regarded as a compromise between the 
liberal classical Roman legal position, and Stoic-Christian moral principles which 
assumed a just price theory.82  
It is also likely that Roman law came to be influenced by sources far more Eastern 
than just Greece, or the broader Hellenic world.83 Baldwin notes the close similarity 
between the Lex Secunda and the legal doctrine of ona’ah in Talmudic Mishnah 
(Rabbinic Law).84 According to the doctrine of ona’ah, translated by Westbrook to 
mean “overreaching or price fraud”, a contract could be rescinded if the contract price 
                                                                                                                                        
(1959) TAPS 17; A Watson The Spirit of Roman law (1995) 176-177. In contrast to some of the 
sources cited above, modern scholarship seems to cast doubt on the idea that the text was 
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80
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was more than one-sixth lower than the market price.85 That the doctrine of ona’ah 
makes use of one-sixth as opposed to one-half should be of little consequence; when 
such a doctrine is transplanted from one legal culture to another, it is likely that one 
would impose upon it whichever proportion seems right within a legal culture.86  
2 3 4 Conclusion 
One can speculate on the origins of the fair price doctrine in order to understand 
its purpose better. However, it is impossible to answer questions as to the proper 
functioning and scope of application of the doctrine of laesio enormis definitively; 
there is also insufficient proof of the origins of this post-classical innovation 
presumably aimed at protecting sellers of land.87 Furthermore, questions as to the 
origin of the doctrine provide little insight into the substantive merit of such a rule, or 
guidance as to how it was or should be applied. As these potential outside influences 
were only discovered much later, they would have little influence on the reception of 
the rule during the Middle Ages. Watson argues that part of the reason why fair price 
doctrines were so popular during the Middle Ages, is that this ambiguity inherent in 
the Lex Secunda allowed it to be developed and repurposed for a variety of different 
ideologies and approaches.88 As will become apparent in the next section, the rule 
was received into the revived Roman law during the course of the Middle Ages 
without any doubts as to its authenticity. 
2 4 Iustum pretium in the Middle Ages 
2 4 1 The glossators  
2 4 1 1 Introduction 
After the hiatus sometimes called the Dark Ages, the study of Roman law in 
Europe began anew, under somewhat mysterious circumstances, in Bologna at 
about 1100 CE, with the establishment of the legal school called the glossators.89 
                                            
85
 Westbrook (2008) RIDA 42; see also M Armgardt “Zur Dogmengeschichte der Laesio Enormis - 
Eine Historische und Rechtsvergleichende Betrachtung” in K Riesenhuber & IK Karakostas (eds) 
Inhaltskontrolle in Nationalen und Europäischen Privatrecht (2009) 3 6-7.  
86
 Watson (1981) JLH 189. 
87
 186, 189; see 2 2 above.  
88
 192-193. 
89
 J Gordley The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine (1991) 32; Whitman (1996) Yale 
LJ 1846-1847. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
   21 
 
The study of Roman law was organised around the Justinianic Corpus Iuris Civilis, 
which is recognised today as being at times fragmented and contradictory, and the 
product of a host of different political and social circumstances.90 The medieval 
scholars, though not uninterested in history, lacked the historical knowledge about 
the context of the Corpus,91 and would by contrast have viewed it as a valid and 
unitary whole,92 and would therefore attempt to derive general legal principles from 
the decisions contained in the Corpus.93  
Their understanding of the Lex Secunda should also be viewed in this light. They 
would try to find the meaning of a text by interpreting it with reference to the content 
of other texts,94 which often lead to interpretations that can today be cast aside as 
being spurious or incorrect.95 This almost blind adherence to the Corpus also meant 
that the glossators did not properly theorise the workings of the fair price rule in the 
Lex Secunda; they simply inferred its operation from other texts available to them.96  
The discussion above regarding the possible influences on the Lex Secunda, as 
well as the doubts regarding the authenticity of the provision,97 would have been of 
no concern to the glossators.98 The first traces of this debate would only emerge 
among some of the late scholastics.99 Similarly, the Aristotelean theory which would 
later underlie the theological justification for later fair price rules was still absent in 
their reasoning.100 Nevertheless as the first great school of Roman law, the 
glossators do present us with an important link in the story of the transformation of 
Lex Secunda into the doctrine of laesio enormis, as the doctrine would come to be 
known.  
The glossators extended the ambit of Lex Secunda first to things other than land in 
the early 12th century, and later to buyers who had paid more than twice the just price 
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(as opposed to sellers who sold for less than half the just price), as well as to other 
analogous contracts, such as lease, in the early 13th century.101  
They identified the just price with market price.102 This view stems from their 
interpretation of the first sentence of D 35 2 63, which reads: “The prices of things are 
taken not from the desire or utility of individuals but from those of the people 
commonly.”103 Accursius in his gloss to C 4 44 6 echoes this view, noting that the just 
price of a thing is not determined by the affection attached to it by a single person, 
but the common estimation,104 and is determined at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract.105 The just price would therefore differ depending on the time and place of 
the contract conclusion.106  
2 4 1 2 Dolus ex re ipsa: fraud flowing from the thing itself 
While the glossators lacked a general theory to justify the Lex Secunda, they did 
link the relief granted to the prejudiced party with the relief granted in the case of 
fraud.107 Accursius, following on the work of Vacarius and Azo, distinguished 
between fraud that was causal, leading a person to contract where they otherwise 
would not (dolus dans causam contractui), and cases where the fraud was incidental, 
where the party would still have contracted but on different terms, or for a different 
price (dolus incidens).108  
Fraud is further subdivided into cases where one party deliberately attempts to 
mislead the other (dolus ex proposito), i.e. fraud as it is understood today, and cases 
where the contracting party was not deceived deliberately, but still contracted on 
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disadvantageous terms. These cases were termed dolus ex re ipsa, or fraud flowing 
from the thing itself.109  
While these rather technical delineations might have been some of the most 
influential contributions of the glossators to medieval scholarship,110 they arose in a 
wayward attempt to integrate the remedy in the Lex Secunda with the other Roman 
texts.111 D 45 1 36 states in a rather cryptic passage, that where there is no fraud on 
the part of one of the contracting parties, but the matter itself contains an element of 
fraud, the prejudiced party is entitled to an exception, as if he was induced to contract 
by fraud.112  
The glossators reading this passage with the Lex Secunda, understood dolus ex 
proposito to be present where the party was prejudiced ultra dimidium (i.e. where the 
prejudice exceeded half of the just price).113 Although the Lex Secunda did not form 
part of classical Roman law, the glossators with their unitary approach to the Corpus, 
and even much later humanist authors, nevertheless followed this mistake due to 
their ignorance of the historical development of the Lex Secunda.114 Canon lawyers, 
borrowing this distinction from the glossators, would also incorporate dolus ex re ipsa 
into the Decretals of Gregory IX.115  
This understanding of the Lex Secunda as being related to a type of fraud is 
important as it would hold credence for centuries. Because of this extraordinary 
interpretation of the Lex Secunda, the glossators were able to create a general legal 
principle out of a specific legal construct, in effect allowing the remedy to be extended 
to other analogous contracts. It even allowed the remedy in the Lex Secunda to be 
granted where the contract was one of strict law rather than of good faith.116  
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It would only be pointed out much later by the late scholastic Arias Piñel that since 
the Lex Secunda did in fact not form part of classical Roman law,117 it is illogical to try 
and understand it by relating it to a text from the classical period.118 D 45 1 36 could 
not have been referring to the Lex Secunda as these two texts are separated by 
hundreds of years. As is discussed below, a proper theoretical justification of the Lex 
Secunda would only emerge in canon law. 
It is also interesting to note at this stage that some glossators denied the remedy 
to the disadvantaged party if they knew the “true value” of the merx at the time of 
contract conclusion.119 In line with the maxim, quia scienti et violenti non fit iniuria, 
contracting parties who knew the value of the merx could hardly be said to have been 
defrauded.120 Whatever the case might have been in the Roman empire, even the 
earliest students of Roman law did not view the Lex Secunda as a remedy based 
solely on objective disparity in the value of the respective performances, but rather 
denied the remedy to those parties that freely consented to buying at an unfair price. 
2 4 2 Medieval canon law. 
2 4 2 1 Introduction to canon law 
Considering the weak foundation of the Lex Secunda, and how unconventional it 
was doctrinally, it may be questioned how it came to be that it was not only received 
into modern law, but was in fact greatly expanded during the Middle Ages.121 Why 
was it not cast off and abandoned like many of the other eccentricities contained in 
the Corpus Iuris Civilis? For this answer one must look towards canon law, where the 
idea of a fair price rule was held in higher regard than ever before or since. The 
survival of the iustum pretium rule is largely attributable to the fondness that canon 
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law, which was greatly attached to good faith, had for the doctrine of iustum 
pretium.122  
As noted above, the Lex Secunda was already expanded during the early 
medieval era to be available to both the buyer and the seller;123 to the sale of land as 
well as other immovables such as houses, and to movables;124 to contracts of sale, 
as well as all manner of analogous contracts,125 and to both bonae fidei and stricti iuri 
contracts.126 Since the Lex Secunda, originally encompassed a much narrower field 
of application, and referred to a specific rescript rather than to a legal principle, it was 
hardly appropriate to refer to the rule as such anymore. The fair price rule would from 
the beginning of the thirteenth century be referred to as the doctrine of laesio 
enormis, which literally means a “very large hurt”.127 This expansion of the Lex 
Secunda was nothing less in substance than an adoption of a general principle of 
proportionality of reciprocal performances.128 
2 4 2 2 Iustum pretium and the doctrine of restitution in canon law  
The views of the medieval theologians differed from that of the contemporary 
Romanists and the Canonists on the issue of just price. The Romanists and 
Canonists, who largely followed Roman law, believed that inadequacy of price which 
fell short of the threshold for laesio enormis did not invalidate a contract.129  
Theologians of the 12th and 13th century, however, adopted a far stricter approach. 
The doctrine of restitution developed by medieval theologians, held that every 
disturbance of the natural order had to be restored,130 and accordingly did not allow 
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contract price to diverge from the just price to the same extent; “divine law demanded 
restitution even if the mistake were a penny”.131  
The conventional view is that the doctrine of restitution was not meant to be 
applied to everyday life. The doctrine operated in terms of divine law (lex divina) and 
the laws applied to the celestial court (ius poli), and primarily found application in the 
forum internum, i.e. the realm of conscience,132 in contrast to laws applied by the civil 
court (ius fori) and the civil law or human law (lex humana), which were more 
generous in allowing parties to determine the price in everyday commercial 
practice.133  
Indeed it seems that in decisions dating to 1170 and 1208 CE, canon law courts 
still followed the position of the late Roman law; parties were free to determine the 
contract price as long as the disproportion between price and performance did not 
exceed the ratio or threshold of two to one used by the doctrine of laesio enormis.134 
This would progressively change through the course of the 13th century. A papal 
decree in 1204 by Innocentius III allowed judges to apply the doctrine of restitution 
directly through a special procedure in the forum externum.135 Versions of the 
doctrine were included no less than twice in the Decretum Gregorii IX (also referred 
to as the Liber Extra).136 Canon law judges were now able to provide far greater 
assistance to a prejudiced party through the doctrine of restitution than civilians could 
under the Lex Secunda.137  
This development is important because it presented a conundrum for medieval 
civilians. If they remained true to Roman law they would be able to grant relief to a 
prejudiced party in far fewer cases than the ecclesiastical courts. Faced with this 
challenge, civilian jurists purposefully misinterpreted Roman texts in order to provide 
protection to the prejudiced party and thereby “save the face” of Roman law.138 When 
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seeking relief in canon law, the point of departure was not to look as in Roman law, 
for an action that falls within one of the categories of actions, or procedures available 
to the prejudiced contracting party. Restitution in canon law was based on a divine 
law with universal application.139 
This allowed for a much more general and flexible scope of application that was 
able to offer restitution where the civil law could not do so.140 The extensive 
development, the expanding really,141 of the Lex Secunda during the Middle Ages,142 
and the transformation into a principle of proportionality, can thus be viewed in part 
as an attempt at competing for legitimacy with canon law.143 
Why was canon law so fond of the iustum pretium doctrine, and broadly speaking 
of restitution? This fixation has its roots in the seventh commandment, the command 
not to steal.144 Receiving anything more than one was due was a form of theft that 
theologians sought to avoid at all costs.145 Restitution in canon law refers to those 
situations in which a moral, and therefore sometimes also a legal duty, arises to 
return a thing.146 Theologians defined the recovery of equality in exchange, i.e. the 
recovery of an amount over or underpaid, as a form of restitution:147 One who did not 
make restitution to the true owner of what he took away, could not achieve penitence 
and the remission of his sin.148  
2 4 2 3 The development of the doctrine of laesio enormis by Thomas Aquinas and 
Albertus Magnus 
Despite the fact that the notion of a iustum pretium formed part of both Roman and 
Talmudic law,149 most modern studies of the iustum pretium doctrine inevitably centre 
                                            
139
 J Hallebeek The Concept of Unjust Enrichment in Late Scholasticism (1996) 20. 
140
 Decock Theologians 514-515; Hallebeek Unjust Enrichment 21; Hallebeek “De Iustum Pretium 
leer” in Historische Wortels 4. 
141
 See in this regard Hallebeek Unjust Enrichment 41-45. 
142
 In this regard see the discussion above at 2 4 2 2; Gordley & von Mehren Private Law 462; 
Zimmermann Obligations 262.  
143
 Hallebeek (2015) Fundamina 21; Hallebeek “De Iustum Pretium leer” in Historische Wortels 6. 
144
 Hallebeek Unjust Enrichment 19; Decock Theologians 514. 
145
 Decock Theologians 514. 
146
 Hallebeek Unjust Enrichment 19. 
147
 Decock Theologians 514. 
148
 514. 
149
 See above 2 3 3; see also Watson (1981) JLH.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
   28 
 
on the medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas.150 This might be because of the great 
influence Aquinas had on canon law, and the early modern scholastic tradition,151 
and also because he may have been the first to discuss certain questions regarding 
the nature of a just price at length.152  
Despite the influence attached to these ideas, Aquinas never developed a clear 
iustum pretium rule or doctrine.153 This has given rise to considerable confusion and 
debate about his views. The passages where Aquinas does deal with just price are 
scattered over his Summa Theologica, and his commentary on Aristotle’s 
Nichomachean Ethics. Depending on which passage is referred to, varying, and often 
contradictory, interpretations could arise.154 
The fragmented nature of his writing on just price has allowed some writers only to 
select those passages which are favourable to, or suitable for their theses.155 The 
argument whether Aquinas conceptualised the just price as an objective price based 
on production costs, or as a subjective market-oriented price based on fluctuations in 
scarcity and need, has been especially contentious. The former view has been 
espoused by some who wish to cast Aquinas as supporting a (Marxist) labour theory 
of value;156 and by others, who even today mischaracterise the medieval notion of a 
just price as a metaphysical or objective value inherent in a thing,157 in order to refute 
it more easily. As will become apparent later, the question on what should be the 
measure of a just price remains contentious to this day.158  
2 4 2 3 1 How Aquinas justified a iustum pretium rule 
The works of Aristotle on metaphysics, politics and ethics were rediscovered 
shortly before the birth of Aquinas, and had a monumental impact on the intellectual 
community in these fields, comparable to that of Darwin or Newton in the natural 
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sciences.159 The philosophy of Aristotle provided Aquinas and his contemporaries 
with the necessary principles, theories, and justifications to solve numerous problems 
posed by Roman law.160 
Aquinas attempted to follow Aristotle in classifying justice into several different 
types, the most important of which for our discussion is the category of commutative 
justice,161 which features prominently in Aquinas’s justification of a just price doctrine. 
Commutative justice is not concerned with redistribution of wealth, as this lies in the 
domain of distributive justice, which sought to ensure that everyone received their fair 
share of whatever wealth exists in society.162 Commutative justice, according to 
Aquinas is rather concerned with preserving the share of wealth which individuals 
owned. In exchange people should accordingly give something of equal value to 
what they receive, so as to not enrich or impoverish either party.163 
Aristotle argued that in a society based on the division of labour, the exchange of 
unlike goods between people of unlike professions becomes a necessity.164 The 
division of labour (and accompanying specialisation) inevitably leads to 
interdependence. Equality in exchange is essential to ensure the continued existence 
of such a society; if the shoemaker does not receive adequate value for his goods, 
he will have no incentive to continue producing shoes,165 but society would still 
require shoes. It is this conundrum that led Aristotle to propose his theory of “just 
reciprocation in the exchange of goods”. 
Aquinas following on the views of Aristotle argued that since contracts of 
exchange are established for the common advantage, they should observe equality 
of value in the things exchanged between the parties. To sell a thing for more than it 
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is worth, or to buy for less than it is worth, is therefore unjust and unlawful as it is 
contrary to commutative justice.166 
As a theologian, Aquinas also drew on divine authority to justify a fair price rule. 
He referred to the golden rule of the Gospel: “Do unto others what you would have 
them do unto you.”167 Since no-one wishes to pay an unfair price, one should 
therefore also not sell at an unfair price.168 Despite its religious origin, such a rule 
does not seem too far removed from the modern conceptualisation of a duty to act in 
good faith, at least to the extent that it requires mutual respect and consideration. 
Such a rule was also recognised by the Medieval civilians, who held as a general 
principle of good faith that there should be no deceit or overreaching.169 
2 4 2 3 2 How is a just price to be determined? 
Just reciprocation depends on some measure of value by which all things can be 
compared. For Aristotle this measure was “need” or “demand” (transliterated as 
“chreia”). The builder of a house satisfies a greater chreia than the shoemaker, and 
accordingly a house is worth more than a pair of shoes.170  
As the need for a certain thing might fluctuate depending on the circumstances, 
this conception of value can be considered subjective; as opposed to, for example, a 
conception of value which holds that all things have a certain intrinsic value.  
While Aristotle does not provide a wholly satisfactory answer as to how to convert 
the abstract principle of need into a concrete measure, Aquinas states that the device 
of money was invented to give a numerical representation for need.171 An exchange 
in line with the principle of reciprocation would therefore be an exchange where the 
respective performances satisfied a proportionally equal amount of chreia.  
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Aquinas and his mentor Albertus Magnus, following the arguments of Aristotle, 
also believed that human need (indigentia) was the measure of a thing’s value.172 
Aquinas also took the view that value does not come from the intrinsic quality of a 
thing, as it is impossible to divine an objective value solely from the properties of a 
thing.173 In turn the manifestation of need is preference (praeeligere), and as such 
“need” is in this context synonymous with “demand”.174 Albertus measured indigentia 
through the factor of utility (utilitas), i.e. how useful a thing was in satisfying a need.175  
Where Aquinas and Albertus did introduce new arguments was through adding a 
second basis for the measuring of value, namely the labour and expenses involved in 
the production of a thing.176 This added a more objective basis to the formerly 
subjective assessment of value. Depending on the subjective need for a thing, a 
common pair of shoes could (theoretically at least) have higher value than a house; 
but viewed more objectively, by taking into account the labour and expenses involved 
in the production of the respective things, it normally could not.  
Aquinas and Albertus adapted the reasoning of Aristotle to justify the inclusion of 
this second basis for value; arguing that members of society would only engage in 
trade if they were justly remunerated for labour and expenses incurred by them.177 
This does not necessarily mean that the just price and the cost of production had to 
be one and the same. Interpreted another way, this argument could simply mean that 
the market price for a thing should not permanently fall below the cost of 
production.178 
The importance attached by Aquinas to labour and expenses should be situated 
within the importance historically attached to these factors by the Christian church,179 
as well as the scepticism the church displayed towards traders and merchants in its 
early years.180 In his earlier work Aquinas at times comes close to stating that the 
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exchange of commodities should be based on the amount of labour expended on the 
respective articles.181 
Some scholars in the first half of the 20th century therefore argued that the second 
basis introduced by Aquinas, that of labour and expenses, was intended to subsume 
the first subjective basis.182 Much of this scholarship sought to characterise Aquinas 
as a type of proto-Marxist.183  
However, especially in his late writing, Aquinas expressed views clearly favouring 
the current price.184 The term “current price” should be understood as the price the 
merx would currently fetch in the market between willing buyers and sellers, at a 
certain time and place, under free and competitive conditions.185 Aquinas held, for 
example, that it was permissible to sell a thing for more than its worth, if both parties 
subjectively attached a higher value to a thing.186 By contrast, the buyer’s willingness 
to pay more, for example due to a pressing need, does not justify that the seller 
charges a higher price than the current price.187 Aquinas also admitted that the just 
price of a thing is not fixed, but depends on an estimate and therefore changes within 
a certain range or band.188 Albertus Magnus also favoured such a view, defining the 
just price as: “What goods are worth according to the estimation of the market at the 
time of sale.”189 
These views align much better with conception of a just price as a type of market 
price, and according to both Baldwin and De Roover logically exclude a theory of just 
price based exclusively on production costs.190 The consensus among more recent 
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scholars thus seems to be that Aquinas viewed the just price as the price which a 
good would currently be worth in the market.191 
So, if the market price is the just price, what would Aquinas consider an unjust 
price? It seems that those prices where the advantaged contracting party exploited a 
particular weakness of the disadvantaged party, a so called pretium affectionis, were 
considered unjust.192 This could include price induced by fraud, price discrimination, 
or monopoly profits.193 It has already been noted that the seller was not allowed to 
sell a thing for more than it was worth to him, so there was still an upper limit to the 
price he could ask.194 It has also been argued that a market price which falls 
permanently below the cost of production would be an unjust price, so there is a 
lower limit as well.195  
It can thus be inferred, rather unsatisfactorily to those wishing to place Aquinas on 
either side of the spectrum, that the just price of Aquinas was neither completely 
subjective (in the sense of being dependant only on the subjective estimation of a 
person as to the worth of a thing) nor objective (in the sense that the actual cost 
incurred were decisive, or that it was reliant in some intrinsic value), but rather 
something in between; it was determined with reference to several considerations, of 
which the main determinant was the market price.  
2 4 3 Towards the late scholastics and natural lawyers.  
2 4 3 1 Introduction  
During the 16th and 17th centuries a school of jurists situated in Spain made a 
conscious attempt to synthesise Roman law with the moral theology of Aquinas.196 
The different schools of medieval law thus came together with these Spanish late 
scholastics, and many fundamental concepts and doctrines of modern private 
contract law descend from the synthesis they achieved.197  
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The late scholastics found it easy to integrate Roman law with the idea of Aquinas 
that commutative justice required equality in exchange.198 Roman law already 
provided the remedy in the Lex Secunda, and, following the teaching of Aquinas, the 
scholastics argued that while the commutative justice required equality, pragmatic 
concerns dictated that only large deviations could be remedied.199 In addition to the 
arguments which they inherited from Aquinas, the late scholastics also justified the 
iustum pretium doctrine by way of the “do no harm” principle expressed in D 1 1 1-
1 1 3, which can be paraphrased as the intent to “give everybody his right, to do no 
harm (neminem laendere), and to live honestly.”200  
2 4 3 2 What did the late scholastics understand by a “just price”? 
Like their Romanist and theologian predecessors, the late scholastics by and large 
viewed the just price as the market price, free of collusion or artificial restriction of 
supply.201  
This is evidenced by the fact that prominent scholastics such as Leonard Lessius 
and Juan de Lugo justified and defended extremely liberal (and market-oriented) 
commercial practices, such as insider trading through use of the iustum pretium 
doctrine.202 In the case of a trader who had inside knowledge of the fact that a ship 
carrying spices to a town had sunk, Lessius held that he was not prohibited from 
using this insider knowledge to his advantage, by for example buying up all the spice 
in town at the current market price, and then selling it at a much higher price in 
future.203 While the merchant had profited by buying and selling at two different 
prices, he had done so both times at the prevailing market price, and thus at the just 
price.204 A fair price rule would also not have precluded a merchant from receiving 
great profits in the sale of his wares, if he were, for example, able to produce his 
wares at a rate much lower than the prevailing market price.205  
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These examples logically exclude the view that the just price is a function of the 
intrinsic value, or production costs of a thing, and also necessitate that modern 
scholars reassess the view that a market-oriented just price doctrine would 
necessarily impede free-market practices.206 The late scholastics also did not view 
the iustum pretium as a single discrete price, but rather believed that any price which 
fell within a certain range, reflecting the fluctuation of need and scarcity, could be 
considered just.207 Allowing a iustum pretium which fluctuates presents some 
difficulty with preserving strict equality in exchange. The scholastics might have taken 
a longer view, arguing that it does not matter if a contracting party recovered more or 
less in a particular transaction, as long as he normally, or eventually, recovered the 
just amount.208  
Writers such as the late scholastic Domingo de Soto also argued that factors such 
as the risk of destruction or devaluation borne by the contracting parties should be 
taken into account when determining the iustum pretium.209 Even if this risk did not 
materialise, a contracting party could gain a little with each transaction to 
compensate for the times when the risk does materialise and they stand to lose 
greatly.210 It is for the same reason that a merchant is allowed to sell his goods for 
much higher when their value increases due to an external event. While he profits 
from those times when their value increases, he also carries the risk of their value 
decreasing.211 
Lessius argued that discrepancies between the prevailing market price and the 
iustum pretium, which arose due to fluctuations caused by scarcity and demand, had 
to be tolerated as necessary evils, as these discrepancies were unavoidable in a 
market economy; in contrast, those discrepancies which arose due to one party 
taking advantage of another’s ignorance, or exploiting necessity or dire 
circumstances, did not have to be tolerated.212 Where such discrepancies could not 
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be tolerated, i.e. if they were not necessary, the public authority could intervene by 
imposing a just price.213 
2 4 3 3 Doubts about the authenticity of the Lex Secunda 
As has been noted above,214 late scholastics such as Arias Piñel were some of the 
first scholars to realise that the remedy in the Lex Secunda was an invention of post-
classical Roman law and thus not of classical origin.215 According to Piñel, the view 
that the Lex Secunda did not form part of classical Roman law, was against the 
prevailing opinion of all previous writers, and would have shocked the majority of late 
medieval scholarship.216 Piñel correctly surmised that the remedy in the Lex Secunda 
was unknown to the classical Roman jurists: the Corpus contains no method of 
assessing what constitutes an unjust price, lesion is not listed as a ground for 
rescission in D 18 5 (De rescindenda venditione), and does not appear as a remedy 
available to prejudiced parties anywhere else in the imperial constitution, or in other 
writings from the classical era.217 Not only did this dispel the doctrine of dolus re 
ipsa,218 but it also upended the scholarship surrounding the remedy and how it was 
viewed.219  
It has been noted above that medieval civilians studied the Corpus by analysing 
the relations between the texts.220 Once they realised that the Lex Secunda is a post-
classical invention, this changes how other texts should be interpreted. For example, 
due to the Lex Secunda, medieval scholars interpreted the famous passage in the 
D 4 4 16 4 to mean that parties were allowed to enter into harsh bargains, as long as 
the harm was moderate. Piñel was the first to realise that there was no such 
restriction, and that there would accordingly be no difference for the classical Roman 
jurist between prejudice of more or less than half of the fair price of the good.221  
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2 4 3 4 Should contracting parties be able to renounce the Lex Secunda? 
Piñel and other scholastics such as Luís de Molina, and Antonio Gòmes also 
introduced some novel arguments with regards to the application of the remedy. They 
argued for example that the remedy granted by the Lex Secunda could not be 
excluded contractually, since the same weakness which induces a contracting party 
to conclude a contract at an unjust price would induce them to include a term 
excluding the remedy.222 This is especially relevant in the modern contractual context 
where the remedy would simply be excluded in all standard term contracts.223 The 
late scholastics also argued that a party could not renounce the remedy at all if the 
prejudice were extremely gross (laesio enormissima).224 
2 4 3 5 Just price as the lawfully regulated price 
One aspect of the medieval theory regarding the doctrine of iustum pretium has 
been ignored thus far, but should be addressed before continuing. Medieval scholars 
identified just price as either the current market price, or as the lawfully regulated 
price set by the authorities.225 From a modern liberal economic perspective this might 
seem like a paradox; either the just price is a free-floating market price, or it is the 
centrally regulated price, but it cannot be both. This might not have been a 
contradiction in medieval economic practices. Gordley argues that in determining the 
just price the authorities were simply fixing or setting what they believed to be the 
current market price, taking into account need, scarcity, and the communis aestimatio 
of the buyers and sellers.226 While plausible, this argument assumes that authorities 
did not set the lawfully regulated price in order to achieve distributionist goals, which 
seems more likely than just the maintenance of the just price.227  
In contrast to price setting by the justly-constituted authorities, the late medieval 
theologians, civilians, and late scholastics were fiercely opposed to price setting 
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through monopolistic practices; since this would drive the monopolistic price above 
the competitive market price.228 
2 4 3 6 Conclusion 
The late scholastic view of the just price was clearly quite nuanced, containing 
many lessons even for a modern law of contract. Scholastic teaching and doctrine 
spread throughout Europe during 16th and 17th centuries, and as a consequence is 
clearly perceivable in the work of the 17th century northern natural law school.229  
The Roman-Dutch jurist Grotius in turn took over and popularized the teaching and 
doctrines of the late scholastics,230 and these doctrines would remain relatively 
unchanged in the work of his later successors such as Samuel Pufendorf and Robert 
Pothier.231 From there these doctrines would make their way into the civilian legal 
codes and common law case law.232 The influence of the scholastic writers on 
Grotius in general is well documented,233 and this applies specifically to the iustum 
pretium doctrine as well.234 Indeed all of the most important elements of the 
scholastic discussion on fairness in exchange seem to be carried forward by him.235 
In this way the work of the late scholastics has particular relevance for South African 
law of contract.236  
2 5 Roman-Dutch law  
For pragmatic reasons, this section focuses on the doctrine of laesio enormis in 
the law of the Netherlands of the 17th to 18th century, which formed part of the 
broader supranational “European system of law” termed the ius commune.237 Legal 
scholars of this era were closely connected, and formed part of a “single and 
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undifferentiated cultural unit”.238 Due to the near-universal use of Latin in continental 
European universities, and since courses were all based on the Corpus Iuris Civilis, 
scholars were able to move freely from institutions in one country to those in 
another.239 
The views of the Roman-Dutch institutional writers are especially important for this 
discussion due to the authority which the South African common law attaches to 
them. This is not to say that the views of other writers of the ius commune, such as 
Pothier or von Savigny are unimportant, as these writers would themselves become 
influential authorities in South Africa, both through their influence on the ius 
commune, and indirectly through their influence on the English common law.240 
Our study starts with Hugo de Groot, Latinised as Grotius, one of history’s most 
famous jurists, and arguably the most important of the Roman-Dutch jurists;241 and 
spans to Johannes Voet, not the last of the Roman-Dutch jurists, but the last great 
jurist who played a role in the synthesis of Roman law and the indigenous law of the 
Netherlands.242 Writing on laesio enormis was however not restricted to these two 
writers, nor was its application restricted to the province of Holland. In addition to 
Grotius and Voet, the doctrine is discussed for example, in the work of Schrassert for 
Gelderland; Groenewegen van der Made, and Van Leeuwen for Holland; Van 
Wassenaer for Utrecht, and Van der Sande for Friesland.243 
In time of Grotius, Aristotelean philosophy dominated the European intellectual 
landscape, both in the Catholic south and in the Protestant north.244 Loyalty to 
Aristotelean philosophy is perhaps the aspect of Grotius’ writing that marked him as a 
conservative intellectual, “nearer to being the last of the medieval writers than the first 
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of the moderns.”245 It is ironic that Aristotelean theory was starting to fall out of favour 
at the same time as the natural lawyers were disseminating the doctrines of the late 
scholastics.246 While Grotius hailed Aristotle as “deservedly holding the foremost 
place among philosophers”, contemporary modernisers such as Bacon, Descartes, 
and later Hobbes, expressly repudiated Aristotle.247 
Nevertheless, the doctrine of laesio enormis, forming part of the positive law, was 
largely maintained in the civilian legal systems until the late 18th and early 19th 
century.248 This was also the case in the Netherlands, where there was a fairly 
general reception of the doctrine, with a similarly broad application as espoused by 
the medieval civilians.249  
2 5 1 Introduction to the views of Grotius and Voet 
For natural lawyers such as Grotius, no contrast would have existed between 
giving effect to the will of the parties, and the regulation of the fairness of the 
contract.250 Viewed in terms of the teachings of Aquinas and Aristotle, each contract 
had its essence defined by the end which it served. In a contract of exchange, such 
as sale, it was inherent in the contract that equality in the value of what was given 
and received be maintained.251 The parties to the contract could only have intended 
to preserve equality, as would be evidenced by the type of contract which they chose; 
if they wished to enrich one of the parties they would have made a gift and not an 
exchange.252 Grotius makes as much clear when he states in his De Jure Belli ac 
Pacis that the principal act of a contract is that no more be exacted than is just,253 
and that in contracts of exchange this rule should be carefully observed,254 as it is not 
the ordinary intention of people to make a donation.255 This observation of Grotius, 
that parties to a (non-gratuitous) contract usually intend to make an exchange of 
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equal value, forms the basis of many modern arguments in support of a fair price 
rule.256 
Grotius explains further that any deviation from the just price is an injustice that 
should in principle be remedied,257 even where one of the parties was merely 
mistaken with regards to the price.258 However, as the law does not concern itself 
with trivial matters (minima), and in order to avoid a plethora of claims, the law only 
regulates sufficiently significant deviations or inequalities.259  
Grotius reached a similar conclusion in his Inleiding tot de Hollandsche Rechts-
geleertheyd260 (“Inleidinge”). He initially states that any performance which exceeds 
or falls short of the real value of the thing (rechte waerde) is to that extent lacking a 
reasonable cause.261 However, he then proceeds to argue that the law nevertheless 
grants legal force to such contracts due to pragmatic considerations: the precise 
value of a thing is difficult to ascertain, and endless litigation (that could ensue if all 
imbalanced contracts could be set aside) should be avoided.262  
Grotius notes further in Inleidinge that the development of a fair price rule was 
necessary in order to curb the avarice of merchants. Similar to Aquinas, he argues 
that since the origin of all agreements (handelinge) lies in respective abundance and 
scarcity, reason demands that there should be equality in exchange.263 Demanding 
strict equality would however deprive traders from making a profit. Trade functions to 
the benefit of society as a whole, as without it participants in the market would not be 
able to procure all manner of things. For their trouble and risk, and due to the 
constant fluctuation of prices associated with trade, the law allowed contracting 
parties to transact in whichever manner was most advantageous to them. In due 
course some contracting parties abused this freedom, acting with self-interest beyond 
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reason.264 For this reason the seller prejudiced ultra dimidium was afforded relief, first 
extended to the buyer, and later to other contracts (with the exception of judicial and 
testamentary sale), and contracts which were part sale and part donation.265  
The different rationales provided for in Inleidinge and De Jure Belli ac Pacis might 
be said to reflect the differing nature of the two books. While Inleidinge is usually 
considered a textbook reflecting the standing law of the Netherlands, De Jure Belli ac 
Pacis by contrast, is often said to reflect the views of Grotius as a natural lawyer.266  
Voet in turn justifies laesio enormis by stating that while parties are usually allowed 
to get the better of each other, this is not the case where it is clear that there has 
been great prejudice (laesio enormis) to one of the parties, as the matter is then said 
to involve fraud.267 Voet conceived of laesio enormis as a concretisation of the action 
arising from fraud.268 He argues that even in classical Roman law, before the advent 
of the Lex Secunda, unfairness which was plainly clear was remedied by a bonae 
fidei judicial proceeding. In his view, the scope of actions based on good faith was so 
broad in Roman law that the Lex Secunda introduced nothing novel except to provide 
a yardstick by which unfairness could be measured; where before this discretion had 
been left to the judge; it now provided relief based on a fixed ratio.269  
2 5 2 Scope and application of the remedy 
2 5 2 1 Who is entitled to the remedy? 
As has been noted above, the relief provided under the doctrine of laesio enormis 
had by the time of Grotius and Voet been greatly expanded.270 According to Grotius, 
it was on grounds of equity (billickheid), that the fair price rule was extended to the 
buyer who had paid more than twice the value of the goods (as opposed to the seller 
who has given less than half), and the was later extrapolated to contracts of hire, and 
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265
 23. 
266
 See De Groot & Neff War and Peace xix, xxiv. 
267
 Commentarius ad Pandectas 18 5 3; all translations of Commentarius ad Pandectas are taken from 
the translation and commentary of Gane: J Voet, J van der Linden, & P Gane The Selective Voet 
being the Commentary on the Pandects [Paris edition of 1829] and the Supplement to that Work by 
Johannes van der Linden (1955). 
268
 See the discussion of dolus ex re ipsa above at 2 4 1 2. 
269
 Commentarius ad Pandectas 18 5 4; see also Dias “Laesio Enormis” in Roman Law of Sale 47. 
270
 See 2 4 2 1 above.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
   43 
 
all other similar contracts.271 Voet argued that this rationale is greater for the remedy 
to be available to the buyer and not to the seller, as everyone can, and ought to know 
the value of that which they own, but not necessarily the value of things belonging to 
others.272  
2 5 2 2 What types of transactions were covered? 
Voet recognised that the remedy applies to all bonae fidei judicial transactions, 
which are bilateral in nature, and even to barter, as it was in his opinion similar to 
purchase.273 He noted however, that Roman law did not extend the remedy to loan 
for use, deposit, or stricti iuris contracts,274 but that custom extended the remedy to 
all contracts, since the distinction between stricti iuris and bonae fidei contracts had 
largely been abolished.275 Although the Lex Secunda had only been applicable to 
land, laesio enormis was also applied to movables in Roman-Dutch law. Voet 
contended, however, that the remedy should only apply to valuable movables.276 
2 5 2 3 How was the excess calculated? 
Voet differed from Grotius in how laesio enormis should be adjudged when it is 
applied to the buyer. Voet argued that laesio enormis was present where a thing 
worth 100 was bought for more than 150 (instead of 200 as would be advocated by 
the other writers).277 Voet argued that buying for more than 150 would lead to a 
similar prejudice as when a thing was sold for half its worth, i.e. for less than 50 
where it was worth 100. In both of these cases the difference between the contract 
price and the just price exceeds 50. Though Voet is supported in his opinion by 
Damhouder,278 the more conventional view as espoused by Grotius is probably 
correct.279 Like the seller who receives less than half of the value of the merx in the 
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purchase price, the buyer here receives less than half the value of his money in the 
merx.  
Voet states that since the question whether there was laesio enormis is a question 
of fact, the burden of proof lies on the party seeking relief.280 Voet denies the remedy 
to those who knew the true value of the good, and nevertheless sold it, or bought it, 
consciously incurring laesio enormis.281 A person who is knowingly wronged is 
deceiving himself and therefore can complain of no wrong.282 This is linked to Voet’s 
conception of laesio enormis as a type of fraud.283 One cannot be aware that fraud is 
occurring in a sale, and then later raise it as an exception.284 There might however be 
cases, where even though the seller knows the true value of a thing, he sells it 
because of dire necessity. Voet would deny the seller the remedy in this case, which 
has led to his view being criticised.285  
2 5 3 How is a just price to be determined? 
In discussing how the just price of a thing is to be determined, Grotius states that 
the most natural measure is indigentia, or the need for it.286 However, he cites the 
great value attached to pearls as an example that indigentia cannot be the sole 
measure of the value of a thing. Grotius favoured valuing things by the price which 
was usually offered or given for it. He also states however that account has to be 
taken of the labour and expenses involved in the production of a thing, and that the 
current price is not so fixed so as to now allow for some variance or discrepancy in 
the price.287  
Voet in turn states that the value of a thing should be determined not with 
reference to the private affection or subjective value, which one person attaches to it, 
but rather with reference to the quality, and the amount of earnings received from 
it.288 The value of the thing must be judged as it was at the time and place where the 
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contract was concluded, and not at the time that the action is brought.289 Voet wisely 
acknowledges that the price of a thing differs between different places and different 
times as the demand and supply of a certain thing changes.290 Both of these writers 
seem therefore to favour an understanding of just price that aligns with market price. 
2 5 4 The nature of the remedy  
As with the Lex Secunda, the advantaged party could avoid rescission of the 
contract if they were prepared to increase the selling price in the case of a prejudiced 
seller, or decrease the selling price in the case of a prejudiced buyer, to the just 
price.291 The effect of the remedy was to place the respective parties in the position 
they were in had no sale taken place, meaning that mutual duties of restoration arose 
regarding the delivered performances.292  
2 5 5 Just price and Calvinist commercial ethics 
There has in recent times been some dispute as to whether the position set out 
above was indeed the position in everyday Dutch trade practice and moral concerns, 
or whether this was only the “sophisticated law of learned Dutch scholars”.293 
Hallebeek has tried to show, however, that while the legal handbooks discussed 
above, and the more vernacular ethics handbooks written for merchants seem to 
contradict each other at first glance in relation to rules on fair price, this can be 
explained by the fact that these books tend to emphasise different aspects of the just 
price doctrine due to their differing purpose and standards.294 While the legal 
textbooks studied above followed the approach of the civilian doctrine of laesio 
enormis, Calvinist ethics textbooks advocated for the stricter standard of the forum of 
the conscience in accordance with the doctrine of restitution as espoused by 
medieval theologians.295 Both the legal and ethics handbooks seem therefore to 
advocate for a just price doctrine.  
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2 5 6 Conclusion 
Very few of the arguments and theories in support of a fair price rule mentioned by 
Grotius, Voet, or the writers of the broader ius commune are particularly novel. The 
three determinants of just price mentioned by Grotius had all been mentioned in 
medieval commentaries to Aristotle’s ethics, and in some form or another by Aquinas 
and his contemporaries.296 The theories of just price developed by the Roman-Dutch 
writers therefore seem to mainly be a continuation of earlier scholastic theories of just 
price.  
A second interesting point is that a general theory or justification for fair price rules 
seems to be lacking in the writing of the Dutch (and indeed French, and German) 
jurists of the 17th and 18th centuries. As is evident in the views of Grotius and Voet 
above, these writers usually did not go much further than stating in some form or 
another, that exchange requires equality.297 Pothier for example, while defending 
laesio enormis, wrote simply that “equity, in acts of commerce, consists in equality”. 
He nevertheless found it necessary to justify the remedy further by arguing that the 
gross disproportion was evidence of imperfection in the consent of the prejudiced 
party.298 This points to a change in the understanding of equality in exchange. As the 
Aristotelean ideas of commutative justice were disappearing from the reasoning of 
these writers,299 gross disproportion seems to change from being a reason in itself to 
set aside a contract, to merely being evidence of a procedural defect in the 
conclusion of a contract. This important line of thought will be pursued further in the 
next chapter. 
2 6 Conclusion: Towards the modern law of contract 
The iustum pretium rule underwent significant change in the Middle Ages, from a 
remedy meant to apply to a specific legal question, to a general rule or principle 
requiring equality in exchange.300 While this is in part due to the fondness which 
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canon law enjoyed for the doctrine,301 this development started well before canon 
law, and was continued afterwards in the civilian tradition.302 
This metamorphosis related to the form as well as the substance of the remedy. 
The same rules cannot necessarily apply to an exceptional remedy for the sale of 
land at undervalue, and to a general principle of equality in exchange.  
The glossators, ignorant of the exceptional nature of the Lex Secunda, and 
reading the Corpus Iuris Civilis as a unitary whole, interpreted the iustum pretium as 
the current market price in free competition. Not only was such an interpretation 
suggested by other Roman texts, but it was also the only possible way for them to 
interpret the remedy without invalidating thousands of transactions happening every 
day.303 While the original purpose of the remedy is unfortunately unclear, from the 
rebirth of Roman law throughout the Middle Ages and into the early modern age it 
was viewed as a remedy enforcing a market-oriented just price. This remedy was 
aimed at avoiding exploitation, weakness, price discrimination, fraud, and 
exceptionally harsh bargains,304 rather than at ensuring that things are sold for their 
inherent or objective worth. Even Aquinas, the disciple of Aristotle, whose theory of 
essences seemed to hint at an intrinsic worth in all things, viewed the iustum pretium 
as a market-oriented price.305  
Though the Romans left us with few clues as to the justification and application of 
the Lex Secunda, the fair price doctrine was meticulously discussed and expounded 
through the Middle Ages. Hardly a question could be conceived that was not 
discussed by the glossators, theologians, late scholastics, or writers of the ius 
commune. This does not mean there were definitive “right” answers to all of these 
questions. It was pointed out, for example that Voet and Grotius differ with regards to 
certain facets of the application of the remedy; such as what the nature of the relief 
is, or under what circumstances the remedy is available to the buyer. These 
questions are, however, not unanswerable. As becomes apparent in the next chapter 
                                            
301
 See 2 4 2 1. 
302
 See 2 4 1 1; see also 2 4 3 6. 
303
 Gordley Origins 65. 
304
 See for example Decock Theologians 602; F Monsalve “Economics and Ethics: Juan de Lugo’s 
Theory of the Just Price, or the Responsibility of Living in Society” (2010) 42 History of Political 
Economy 495 496, 515-516.  
305
 See Aquinas Summa Theologica 2 2 77 1; Baldwin (1959) TAPS NS 74. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
   48 
 
on the fate of laesio enormis in modern systems, there are many potentially 
meritorious approaches to enforcing a fair price rule. 
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CHAPTER THREE: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPT OF A FAIR 
PRICE OR IUSTUM PRETIUM 
3 1 Introduction 
The previous chapter gave an historical account of the origin and development of 
the fair price rule from its inception in Roman law, through the Middle Ages to early 
modern Roman-Dutch law. This chapter provides a comparative overview and 
analysis of how several modern legal systems approach equality in exchange, and 
more specifically substantive fairness in price. The aim of this comparative analysis is 
to provide a backdrop for the evaluation and critical analysis of the fair price rule in 
the subsequent chapters. Before moving on to the modern law of contract, it is 
necessary first to provide a brief overview of the falling out of favour which the fair 
price rule experienced during the 18th and 19th centuries. 
3 2 The decline and fall of the doctrine of laesio enormis 
Due to new philosophical schools that were emerging in the 17th and 18th century, 
philosophers and the educated elite increasingly rejected Aristotelean ideas such as 
the metaphysics of essences, and Aristotelean conceptions of the virtues of promise 
keeping, which underlay much of the contract law theory of the late scholastics.1  
According to the scholastics, parties entered into a certain contract through an 
exercise of their will, but the obligations of the contract were determined by the type 
to which it belonged.2 Natural lawyers, by contrast, argued that parties should be free 
to determine the content and obligations of the contract, in line with the concept of 
freedom of contract.3 Equality of exchange would accordingly no longer be viewed as 
one of the basic principles of contracts of exchange.4  
The concept of the will of the contracting parties featured so strongly in the writing 
of the European jurists of the 18th and 19th century that they were viewed as having 
developed a “will theory” of contract.5 The will of the parties was not a novel 
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consideration in contract law theory; it had been used by the scholastics in 
conjunction with other considerations such as the virtues of promise keeping, equality 
in exchange, and the essence of a contract. What was novel was that the will 
theorists almost exclusively spoke of the will of the parties as the basis for a 
contract.6  
The German jurist Christian Thomasius (1655-1728), a member of the natural law 
school, was at the forefront of the attack on laesio enormis.7 Thomasius published a 
dissertation in 1706 titled De Aequitate Cerebrina Legis Secundae de Rescindenda 
Venditione which was strongly critical of this doctrine on the basis that it violates the 
individualistic notion of freedom of contract.8 Thomasius argued that the contents of a 
contract depends only on the free will of the parties,9 and accordingly that no just 
price can exist outside of that agreed upon by the parties.10 He argued that for a just 
price to be possible, value would have to reside in the inherent qualities of a thing.11  
It is contentious how much of the scholastic doctrine of just price Thomasius 
understood. Gordley argues that Thomasius misunderstood the scholastic conception 
of equality in exchange, as the scholastics never argued for the just price to be based 
on some intrinsic or objective worth of a thing, but rather on the market price.12 
Thomasius’ invective against the doctrine of laesio enormis should also be viewed as 
part of the struggle against the authority of Roman law;13 an issue which cannot be 
discussed at length here, but which has received significant attention elsewhere.14 
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Nevertheless the arguments of Thomasius greatly impressed other natural lawyers 
of his era, such as the Prussian jurist Carl Gottlieb Suarez, who did not include laesio 
enormis when drafting the Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten of 
1794 (“Prussian Civil Code”),15 as well as the French jurist Théophile Berlier, who 
argued for its abolition in the French Code Civil.16 This position was followed by 19th 
century French and Belgian jurists such as Charles Demolombe and François 
Laurent,17 and Germans such as Wilhelm Endemann, leading to the abolition of the 
remedy in much of Germany.18 The doctrine forms part of the French Code Civil19 
but, like the Lex Secunda, is restricted to the seller of land.20 The doctrine never 
formed part of the English common law, where traditionally an agreement was 
e n f o r cea b le  wh e th e r  o r  no t  a d e qua t e  co n s id e ra t i on  wa s  g i ve n . 21 
The focus thus now shifts from the age of the ius commune, to the age of 
codification. Pioneering civil codes were adopted in France, Prussia, and Austria in 
the late 18th to early 19th century,22 and these were followed by the highly influential 
German Civil Code (“BGB”) that entered into force at the beginning of the 20th 
century.  
Discussing the treatment of equality of exchange in modern codified systems, as 
well as, by way of contrast, in the uncodified common law, would in turn hopefully 
contribute to evaluating and formulating proposals for the reform of the modern South 
African law of contract, which has retained uncodified civil law, and also has been 
influenced by English law. In this regard it may be especially significant to understand 
how some systems treat the relationship between the substantive unfairness 
associated with an excessive price, and problems with the formation of the contract, 
such as exploiting weakness or abuse of circumstances; as indicated, these have 
been familiar challenges in the civilian tradition.  
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3 3 German Law  
3 3 1 Introduction 
While it was never the intention of the drafters of the BGB, there is ample evidence 
to suggest that contracts in German law can today be voided almost exclusively on 
the basis that a gross disproportion exists between the values of the respective 
performances. To understand how and why this development occurred, one has to 
follow the developments in case law dealing with gross disproportion under § 138 (1) 
and (2) BGB.  
3 3 2 Historical Development  
As mentioned above,23 the ideas of Thomasius had a direct influence on the 
development of early modern German law. During the drafting of the Prussian Code, 
Suarez argued that the whole theory underlying laesio enormis had been cast in 
doubt by Thomasius and other legal scholars.24 The Prussian Code provided 
therefore that the objection that the price of a thing does not bear a relation to its true 
value is not in itself cause to invalidate a contract.25 However, in the adjoining 
provision, it was determined that if the disproportion was so great that the purchase 
price exceeded twice the value of the thing, mistake invalidating the contract could be 
presumed.26 Laesio enormis was also abolished in the German state of Bavaria in 
1861, and in Saxony in 1863, and as well as in general German commercial law by 
the Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch of 1861.27  
Due to the same liberal approach adopted by German jurists in the abolition of 
laesio enormis, the control of interest rates similarly fell out of favour in Germany 
during the latter half of the 19th century. By 1867, usury laws were abolished in the 
whole of Northern Germany.28 The idea was seemingly (and naively) to create a 
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regime of free competition, but this was not to be. Complaints about usurious 
practices increased during this period and it became clear that some form of control 
had to be reintroduced.29 By 1880 imperial legislation had made it a criminal offence 
to lend money at a rate which exceeded the customary rate of interest, where that 
rate was achieved through the exploitation of certain types of weakness in the other 
party.30 The scope of the legislation was extended to other bilateral contracts with a 
similar purpose in 1892, and then incorporated into the new BGB.31  
The drafting commission of the BGB had intended to abolish all forms of relief 
relating to excessive prejudice, in favour of adopting legislation in relation only to 
usurious interest rates.32 The second paragraph of § 138 BGB was however inserted 
by a committee of the Reichstag (after it had been rejected by the first and second 
drafting commission).33 The provision currently reads as follows: 
“§ 138 Sittenwidriges Rechtsgeschäft; Wucher 
(1) Ein Rechtsgeschäft, das gegen die guten Sitten verstößt, ist nichtig. 
(2) Nichtig ist insbesondere ein Rechtsgeschäft, durch das jemand unter Ausbeutung 
der Zwangslage, der Unerfahrenheit, des Mangels an Urteilsvermögen oder der 
erheblichen Willensschwäche eines anderen sich oder einem Dritten für eine Leistung 
Vermögensvorteile versprechen oder gewähren lässt, die in einem auffälligen 
Missverhältnis zu der Leistung stehen.” 
“§ 138 Transaction contrary to good morals; usury 
(1) A legal transaction which violates good morals is void.  
(2) A legal transaction is also void when a person takes advantage of the distressed 
situation, inexperience, lack of judgement ability, or grave weakness of will of another 
to obtain the grant or promise of financial advantages for himself or a third party that 
are obviously disproportionate to the performance given in return.”34 
3 3 3 Functioning of § 138 BGB 
§ 138 (1) BGB declares void contracts that are judged to be illegitimate on the 
basis of being contra bonos mores, which can be translated as contrary to good 
                                            
29
 Zimmermann Obligations 175; A similar experiment occurred in the 19
th
 century in England and the 
United states with the repeal of usury law, which lead to a similar result – a proliferation of 
loansharking practices, and an increase in poverty; see EA Posner “Contract Law in the Welfare State: 
A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to 
Contract” (1995) 24 JLS 283, 313. 
30
 Zimmermann Obligations 176. Dawson (1937) Tulane LR 48. 
31
 Zimmermann Obligations 176; Dawson (1937) Tulane LR 48. 
32
 Dawson (1937) Tulane LR 49. 
33
 See Dawson (1937) Tulane LR 49 as well as Gordley (1981) CLR 1626; A minor amendment of the 
provision occurred in 1976 in order to harmonise the terminology with that of the Criminal Code 
(Strafgesetzbuch). 
34
 Translation from Gordley & von Mehren Private Law 474.  
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morals, or more loosely as contracts that are illegal because they are against public 
policy.35 Despite the drafters of the BGB being aware of the dangers posed by wide 
discretion granted to judiciary by the provision, the provision was nevertheless 
included with the aim that the courts would further develop and concretise it.36 As will 
be outlined below, courts have indeed played a significant role in the development of 
the provision, but not always in the manner which the drafters might have anticipated. 
In contrast to the general prohibition of illegal contracts under § 138 (1) BGB, 
§ 138 (2) BGB is aimed at combatting a specific instance of a contra bonos mores 
contract, namely Wucher.37 While Wucher is usually translated as usury, the meaning 
of the term in Germany is broader than just taking excessive interest, but rather 
refers to the taking of excessive advantage.38 § 138 (2) BGB is usually said to 
contain an objective and subjective requirement in order for a contract to be set 
aside. There must be a striking objective disproportion in the respective 
performances of the contracting parties, and this disproportion has to be brought 
about by the exploitation of one of the listed deficiencies, namely a distressed 
situation, inexperience, lack of judgement, or grave weakness. The first requirement 
is said to look at objective disparity while the second requirement can be said to refer 
to procedural defects in the bargaining process.39  
In line with the general rule in German law, the party alleging illegality under § 138 
BGB bears the burden of proof in the dispute, both with regards to the objective and 
subjective requirements, although they might be assisted by special presumptions in 
the latter.40 
3 3 3 1 The procedural or subjective requirement of § 138 (2) BGB 
The subjective or procedural element of § 138 (2) BGB has posed quite a 
challenge due to the fact that these subjective elements of weakness are usually 
                                            
35
 See BS Markesinis, H Unberath, & A Johnston The German Law of Contract: A Comparative 
Treatise 2 ed (2006) 24. It should be noted that this provision fulfils a different function to § 134 BGB, 
which declares contracts that violate a statutory provision illegal. 
36
 24, 248. 
37
 Zimmermann Obligations 176. 
38
 Gordley & von Mehren Private Law 474. 
39
 Markesinis et al Law of Contract 250. 
40
 C Armbrüster in FJ Säcker, R Rixecker, H Oetker, & B Limperg (eds) Münchener Kommentar zum 
Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch 7 ed (2015) (“MüKo”) § 138 [168]; JE du Plessis “Illegal Contracts and the 
Burden of Proof” (2015) 132 SALJ 664 669.  
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interpreted by the courts in a very narrow fashion.41 The terms “grave weakness of 
will” and “lack of judgement” have for example been taken to refer to quite serious 
defects, which, while not necessarily amounting to pathological conditions, should 
border on a lack of capacity.42 Courts have also ruled, for example, that the 
inexperience of the disadvantaged party must relate to commercial practice in 
general, and not specifically to the transaction in question.43  
In adjudicating whether a person was in a distressed situation (Zwangslage) 
German courts historically applied a similarly strict test.44 So for example, a 
disadvantaged contracting party who entered into a prejudicial agreement in order to 
secure a loan, was deemed by the court to not be in a distressed situation since he 
otherwise owned assets which he chose not to sell.45 The courts have similarly 
refused the remedy where contracting parties needed money, but could otherwise 
have secured a loan.46 While German courts today do not require that the 
Zwangslage should threaten the economic existence of the disadvantaged 
contracting party, they do require that disadvantaged parties should find themselves 
in a situation of serious distress.47 
Some courts have also required that the advantaged party must have knowingly 
abused the enumerated weakness of the disadvantaged party,48 or that he must have 
obtained his benefit in a manner which is reproachable.49  
Courts therefore became quite dissatisfied with the procedural requirement of 
§ 138 (2) BGB as it was viewed as being too confining, leading to the courts 
sometimes attempting to circumvent the requirement.50 The simplest way in which 
courts have done this, was to infer from the objective disproportion in the value of the 
                                            
41
 Markesinis et al Law of Contract 251. 
42
 See Markesinis et al Law of Contract 251; BGH NJW-RR 1988, 763, 764. 
43
 Markesinis et al Law of Contract 251; see OLG Hamm NJW-RR, 1993, 628, 629. 
44
 See the cases of the Reichsgericht at the turn of the 20
th
 century discussed in JP Dawson 
“Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version” (1976) 89 HLR 1041 1056-1058.  
45
 RG, 20.05.1916 reported in Warneyers Jahrbuch der Entscheidungen Ergänzungsband (1916) case 
no 195, p 311; see Dawson (1976) HLR 1058. 
46
 RG, 30.04.1914 reported in Seufferts Archiv 69 (1914) no 232, p 436; see Dawson (1976) HLR 
1057. 
47
 Armbrüster in MüKo § 138 [149]. 
48
 See BGH NJW 1994, 1275-1276. 
49
 IH van Loo Vernietiging van Overeenkomsten op Grond van Laesio Enormis, Dwaling, of Misbruik 
van Omstandigheden LLD Thesis, Open Universiteit (2013) 274. 
50
 Gordley (1981) CLR 1630. 
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respective performances that the disadvantaged party did in fact suffer from one of 
the weaknesses at the time of the conclusion of the contract.51  
3 3 3 2 The development of § 138 (1) BGB to combat inequality in exchange  
Much more significantly, however, where an absence of clear proof of one of the 
enumerated weaknesses was present, courts preferred to side-step § 138 (2) BGB 
altogether, by finding the contract itself to be contrary to good morals (gute Sitten) 
under the much more open § 138 (1) BGB.52  
This occurred first in 1921 in a case before the Reichsgericht,53 where the court 
determined that despite there being no evidence of the lessee being in special 
difficulty when the contract was concluded, the fact that he entered so easily into an 
unusually onerous contract indicates indiscretion, the inability to appreciate the 
consequences of the contract, and a lack of reflection.54 The court concluded that 
even though a contract cannot be avoided solely due to objective disproportion under 
§ 138 (2) BGB, other circumstances alone, or in combination with such a 
disproportion, may indicate that a transaction is immoral and therefore void under 
§ 138 (1) BGB.55 This judgment opened the door for courts to circumvent the 
subjective requirement of § 138 (2) BGB by avoiding the contract under 
§ 138 (1) BGB. 
The question then became what exactly is needed, in addition to a striking 
disproportion, to invalidate a contract in terms of this provision.56 This was answered 
in another case before the Reichsgericht in 1936,57 where the court found that the 
advantaged party needed to display such a reprehensible character that the juristic 
act as a whole, when considering its content, motive, and purpose, offends against 
good morals.58 The advantaged party can display such a reprehensible character or 
attitude either through deliberate exploitation of the weaker economic position of the 
other party, or through gross negligence, by not realising that the disadvantaged 
                                            
51
 Gordley (1981) CLR 1647; Zimmermann Obligations 268. 
52
 See Gordley & von Mehren Private Law 475. 
53
 RGZ 103, 35, 37. 
54
 See Gordley & von Mehren Private Law 475. 
55
 See 476. 
56
 § 138 (2) BGB would be superfluous, if nothing else were required; see Gordley (1981) CLR 1630. 
57
 RGZ 150, 1, 2. 
58
 See Gordley & von Mehren Private Law 477. 
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party entered into the contract due to his dire circumstances.59 The advantaged party 
therefore acts in a negligent fashion by not taking into account the interests of the 
other party, and by not preventing the gross disparity from arising.60  
This position is so dominant today that in cases where lower courts have applied 
the more stringent criteria of § 138 (2) BGB, the BGH have overturned their 
judgments on the basis that where it is possible, the lighter requirements of § 138 (1) 
BGB should be applied.61 These decisions have therefore blurred the line 
considerably between § 138 (1) and (2) BGB.  
3 3 3 3 Displaying a “reprehensible character” 
This additional requirement under § 138 (1) BGB, of displaying a reprehensible 
character has also been watered down considerably. Courts have often been 
prepared to infer some circumstance indicating weakness, or exploitation thereof, 
from the objective disparity in the value of the respective performances, to the extent 
that the requirement of showing a reprehensible character has been called a fiction,62 
and without any practical significance.63 Courts will often assume intent or negligence 
on the part of the advantaged party, who very rarely succeeds in showing that he was 
not negligent.64  
Some courts have gone as far as to argue that if an especially gross disproportion 
exists (besonders grobes Missverhältnis), as opposed to just a strikingly gross 
disproportion (auffälliges Missverhältnis), the disparity would be enough per se to 
void the contract.65 However, the more general position seems to be that once an 
especially gross disproportion has been proved, a rebuttable presumption 
(Vermutung) arises that the advantaged party has displayed a reprehensible 
character,66 which, as noted above, is difficult to rebut.67 Like any presumption, it 
                                            
59
 Zimmermann Obligations 269. 
60
 Van Loo Vernietiging 273. 
61
 Van Loo Vernietiging 274-275; see BGH, NJW 1985, 3006, 3007, especially para 4.  
62
 Markesinis et al Law of Contract 254; Zimmermann Obligations 269.  
63
 Gordley (1981) CLR 1631, 1649; Van Loo Vernietiging 273. 
64
 Gordley (1981) CLR 1631; Van Loo Vernietiging 275. 
65
 Zimmermann Obligations 269; Van Loo Vernietiging 275; see OLG Stuttgart, NJW 1979, 2409.  
66
 See Armbrüster in MüKo § 138 [116]. 
67
 Van Loo Vernietiging 275. 
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assists the prejudiced party in proving the reprehensible character, but does not 
prove it by itself.68 
Courts have even granted relief in cases where the only signs of weakness were, 
respectively; that the print was small, that the language was unclear, that the monthly 
and not the yearly interest rate was provided, or that the disadvantaged party needed 
money urgently.69  
3 3 3 4 The role of the presumption of a reprehensible character 
This presumption that the advantaged party has displayed a reprehensible 
character will arise customarily in certain types of contracts, especially those between 
professionals and consumers, where the courts assume that the consumer is in a 
structurally weaker position.70 Examples include consumer credit contracts,71 or 
contracts for the purchase of immovable property, or financial lease agreements.72 
This differs for example from business-to-business contracts, such as commercial 
lease or rental agreements. In these cases the presumption will typically not arise, in 
part due to the difficulty involved in proving that it was possible for the advantaged 
party to know of the existence of the gross disproportion,73 and in part due to the fact 
that the prejudiced party is a commercial party and therefore presumably in less need 
of protection.74  
There are some indications that this presumption does not function as strongly as 
it used to, and there are many examples in practice of how this presumption can be 
rebutted.75 One of these is to show that despite the disproportion the disadvantaged 
party accepted the contract due to a special affection for the merx (besonderes 
Affektionsinteresse).76 The presumption can also be rebutted by showing that the 
disadvantaged party was entirely indifferent towards the contract price.77 This is 
typical in situations where a contracting party is so wealthy that he displays a 
                                            
68
 Armbrüster in MüKo § 138 [116]. 
69
 See Gordley (1981) CLR 1648. 
70
 Markesinis et al Law of Contract 254. 
71
 Markesinis et al Law of Contract 255; see BGH, BGHZ 128, 255, 257. 
72
 Armbrüster in MüKo § 138 [116]. 
73
 [116]. 
74
 [116]. 
75
 Armbrüster in MüKo § 138 [116]; see BGH, NJW 2001, 1127, 1129.  
76
 Van Loo Vernietiging 276. 
77
 BGH, NJW 2001, 1127, 1129; Van Loo Vernietiging 276-277. 
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complete disinterest towards the contract price because money is no object. A further 
ground for rebuttal of the presumption exists where there has been a mutual mistake 
with regard to the value of the merx.78  
It is not required under § 138 (1) BGB that the advantaged party should have been 
aware of the disproportion,79 and conversely it is not enough for the advantaged party 
to allege that he was unaware of the disproportion in order for the presumption to be 
rebutted.80 It is required however that the advantaged party should have been able to 
find out about the disproportion.81 Accordingly, the application of § 138 (1) BGB can 
be negated by proving that there was no way for the advantaged party to discover 
the disproportion in the value of the performances.  
The presumption will not be rebutted, however, merely by proving that the 
disadvantaged party was aware of the disproportion, and it cannot be inferred from 
this alone that the disadvantaged party acted freely in concluding the contract.82 An 
example of such a situation might be a contract concluded while the disadvantaged 
party was in a distressed situation. The fact that they knowingly assent to an 
exploitative price cannot be used to prove that they freely assented to the contract.  
3 3 4 Calculating the disproportion: A flexible approach  
What is considered to be a striking or manifest disproportion (auffälliges 
Missverhältnis) and in relation to what is it calculated? The general rule is that the 
market price is used as a measure for what is appropriate.83 The disproportion is 
measured in relation to objective market value, and not the subjective value attached 
to it by one of the parties.84 The value of performances is always measured at the 
date of the conclusion of the contract.85 There is no fixed ratio according to which this 
                                            
78
 Van Loo Vernietiging 276-277; see BGH, NJW 2001, 1127, 1129. 
79
 Armbrüster in MüKo § 138 [116]; see BGH, BGHZ 146, 298, 303. 
80
 Armbrüster in MüKo § 138 [116]. 
81
 [116] 
82
 Armbrüster in MüKo § 138 [116]; BGH, NJW 2010, 363, 364 para f; this is an important difference 
between the approach followed in Germany, and that followed in Austria and Louisiana.  
83
 Armbrüster in MüKo § 138 [113]; Markesinis et al Law of Contract 248; Dawson (1976) HLR 1063; 
Van Loo Vernietiging 265. 
84
 Armbrüster in MüKo § 138 [114]. 
85
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disproportion is measured; what is appropriate should be decided on a case by case 
basis before the courts.86  
Nevertheless the courts being influenced quite strongly by the doctrine of laesio 
enormis often make use of the classical (2:1) ratio as a guideline.87 A price that is 
more than double, or less than half, of the market price is usually considered an 
especially gross disproportion (besonders grobes Missverhältnis).88 The BGH has in 
the past been criticised for blurring the distinction between a gross disproportion, and 
an especially gross disproportion by using the terms in conjunction, or 
interchangeably.89 It has recently clarified however that an auffälliges Missverhältnis 
exists where the difference between performance and counter-performance is 
significant, but still falls short of a besonders grobes Missverhältnis.90 In the case in 
point the court accepted that a disproportion of between 57.59% and 62.36% 
(depending on how it was calculated) fell short of a besonders grobes Missverhältnis, 
but still constituted an auffälliges Missverhältnis.91 Where necessary the value of the 
disproportion is determined with the aid of an expert.92 In summation, a price that is 
more than double, or less than half the market price is usually considered a 
besonders grobes Missverhältnis, anything short of that but still striking is considered 
an auffälliges Missverhältnis. This leaves us with little indication of the minimum 
disproportion that must exist, however, in order for the objective requirement to be 
satisfied. 
Because § 138 BGB, in contrast to the classical doctrine of laesio enormis, does 
not make use of a fixed threshold beyond which the disparity in the value of 
performances is considered striking or manifest, the application of the guidelines 
discussed above usually varies according to the surrounding circumstances, the type 
of contract, and the nature of the parties. So for example in contracts for the lease of 
residential housing, a rental price that exceeds the market price by more than 50% 
has been declared illegal, while for commercial lease contracts the benchmark is 
                                            
86
 Zimmermann Obligations 176. 
87
 Van Loo Vernietiging 269. 
88
 Armbrüster in MüKo § 138 [114]; Zimmermann Obligations 268; BGH, NJW 1992, 899, 900; BGH, 
NJW 2000, 1487, 1488.  
89
 Armbrüster in MüKo § 138 [114] n 661. 
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 Armbrüster in MüKo § 138 [114]; BGH, BGHZ 160, 8, 16. 
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exceeding the market price by 100%.93 For real-estate transactions the BGH 
assumes that an especially gross disproportion exists when the contract price 
exceeds the value of the merx by 90%.94  
The flexible nature of this approach allows the BGH to apply the remedy in cases 
where it is difficult to determine the exact value of performance; most prominently 
cases involving an element of chance.95 
The BGH has also in the past looked not only at the prejudice suffered by the 
disadvantaged party in terms of the contract price versus the market price, but also in 
absolute terms, so as to be able to compare the prejudice to other measures, such as 
for example, the average German monthly income.96  
3 3 5 Effect of § 138 BGB 
A contract found to be usurious is void (nichtig).97 Obligations assumed thereunder 
are unenforceable,98 and performances already performed are to be returned in 
terms of the rules of unjustified enrichment in accordance with § 812 BGB. But 
German Courts assume the power to substitute a fair price in some cases, instead of 
declaring the contract void. So for example in terms of lease agreements courts will 
often substitute the excessive price with a market price.99 The illegality of a contract 
deemed to be usurious under § 138 BGB carries severe consequences for the 
advantaged party. He can for example be held liable for any damages caused by his 
illegal conduct,100 and would in some cases be at risk of not being able to claim back 
the value of his performance at all.101  
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 Markesinis et al Law of Contract 248; T Ackermann & J-U Franck “Validity” in S Leible & 
M Lehmann (eds) European Contract Law and German Law (2014) 167 215; BGH, BGHZ 135, 269-
270. 
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 Armbrüster in MüKo § 138 [114]; BGH, NJW 2014, 1652.  
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 Van Loo Vernietiging 272; see for example BGH, NJW 1985, 3006, in which a 77-year old 
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house free of charge until her death; see similarly BGH, NJW 2001, 1127.  
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 Van Loo Vernietiging 270; see BGH, NJW-RR 1998, 1065. 
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Richterliches Moderationsrecht oder Totalnichtigkeit PhD Thesis University of Hamburg (1979); H Kötz 
European Contract Law 2 ed (transl G Mertens & T Weir, 2017) 117. 
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 Compare and contrast: Dawson (1937) Tulane LR 50, 54 and Dawson (1976) HLR 1056 n 31, 1068. 
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 Markesinis et al Law of Contract 250. 
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3 3 6 Conclusion 
Though it was clearly not the intention of the drafters of the BGB, and even though 
the BGH rejected such an approach in 1981,102 and in recent judgments reiterated 
the position that the requirement of a reprehensible character is indispensable,103 it 
seems that German law is moving closer to the position where, by itself, gross 
disproportion (grobes Missverhältnis) is indeed enough for the contract to be 
invalid.104 In outcome, if not in form, this seems to resemble yet another revival of the 
doctrine of laesio enormis.105  
We have also seen that application of § 138 (1) and (2) BGB is both flexible and 
far-reaching. German courts have also shown themselves as willing in some 
instances to complete contracts on behalf of the parties, such as in the case of a fair 
rental price being substituted into a contract. Where necessary, the courts have also 
adapted the remedy through a purposive interpretation of the open norm found in 
§ 138 (1) BGB. 
3 4 Austrian law 
3 4 1 Introduction  
Unlike in Germany, there was no attempt to abolish laesio enormis during the 
codification of the Austrian Civil Code (“ABGB”). Among the civil codes compiled 
during the 19th century, the ABGB went the furthest in its incorporation of the doctrine 
of laesio enormis.106 There were suggestions that the scope of application should be 
restricted to contracts of sale, or only to goods worth more than a certain amount.107 
Ultimately, however, laesio enormis was included with a broad scope of application, 
but with a number of exceptions.  
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 See BGH, NJW 1981, 1206 para b, where the BGH rejected the judgment in OLG Stuttgart, NJW 
1979, 2409 that an especially gross disproportion is enough by itself to void a contract, noting that this 
would otherwise amount to a reintroduction of the doctrine of laesio enormis.  
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 See Armbrüster in MüKo § 138 [116]; BGH, NJW 2010, 363, para 6.  
104
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§ 934 ABGB allows a prejudiced party to avoid a bilateral contract if the prejudice 
suffered is equal to more than half of the value of his own performance. The provision 
reads:  
“If in a bilaterally binding contract one party receives consideration equal to less than one-
half of what he has given, based upon common value, such party may demand the 
rescission of the contract and the restitution of the status quo. The other party, however, 
may preserve the contract provided he makes up the deficiency, according to the common 
value. The disproportion of the value is to be determined as of the moment when the 
contract was made.”108 
Although § 935 ABGB determines that the remedy cannot be excluded 
contractually, the provision excludes the application of the remedy in a number of 
situations:  
“[The application of § 935 ABGB cannot be excluded contractually; it is nevertheless not 
applicable when someone has declared that] the property is accepted at an extraordinary 
valuation for personal reasons;109 where a party knowing the real value has nonetheless 
consented to the disproportionate valuation; where it can be presumed from the 
relationship between the parties that they intended to conclude a mixed contract 
consisting of both onerous and gratuitous obligations; where the real value can no longer 
be ascertained; and, lastly, where the property has been sold by the court in public 
auction.”110  
Austrian law does, however, contain a second rule that can be said to function as 
a fair price rule. While § 934 ABGB avoids contracts solely on the basis of objective 
discrepancy, § 879 (2)4 ABGB declares contra bonos mores, grossly 
disproportionate contracts that are concluded through exploiting the strained financial 
situation, lack of experience, or excited state of mind of the disadvantaged party.111 
§ 879 (2)4 thus functions in a relatively similar fashion to § 138 BGB.112 This part of 
the current study focuses on § 934 ABGB, but it is important to keep § 879 (2)4 in 
mind, as it can be applied in many of the situations where § 934 ABGB is explicitly 
excluded, and where the disproportion is striking, yet falls below 2:1.113 
                                            
108
 The translation is from PL Baeck The General Civil Code of Austria (1972) 179. 
109
 Baeck translates besonderer Vorliebe as “personal reasons“. This might be better understood as a 
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110
 The translation is from Baeck Civil Code of Austria 179. The first sentence of the provision has 
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111
 See R Bollenberger in H Koziol, P Bydlinski, & R Bollenberger (eds) ABGB Kurzkommentar 5ed 
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An amendment to § 935 ABGB in 1979 prohibited the exclusion of the remedy of 
laesio enormis by express waiver. Prior to the amendment, a term waiving the 
remedy was in practice included in almost all standard term contracts. The remedy 
was therefore hardly ever applied.114 Since then it has become a powerful remedy, 
especially in the field of consumer protection.115 § 351 of the Austrian 
Unternehmensgesetzbuch (Code of commercial law), which enjoys preference over 
the general rule, determines that the application of § 934 ABGB can be excluded in 
commercial contracts, but only to the disadvantage of the commercial party. In this 
case it will accordingly only be available to the consumer.116 
3 4 2 Calculating the disproportion: A fixed ratio 
The value of the respective performances is estimated with the help of an expert 
(Sachverständige), even in matters where the performance itself is not expensive.117 
A geometric method is used to calculate whether lesion is present, whereby the 
relation between the two performances is measured. The seller is prejudiced if for a 
thing worth 10 Euro, he receives less than 5; the buyer is prejudiced if, for a thing of 
the same value (i.e 10 Euro), he pays more than 20 (and not only more than 15 as 
the argument of Voet118 would have it).119  
§ 934 ABGB speaks of a disproportion between the value of the merx (gemeiner 
Wert) and the value of the performance. The value of a thing, according to § 304 
ABGB, is generally its price,120 and if a court is called upon to estimate the value of a 
thing it should be expressed by way of an amount in money. According to case 
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 Baeck Civil Code of Austria 179; W Posch Contract Law in Austria (2015) 98. 
115
 Posch Contract Law in Austria 98 n 299; Art 4:109 PECL, Comment 3.  
116
 This provision formerly determined that any person who engages in a commercial transaction 
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law,121 and the majority of modern academic writing, the value of a thing should be 
measured by its market price.122  
The onus of proving that the disproportion (Missverhältnis) between the 
performance and the value of the goods is more than one half lies with the party 
raising laesio enormis.123 The value of the respective performances is to be 
measured as they were at the time of contract conclusion.124  
3 4 3 Scope of application of the remedy  
§ 934 ABGB is a general contractual remedy, and as such can be applied broadly, 
not only to contracts of sale, but also to contracts for the provision of a service, and 
other bilateral contracts.125 Expressly excluded from the application of the remedy are 
(out of court) settlement agreements,126 and goods whose real value cannot be 
determined.127 Examples of the latter might be where the (non-generic) merx has 
been adapted or destroyed after the conclusion of the contract; or cases where no 
market exists for the merx and accordingly it is impossible to ascertain the value 
thereof, such as a painting by a yet unknown artist,128 or where a monopoly is held in 
a certain market.129  
3 4 3 1 Contracts containing an element of chance 
Further excluded from the operation of § 934 ABGB are contracts which contain 
an element of chance, so called Glücksverträge.130 A contract is considered to be a 
Glücksvertrag when the benefit that is stipulated for is of a still uncertain or 
speculative nature.131 There is some debate as to whether such contracts should be 
                                            
121
 See recently OGH 30.6.2005, 3 Ob 324/04z. 
122
 Winner Wert und Preis 49; F Bydlinski Privatautonomie und objektive Grundlagen des 
verpflichtenden (1976) 154; M Hinteregger “Contracts” in C Grabenwarter & M Schauer (eds) 
Introduction to the Law of Austria (2015) 59 67.  
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 P Bydlinski in Kurzkommentar § 934 [1].  
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125
 Van Loo Vernietiging 216. 
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 § 935 ABGB. 
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 See Winner Wert und Preis 57 for a discussion of the case of OGH 6 Ob 187/99i. In this case 
educational training had been provided to become a master in the slightly unconventional Japanese 
stress relieving technique of “Reiki”. Due to the monopoly in the provision of training for this art form 
no comparison was available as to its value.  
130
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excluded where it is clear that despite some element of chance being present, the 
value of the respective performances are patently unequal nevertheless.132 So for 
example the Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof or “OGH”) has ruled that, 
despite the aleatory nature of lifetime annuities,133 which pay out on a regular basis 
until the date of a person’s death, § 934 ABGB could be applied in such cases.134 
The courts have taken the approach that the value of the annuity could be estimated 
with the use of actuarial tables, and as such is ascertainable.135 In an interesting 
case before the Viennese High Court (Oberlandesgericht or “OLG”), regarding the 
estate of a deceased man who had sold a house to his second wife in exchange for a 
lifetime annuity, the court found that the sale had impoverished the estate beyond the 
threshold of laesio enormis, and accordingly set it aside.136 
3 4 3 2 Intention to donate 
Further excluded from the remedy are so called “mixed contracts”, where the 
intention of the contracting parties is part onerous and part gratuitous. An example of 
such might be a sale at a very high price with the intention that the excess is a partial 
donation.137 The difference in this case between the renunciation of the remedy 
(which is prohibited), and a mixed contract, is that in the latter case it should be clear 
from the intention of the parties that they have concluded a different type of contract 
altogether in which an element of charity is inherent.138 The intention to donate needs 
to be inferred from the relationship between the parties. Such an intention is for 
example often inferred by the courts from contracts between family members.139 Not 
all contracts between family members include such intent, however, and such intent 
is not restricted to familial contracts either. Courts do not attach great weight to 
generic clauses stating any excessive amount above the value of the counter-
performance to be a donation.140  
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 Van Loo Vernietiging 217. 
133
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This is apparent from a case before the OGH141 which concerned a contract for 
the sale of an immovable property between two related parties (a niece and her 
aunt). The contract included a term stating that: “should the agreed-upon counter 
performance not correspond to the true value of the contractual real estate shares, 
then it is agreed that a donation to such an extent is at hand, which is accepted with 
gratitude by the buyer. The seller renounces any remedy or right to recover the 
donation on any ground whatsoever.”142 The court in this case found that there was 
indeed an intention to donate, but based this finding not on the abovementioned 
clause, but rather on the documentary evidence submitted to the court proving that 
there had been a strong and friendly relationship between the two parties.143 
3 4 3 3 Personal affection 
§ 935 ABGB further excludes from the operation of the remedy in the situation 
where a contracting party declares that he accepts the extraordinary value of the 
merx due to personal affection (besondere Vorliebe). To some this might seem to 
fulfil a similar function as the erstwhile, but now prohibited, waiver or renunciation of 
the remedy.144 In case law Austrian courts have excluded the application of the 
remedy on a number of occasions where, although the besondere Vorliebe was not 
explicitly declared by the prejudiced party, the court inferred it from the circumstances 
of the conclusion of the contract.145 
On the other hand, the mere declaration that an extraordinary price is accepted for 
personal reasons, for example in the form of a standard term to this effect would not 
suffice.146 This would be too similar to the abovementioned renunciation of the 
remedy, and would be lacking in credibility. Per definition, a besondere Vorliebe does 
not lend itself readily to generalisation.147  
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 OGH 14.4.1998 6OB518/88. 
142
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3 4 3 4 Knowledge of the true value and mistake 
Lastly § 935 ABGB excludes the remedy where a party knowing the real value of 
the merx has nonetheless consented to the disproportionate price. Such exclusion 
seems rather reasonable. Why should the provision protect a party who knowing the 
true value of a good or service nevertheless sells it at a considerable undervalue, or 
vice versa?  
One answer could be that there are situations where parties are forced by their 
circumstances to engage in transactions while knowing full well that such a 
transaction is disadvantageous. Parties could be coerced to sell a good at 
considerable undervalue because they are in dire need of money, or may have no 
other alternative to purchase a necessary good, even at a extortionate price. These 
aspects do not need to be discussed here as Austrian law, similarly to German law, is 
able to provide relief to disadvantaged parties in these cases through declaring such 
contracts contra bonos mores under § 879 (2)4 ABGB. 
What is meant then by requiring that the disadvantaged party knew the real value 
of the merx? Constructive knowledge of the true value, i.e. that the party ought to 
have known, or could have ascertained with careful investigation what the goods are 
worth does not suffice; positive knowledge is required.148 Neither will the mere 
declaration that the parties are aware of the true value of the goods suffice.149 A party 
should actually know the market price of the good, and not merely have an idea of 
what the market price could be.150  
3 4 3 5 Onus of proving the exclusion of § 934 ABGB 
The onus of proving that the disadvantaged party had knowledge of the true value 
of the merx, that they paid the higher price due to personal affection for the merx, or 
that the disadvantaged party intended the excess as a donation, lies on the 
advantaged party seeking to enforce the contract.151  
                                            
148
 P Bydlinski “Die Stellung der Laesio Enormis im Vertragsrecht” (1983) 105 JBL 410 417; Van Loo 
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3 4 4 Effect of the remedy  
If the requirements for the remedy are met, § 934 ABGB, similar to the Roman and 
Roman-Dutch doctrines of laesio enormis, grants the advantaged party an election (a 
so called facultas alternativa) to negate the invalidation of the contract (i.e. to enforce 
the contract); in the case of a prejudiced seller, the advantaged party would pay up to 
the full “true value” of the performance, in the case of the prejudiced purchaser the 
contract price would be reduced to the true value of the merx.152 Thus the contract 
price is adapted to the full price in order to save the contract. § 934 ABGB however 
does not allow for the judicial adaptation of the contract in a manner similar to 
§ 138 BGB,153 or the model rules.154  
3 4 5 Conclusion  
The approach followed in Austrian law under §§ 934 and 935 ABGB is innovative 
in a number of respects, which has led to the remedy of laesio enormis enjoying a 
relatively broad and general application.  
Not only can the remedy not be excluded to the detriment of the consumer, but 
courts have also recognised that little weight should be attached to standard terms 
which have the aim of excluding the remedy through either declaring that the 
contracting parties know the true value of the performances, that any excess should 
be regarded as a donation, or that the extraordinary price is accepted for personal 
reasons.155 When one of the abovementioned exceptions to the application of § 934 
ABGB is raised, the enforcing (advantaged) party bears the burden of proof. All of 
these measures are aimed at assisting disadvantaged contracting parties in obtaining 
relief.  
In other difficult cases where the value of the performance is not exactly 
ascertainable, such as contracts involving a measure of chance, the pragmatic 
approach followed by Austrian courts has allowed the remedy to be applied 
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nevertheless.156 These considerations have led to the scope of application of laesio 
enormis being broad and becoming even more so in modern Austrian contract law.  
However, the remedy suffers from a measure of inflexibility and arbitrariness when 
compared to the more supple approach followed in Germany and the model rules.157 
This rigidity adds to the simplicity of its application,158 but also means that the remedy 
is rather blunt and lacking in nuance when it comes to adaptation of the contract. The 
remedy suffers accordingly also from the same inflexibility as the classical doctrine of 
laesio enormis due to its all or nothing nature. 
3 5 Louisiana Law 
3 5 1 Introduction 
The focus now shifts to the American state of Louisiana, a jurisdiction which, like 
Germany and Austria, has codified its private law, but which has adopted a different 
approach to laesio enormis, and hence could provide further comparative 
perspectives. This jurisdiction generally shares with the South African law of contract 
the characteristic that it is not purely civilian, and has to some extent been influenced 
by the common law, which means it can be described as “mixed” in nature.159 
However, in the context of laesio enormis, the substantive law of Louisiana is 
essentially civilian in character. The example of Louisiana therefore provides access 
to alternative civil-law approaches, especially that of French law. It also illustrates 
how the application of the civilian doctrine of laesio enormis can function in a modern 
judicial system based on the common law model.160  
3 5 2 History of the Louisiana Civil Code 
Louisiana’s mixed legal system originated with the purchase of the Louisiana 
territory from France by the United States of America in 1803, at which time the legal 
system consisted of a mixture of French and Spanish customs and laws.161 
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Congressional Acts in 1803 and 1804, as well as the 1808 Louisiana Civil Code 
retained the existing civilian private law of the territory, leading to the start of the 
mixed legal system as it is known today.162 An in depth discussion of the history of 
the legal system goes beyond the scope of this enquiry, but it is sufficient to note for 
the current comparison that (like South Africa) the legal system consists of a 
substantive civilian private law overlaid with a structure of executive, legislature, and 
judiciary,163 which is based on the common law model.164  
In the compilation of the Civil Code, Louisiana was primarily influenced by French, 
and to some extent Spanish law. Accordingly, many of the provisions in the modern 
Civil Code still resemble provisions from the French Code Civil of 1804.165 The 1808 
Louisiana Digest and the Civil Codes of 1825 and 1870 recognised a fair price rule in 
the form of a restricted version of the doctrine of laesio enormis.166 The doctrine is 
called lesion beyond moiety in Louisiana, and it is under this heading that it appears 
in the Civil Code.  
3 5 3 The doctrine of laesio enormis in France 
Since lesion beyond moiety in Louisiana was received from the French Code Civil 
of 1804, a brief overview of the history of the doctrine in France is required in order to 
understand the form that the remedy takes today. 
The influence of Pothier on the French Code Civil is well-documented, and this 
influence carried over into the Louisiana Civil Code as well.167 It was briefly noted in 
the previous chapter that Pothier conceived of the remedy of laesio enormis as 
arising due to an implied defect in consent.168 Pothier’s conception of lesion as the 
result of an implied error is also clear in Article 1860 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 
1870, which provided that:  
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163
 See especially, 285-287, 290-292. 
164
 277-281. 
165
 Odinet (2015) Louisiana LR 750, 751. 
166
 See D Tooley-Knoblett & D Gruning “Chapter 13: Lesion Beyond Moiety” in D Tooley-Knoblett & D 
Gruning (eds) Sales: Volume 24 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise Series (2017) § 13:1. 
167
 AD Parker “Comments on the Civil Code” (1929) 4 Tulane LR 73 76; Tooley-Knoblett & Gruning 
“Lesion” in Sales § 13:3. 
168
 See 2 5 5 above; see also Gordley Origins 101.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
   72 
 
“Lesion is the injury suffered by one who does not receive a full equivalent for what he 
gives in a commutative contract. The remedy given for this injury is founded on its being 
the effect of implied error or imposition: for, in every commutative contract, equivalents are 
supposed to be given and received.”169  
Interestingly though, this implied error is conclusive, and does not have to be 
proven as a distinct requirement; it is a fiction that exists even where the seller 
expressly declares that he knows that the true value of the property is more than 
twice the contract price.170 
While the doctrine of laesio enormis formed part of French law during the ius 
commune,171 it was temporarily suspended by the post-revolutionary government, 
since hyperinflation had made the value of money too unstable and therefore led to a 
multitude of lawsuits by sellers of land who were now in possession of “worthless 
paper money.”172 The remedy was, however, not eliminated in its entirety (as is 
incorrectly stated by Odinet),173 but was soon reinstated when the hyperinflation 
abated.174 During the subsequent drafting of the Code Civil, notable jurists such as 
Théophile Berlier, Charles Demolombe, and François Laurent argued that the 
remedy should be abolished as the value of a thing is not absolute but relative, and 
that the just price therefore depends only on the will of the parties.175 It is ironic that 
the doctrine was suspended during this period, because a situation where sellers of 
land have not received sufficient consideration is exactly the type of crisis for which 
the doctrine was apparently invented in Roman law. 
While this view seemed to gain the ascendancy, a restricted version of the 
remedy, only available to the seller of land, still found its way into the Code Civil at 
the urging of Napoleon.176 Napoleon argued that since the price of land was more 
stable than other goods, and since land as a commodity was of great importance to 
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society,177 the manner in which one disposed of it deserved special rules, lest 
contracting parties spoil their inheritance or patrimony through an impulsive 
transaction.178 While Article 118 of the Code Civil thus contains the general rule that 
contracts cannot be invalidated on the basis of laesio enormis; Article 1674 
determines that the remedy is available to the seller of immovable property sold at 
less than five-twelfths of its fair value.179  
3 5 4 Lesion beyond moiety in the Louisiana Civil Code  
3 5 4 1 Availability of the remedy 
Article 1965 of the Louisiana Civil Code today determines simply that: “A contract 
may be annulled on grounds of lesion only in those cases provided by law.” In 
addition to the sale of an immovable, regulated in Article 2589,180 Louisiana law 
provides that the remedy is available in the case of an extrajudicial partition,181 
meaning a situation where co-owners enter into an agreement terminating their co-
ownership,182 and also in the case of exchange,183 but is specifically limited to a 
contracting party exchanging an immovable for “property”, which can include 
movables or immovables, whether corporeal or incorporeal.184 Lesion in the case of 
exchange is foreign to French law,185 and was thus a novel invention. The scope of 
this article used to be limited to even more specific exchanges before a 2010 
revision, which gave it the more general application it currently enjoys.186  
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With regards to sale, the remedy is true to its French roots, only being available to 
a contracting party who sells corporeal immovable property.187 The remedy is thus 
available in the sale of land, buildings, standing timber, and individual units in a 
condominium, but not in the case of servitudes188 or mineral leases.189 This position 
appears to be rather archaic. While immovables might once have been important 
enough to deserve special protection, it is unclear why this limitation persists to this 
day.  
The remedy is also not available in the case of a sale involving an element of risk, 
as it supposedly makes it difficult to determine the true price.190 This is true even in 
cases where the seller reserves some right in the land, such as a lifelong usufruct, as 
the sale is then deemed to involve chance.191 In cases such as Fernandez v 
Wilkinson192 the court found that the lesion beyond moiety is not available when a 
sale is speculative in nature. In the much older case of Parker v Talbot,193 the court 
was presented with an example typical of such a sale, where an elderly woman sold 
her house at a very low price but reserved a usufruct on the property during her 
lifetime. The court, citing the prevailing practice in France at that time, left the door 
open for aleatory contracts to be rescinded where the disproportion between the 
performances is immense.194  
While it is sensible to exclude speculative agreements from the application of the 
remedy if it is impossible to determine the true value of the contract, the experience 
in Germany and Austria has shown that it is sometimes easy to prove the value of a 
transaction with the help of modern actuarial techniques. Insofar as the burden of 
proof lies on the party seeking rescission of the contract, a more flexible approach 
which allows for some discretion in this manner seems preferable.195 
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3 5 4 2 Proving the price is too low 
As shown above,196 Article 2589 allows for rescission when the contract price is 
less than half of the “fair market value” of the immovable. The respective articles for 
partition197 and exchange198 also refer to the ‘fair market value”. The 1870 Civil code 
simply referred to the “value”, which is more ambiguous than “fair market value”. 
Tooley-Knoblett and Gruning note regarding this distinction that: “[S]ome earlier 
cases tried to apply a notion of ‘intrinsic’ value [presumably as opposed to market 
value], without success.”199 However, there is no indication from the sources cited by 
Tooley-Knoblett and Gruning that the courts in Louisiana have ever made use of 
intrinsic worth as opposed to the market value of the merx to assess whether there 
was lesion beyond moiety.  
Whether or not the price is less than half the fair market value of the merx is a 
question of fact. The burden of proof lies on the seller (the party who brings the 
action for lesion), and should in theory be decided on a balance of probabilities,200 as 
in other civil cases.201 However, it seems that the courts often require that a higher 
burden of proof must be satisfied, due to the exceptional nature of the remedy. In 
Haruff v King,202 for example, the Court of Appeal of Louisiana found that the seller 
must “prove the value of his property by ‘clear and exceedingly strong’ evidence.”203 
Satisfying such a burden would require showing that the disputed fact is “highly 
probable, that is, much more probable than its nonexistence."204 This is not a new 
development, however, as such language is present in much older cases. In Mayard 
v Laporte205 the court stated, for example, that:  
“Even if the evidence were sufficient to make out a probable case in favor of plaintiff, we 
should still be compelled to decide against her. The law is well settled that in such cases it 
is not sufficient to make out a merely probable case, but that the proof must be positive.” 
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The court also cited the even older case of Demaret v Hawkins206 which stated that: 
 “The right to rescind a sale for lesion beyond moiety is the only restraint on the liberty of 
the citizen to bind himself or his property according to the dictates of his own judgment, 
and the evidence relied on to establish that right should be peculiarly strong and 
conclusive.” 
Parker notes similarly that since the remedy of lesion beyond moiety is based on a 
conclusive presumption of error on the part of the disadvantaged party, strong proof 
must exist for the action to succeed.207 This burden is clearly more onerous than in 
other civil cases, and might therefore act as a form of control, ensuring that a large 
number of contracts are not invalidated through the remedy by placing a stricter 
burden of proof on the party alleging invalidity.  
3 5 4 3 Renunciation of the remedy 
Article 2589 of the Civil Code determines that the remedy may be invoked by the 
seller, even if he has renounced the right to claim it. Tooley-Knoblett and Gruning 
correctly point out, like the late scholastics,208 and Pothier before them,209 that the 
remedy would be largely illusory if it could be renounced at the time of conclusion of 
the contract.210 They argue however, like Pothier,211 that a renunciation which occurs 
after the payment of the contract price, and the delivery of the thing, should be 
binding, in the same way that a party induced into entering a contract through 
misrepresentation is able to later confirm a contract.212 This position seems to reflect 
an understanding of laesio enormis as a defect in consent. Insofar as renunciation of 
the remedy which occurs after the conclusion of the contract is less open to abuse 
than renunciation at contract conclusion, it is to be preferred.  
It is also possible to avoid the application of the remedy through showing that the 
sale was in fact an onerous donation; but in order for the court to accept this, the 
                                            
206
 Demaret v Hawkins 8 La. Ann. 483 (1852) 484.  
207
 Parker (1929) Tulane LR 77. 
208
 See above at 2 4 3 4. 
209
 RJ Pothier Treatise on the Contract of Sale (transl LS Cushing, 1999) 355 
210
 Tooley-Knoblett & Gruning “Lesion” in Sales § 13:12. 
211
 Pothier Contract of Sale 355. 
212
 Tooley-Knoblett & Gruning “Lesion” in Sales § 13:12. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
   77 
 
buyer would have to show that the transaction meets the requirements in form and 
intent for a valid donation.213 
3 5 4 4 Prescription of the remedy 
The 1985 revision of the Sales Law significantly shortened the period for which the 
remedy is available; an action nowadays has to be brought within one year from the 
time of the sale, as opposed to four in the predecessor article. In addition, this period 
can no longer be interrupted or suspended.214 While this might seem to indicate that 
lesion beyond moiety “lost ground” in the revision,215 such a limitation also makes 
sense as a method to limit the legal uncertainty sometimes associated with the 
doctrine.  
3 5 4 5 Effect of the remedy 
If the seller successfully relies on the remedy, the buyer either has the option to 
return the thing (and in turn receive repayment of the lesionary price), or supplement 
the lesionary price up to the fair market price.216 
3 5 5 Conclusion 
Odinet attributes the survival of the doctrine of lesion beyond moiety in Louisiana 
civil law to the tendency of mixed jurisdictions to resist change by anchoring 
themselves in the traditional and well-known, thus retaining certain aspects of their 
law, even when they are in conflict with new laws or legal regimes.217 In Louisiana 
this has manifested itself as a struggle to retain its civilian identity,218 and 
accompanying legal figures such as lesion beyond moiety.219 This has not only led to 
the doctrine being retained, but also to it remaining largely unchanged from its rigid 
and restricted form as it was adopted from French law, even if the underlying logic of 
these restrictions is no longer present.220 This has happened despite the nature of 
Louisiana’s economy changing since the adoption of the doctrine from a rural 
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agrarian society221 (perhaps necessitating special rules for land as the most 
important asset, or indicator of wealth),222 to a much more complex and diversified 
modern economy, where other assets such as movables, stocks or bonds, and 
incorporeals such as intellectual property, are arguably just as important.223  
A surprisingly visionary article published already in 1940 called for the creation of 
a general lesionary concept, available to both parties, for movables, and immovables, 
and all commutative contracts, with a shortened period of prescription, which does 
away with the crude and inflexible arithmetic of the doctrine in favour of a more 
flexible standard.224 Such a reform has not occurred. 
3 6 English Law 
3 6 1 Introduction 
The traditional view in the English common law is that a contract must be 
supported by “consideration” (i.e. there must be some quid pro quo),225 but that 
consideration need not be adequate to render the contract enforceable.226 At least on 
a formal level, there is no rule or principle, written or unwritten, which can be equated 
to a fair price rule.227 While this can in part be attributed to a liberal approach to 
contract, it also suggests that there might be other mechanisms which deal with 
inequality in exchange.  
The statement of the court in Sturlyn v Albany228 that “when a thing is done, be it 
never so small, this is a sufficient consideration to ground an action”, is often 
(mis)understood to mean that courts as a rule cannot examine the adequacy of the 
consideration. This rule was, however, not meant to prohibit judges from granting 
relief in cases of hard bargains, but rather to allow judges to enforce gratuitous 
contract, such as partial donations, where equal consideration is not intended.229  
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While the English common law lacks a general principle allowing a party to escape 
from a prejudicial deal, it has a patchwork of different rules, which in an assortment of 
circumstances grant the weaker party protection that in some respects is comparable 
to that afforded in the continental systems.230  
3 6 2 Unconscionable bargains  
English courts of equity enjoy the power to provide relief from contracts which are 
so harsh as to be unconscionable.231 Courts of equity have in the past given relief 
from harsh bargains without making use of, or establishing, a principle that there 
needs to be equality in exchange.232 Instead the courts have made use of a variety of 
other arguments such as that an agreement is unreasonable, unjust, inequitable, or 
grossly inadequate, and so forth.233 Although there have been some attempts to 
establish general requirements that have to be met in order for relief to be granted in 
these cases, it seems clear that inequality in exchange, or the existence of an unfair 
bargain, is not enough.234 It seems also that such agreements might be 
unconscionable not because the substance of the contract is objectionable in itself, 
but rather because of reprehensible behaviour of the stronger party.235 
This was typically the case where young heirs had sold their inheritance at a 
pittance in order to finance their lifestyle or gambling debts;236 or where courts gave 
assistance to those who had bought land at a very high price brought about by the 
South Sea Bubble.237 English courts were arguably less concerned about equality in 
exchange than they were about the reckless disposal of inheritances and estates in 
many of these cases.238  
These cases can also be linked to the more modern case of Cresswell v Potter,239 
where the Court of Chancery gave relief to a telephonist who had disposed of her 
rights in a shared property cheaply in return for exemption from further liability under 
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the mortgage.240 The court, drawing on the case of Fry v Lane,241 noted that in order 
for the contract to be set aside, the requirements are that the disadvantaged party 
had to be poor and ignorant, that the sale had to be at a considerable undervalue, 
and there should have been no independent advice.242 In Credit Lyonnais Bank 
Nederland NV v Burch243 the Court of Appeal stated in similar fashion, also with 
reference to Fry v Lane, that: “Equity's jurisdiction to relieve against such 
[unconscionable] transactions, although more rarely exercised in modern times, is at 
least as venerable as its jurisdiction to relieve against those procured by undue 
influence.” Despite some doubt as to the jurisdiction of courts to set aside such 
unconscionable bargains, courts have continued to grant relief on this somewhat 
uncertain basis.244  
3 6 3 Economic duress 
Modern English law acknowledges economic duress (in addition to duress to the 
person, and duress of goods) as a form of duress that renders a contract voidable.245 
This is the case where a party uses their stronger bargaining position to coerce the 
other party in an illegitimate manner to agree to certain contractual terms.246 What 
exactly constitutes unconscionable or unlawful pressure is contested.247 A flexible 
approach, whereby a range of factors are taken into account, was advocated for in 
DSDN Subsea Ltd v Petroleum Geo Services.248 In Universe Tankships Inc of 
Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation, The Universe Sentinel,249 the 
House of Lords held that whether a threat is illegitimate depends on the nature of the 
threat and the nature of the demand. This might for example be the case where one 
of the parties agrees to an extortionate price, or to a disadvantageous modification of 
the contract, only because the counterparty threatened to breach the contract 
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otherwise.250 Some cases where relief is provided through fair price rules in other 
legal systems might therefore be dealt with through the doctrine of economic duress 
in English law. This doctrine is closely related to, and often overlaps with undue 
influence.  
3 6 4 Undue influence 
The doctrine of undue influence was received into South African law from English 
law.251 The close relation to duress and the nature of the doctrine is well illustrated by 
Lord Hoffman in R v Attorney-General for England and Wales:252 
“Like duress at the common law, undue influence is based upon the principle that a 
transaction to which consent has been obtained by unacceptable means should not be 
allowed to stand. Undue influence has concentrated in particular upon the unfair 
exploitation by one party of a relationship which gives him ascendancy or influence over 
the other.” 
Undue influence is a ground of relief developed by the courts of equity,253 and thus 
developed distinctly from the doctrine of duress.254 It allows for the avoidance of a 
contract where a party can show that the contract was concluded due to undue 
pressure or influence exerted by the advantaged party.255 Two categories of undue 
influence are recognised; actual and presumed. Actual undue influence includes 
“overt acts of improper pressure or coercion such as unlawful threats” and overlaps 
with duress as described above.256 Presumed undue influence involves the abuse of 
a relationship of trust between two parties, in the course of which one has acquired a 
measure of influence over the other, of which they then take advantage.257 Although 
not exactly similar, the latter, more subtle type of undue influence aligns better with 
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the doctrine of undue influence in South African law, where it is distinguished from 
duress by the absence of threats or intimidation.258  
The importance of the distinction between actual and presumed undue influence 
lies in the requirement that a manifest disadvantage was required to be proven by the 
disadvantaged party only in the case of presumed undue influence.259 A 
disadvantage is said to be manifest where it is apparent to a reasonable person who 
considered the transaction.260 
A rebuttable presumption of undue influence can arise where a certain type of 
special relationship exists between the parties.261 The importance of the role of 
presumption has been watered down due to the decision of the House of Lords in 
Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No. 2).262 Lord Nicholls endorsed a more flexible 
test in the case, noting that the doctrine is not confined to cases of abuse of trust, but 
could also include cases where vulnerable persons are exploited, as well as other 
cases of reliance or dependence noted above such as duress of goods.263 He also 
noted that the importance lay not in the form or type of the relationship, but rather on 
whether there was sufficient trust and confidence.264 Lord Nicholls also casts doubt 
on the evidentiary value of the manifest advantage requirement. He argued that there 
may be several reasons why contracting parties could enter into manifestly 
disadvantageous contracts, which are not necessarily due to the exertion of undue 
influence.265 Lord Nicholls advocated that the test should rather be whether the 
transaction in question is such that is “calls for explanation”.266 Such a flexible 
approach could prove useful in practice, and could well subsume many cases where 
inequality in exchange arises due to vulnerability or reliance, and where the 
disproportion is apparent enough to “call for an explanation”.  
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3 6 5 Conclusion: A general doctrine of unconscionability? 
Lord Denning attempted in Lloyds Bank v Bundy267 to create a general ground of 
relief for weaker parties to prejudicial contracts based on an inequality in bargaining 
power. This doctrine would thereby subsume the doctrine of undue influence, as well 
as the category of unconscionable bargains discussed above.268 Lord Denning269 
argued that a single thread ran through the relief given in all of these cases, in that it 
rests on the inequality of bargaining power. He noted that it is a matter of “common 
fairness” when one party is so strong, and the other so weak, that the stronger party 
should not be able to “push the weak to the wall”.270 
The arguments of Lord Denning have, however, not been met with approval. In 
later cases such as Pao On v Lau Yiu Long,271 and National Westminster Bank plc v 
Morgan,272 Lord Scarman has severely criticised the dicta of Lord Denning. He noted 
in the former case that contracts are not invalid simply because they have been 
procured by unfair use of a dominating bargaining position, and in the latter that there 
is no need for a principle as the lawgiver had already placed the necessary 
restrictions on freedom of contract to prevent abuse of inequality of bargaining power 
through statutes such as the Consumer Credit Act of 1974.273 
As has been referred to in passing above, the position in English law seems to be 
much closer to the position in the South African law of contract. Not only has South 
African contract law received some of the abovementioned doctrines from the English 
common law, but there also seems to be a similar ideological resistance, especially 
on the part of the judiciary, to engage with equality in exchange as a ground for relief.  
However, the idea of a general doctrine of unconscionability still enjoys some 
support; indeed such doctrines are present today in other common law jurisdictions 
such as Australia, Canada, and the United States.274 Such a general doctrine might 
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present an attractive alternative to the piecemeal approach followed in the English 
common law.  
3 7 The model rules or international contractual regimes 
International contractual regimes, legal instruments, and model rules deal with 
equality in exchange in a variety of ways. In this study, the focus will be on two 
pertinent examples, namely Article 4:109 of the Principles of European Contract Law 
(“PECL”)275 and Article 3.2.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts (“PICC”).276  
3 7 1 Introduction to equality in exchange in the PECL, DCFR, and PICC 
The PECL are of particular interest because they can be regarded as an attempt 
to formulate general principles of European contract law,277 and thus represent 
modern thinking on the traditions that have shaped South African contract law. The 
PECL determine in Article 4:109, under the heading “Excessive benefit or unfair 
advantage” that: 
“(1) A party may avoid a contract if, at the time of the conclusion of the contract: 
(a) it was dependent on or had a relationship of trust with the other party, was in 
economic distress or had urgent needs, was improvident, ignorant, inexperienced or 
lacking in bargaining skill, and 
(b) the other party knew or ought to have known of this and, given the circumstances 
and purpose of the contract, took advantage of the first party's situation in a way 
which was grossly unfair or took an excessive benefit.” 
Art II - 7:207 of the Draft Common Frame of Reference (“DCFR”) is identical to 
Article 4:109 PECL.278 The DCFR Study Group took up the role as the successor to 
the PECL study group by drafting model rules for adjacent areas of law not covered 
by the PECL.279 As a whole, the DCFR is similar in style and substance to the 
PECL,280 and with regards to the provisions in question it does not add much except 
for some additional remarks and minor changes in the notes. It is therefore not 
necessary to discuss the DCFR separately from the PECL in this study.  
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Article 3.2.7 of the PICC determines that:  
“(1) A party may avoid the contract or an individual term of it if, at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract, the contract or term unjustifiably gave the other party an 
excessive advantage. Regard is to be had, among other factors, to: 
(a) the fact that the other party has taken unfair advantage of the first party’s 
dependence, economic distress or urgent needs, or of its improvidence, ignorance, 
inexperience or lack of bargaining skill, and 
(b) the nature and purpose of the contract.” 
The nature of the PICC differs in two important aspects from the PECL and the 
DCFR. Firstly the PICC are aimed at a global, as opposed to a European 
harmonisation of private law, and secondly the PICC deal specifically with 
international commercial contracts, while the PECL deal with general contract law.281 
While it might seem strange to some that parties to a commercial contract are 
protected in this matter, there is in principle no reason why parties to commercial 
contracts cannot also be disadvantaged in an unjustifiable manner,282 and they are 
therefore no less worthy of protection in these cases.  
3 7 2 Functioning of the respective provisions 
Both of these instruments take into account not only the objective discrepancy in 
the value of the respective performances, but also require, or at least give regard to, 
some element of procedural unfairness. The interaction between these two elements 
of objective disparity on the one hand, and procedural unfairness on the other, is 
briefly discussed below.  
3 7 2 1 Calculating disproportion: A flexible approach 
In contrast to the doctrine of laesio enormis, neither Article 3.2.7 PICC nor 4:109 
PECL make use of a set mathematical ratio or threshold by which excessive 
advantage can be determined.283  
The comments to Article 4:109 PECL state that “grossly unfair advantage” does 
not only relate to disparity in terms of value, but also to other cases of unfairness,284 
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such as for example a contract that is good value for money, but which the prejudiced 
party can ill afford. Excessive advantage in terms of Article 4:109 PECL is 
determined in relation the “normal price” or other return typical in such contracts. 
Comment D of the official comments to this provision also stresses that a shortage of 
supply leading to generally high prices, and abnormally high profits, would not be 
ground for its application. 
Art 3.2.7 PICC differs from 4:109 PECL in the respect that the former sets 
excessive advantage as a minimum requirement;285 whereas under 4:109 PECL the 
remedy is available both where advantage was taken in a manner that is grossly 
unfair, or where excessive benefit was taken. 
The “excessive advantage”, which Article 3.2.7 PICC states as a minimum 
requirement, relates only to the substance of the contract.286 This requirement is 
considered to be rather onerous. Even a considerable disparity in the performance 
and counter performance would be insufficient for the contract to be avoided or 
adapted.287 What is required is disequilibrium between the respective obligations of 
the parties that is so great as “to shock the conscience of a reasonable person”.288  
3 7 2 2 When is advantage-taking unjustified? 
The comments to Article 4:109 PECL make clear that an excessive advantage on 
its own will not be enough in most cases for the contract to be set aside. It would 
ostensibly create too much uncertainty if contracts were voidable solely due to 
objective disparity, especially in cases where it is not clear why the disadvantaged 
party was not able to look after their own interests.289  
Article 3.2.7 PICC requires in a comparable fashion that the taking of the 
excessive advantage should be unjustifiable.290 From this construction it is clear that 
there will be instances where giving an excessive advantage can be justified. 
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The provision states that in adjudging whether an excessive advantage has been 
given in an unjustifiable manner, regard must be had to all the circumstances; 
therefore no closed list of factors which can be considered exists.291 The two factors 
which are included in the text of the article, and which deserve special attention 
according to the notes, are certain forms of taking advantage of an (unequal) 
bargaining position between the parties (Article 3.2.7(1)(a), and the nature and 
purpose of the contract (Article 3.2.7(1)(b)).  
The comments use “unequal bargaining position” as a catch-all term for taking 
unfair advantage of the other party’s dependence, economic distress or urgent 
needs, or its improvidence, ignorance, inexperience, or lack of bargaining skill.292 
Support has been expressed for referring to these factors as “taking advantage of 
certain forms of weakness”,293 which might be a more appropriate term.294  
Similar to Article 4:109 PECL, a superior bargaining position brought about by 
market forces would not in and of itself be enough to satisfy this requirement in 
Article 3.2.7 PICC,295 nor would this requirement be satisfied in the case of an 
ignorant party who could otherwise reasonably have been expected to know the state 
of affairs.296  
The comments to Article 3.2.7(1)(b), on the nature and purpose of the contract, 
are rather vague, and might be seen by some as leaving too much room for 
discretion. The comments state that depending on the nature and the purpose of the 
contract, an excessive advantage can be unjustifiable even where the benefitting 
party did not abuse the other party’s weak bargaining position.297 Beale et al, are of 
the opinion that the above-mentioned comment indicates that this provision differs 
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from Article 4:109 PECL, in that under Article 3.2.7 PICC an “unjustifiably excessive 
advantage” may in and of itself be enough to render a contract voidable.298  
3 7 2 3 Is actual or deemed knowledge of the abuse a requirement for relief? 
The knowledge requirement in Article 4:109(b) PECL is satisfied where the 
stronger party knew or ought to have known that the disadvantaged party was not in 
a position to protect his own interests, and nevertheless proceeded to take 
advantage.299 This raises the question under what circumstances an advantaged 
party “ought to have known” about the circumstances of weakness. The comments 
only state in this regard that it would create too much uncertainty if contracts are set 
aside where there was no reason for the advantaged party to know about the 
situation of weakness of the disadvantaged party.300  
Contrary to Article 4:109 PECL, Article 3.2.7 PICC does not expressly require that 
the advantaged party knew or ought to have known of the weakness when taking 
advantage thereof.301 As the factors to be taken into account are not a closed list, the 
knowledge of the advantaged party could still play a role as part of the consideration 
of the general circumstances of the case.  
3 7 3 Effect of the remedy 
Both Article 3.2.7 PICC and Article 4:109 PICC allow for a contract to be avoided 
or adapted at the request of the disadvantaged party.302 This might be seen as 
acknowledgement thereof that a number of cases exist where the disadvantaged 
party would not want the contract to be invalidated, but would prefer that the contract 
continues in a modified form.303 This could for example be due to some commercial 
necessity, or due to the time and expenses involved in concluding a new agreement. 
In adapting the contract, the PECL and PICC follow relatively similar approaches, 
adapting the contract to what might have been agreed had the requirements of good 
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faith and fair dealing been met under PECL,304 or making the contract accord with 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing under the PICC.305 
The same could be said with regards to the party that received an excessive 
advantage, in that invalidating the contract could also result in unfairness to them, or 
at least a suboptimal arrangement. Accordingly, both Article 4:109(3) PECL and 
Article 3.2.7(3) PICC grant the court the ability to adapt the contract at the request of 
the party receiving notice of avoidance (the advantaged party); provided that they 
inform the party who gave notice of avoidance promptly and before they act on said 
avoidance.  
Under Article 4:117 PECL the disadvantaged party may in addition to, or instead 
of, avoidance of the contract, recover damages to the extent of the position they were 
in before the conclusion of the contract.306 Article 3.2.16 PICC determines that a 
party is liable for damages if they knew or ought to have known of a ground for 
avoidance, and that this right arises irrespective of whether the contract is avoided. 
After avoidance in terms of Article 3.2.7 PICC the respective obligations terminate 
retroactively and mutual duties of restitution arise.307 A party who chooses to adapt 
the contract loses their right to avoidance under both PECL and the PICC. Neither of 
these remedies can be excluded by agreement by the parties or otherwise.308 
3 7 4 Conclusion 
The model rules studied above present modern and flexible manifestations of a 
fair price rule. Both of these rules take into account not only the objective disparity 
between the value of the respective performances, but also the conditions under 
which the contract was concluded, in assessing its fairness. The model rules are also 
flexible in their approach to restitution, allowing for adaptation of the contract both on 
request of the advantaged and disadvantaged parties, as well as allowing for the 
recovery of damages on the part of the disadvantaged party.  
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3 7 5 Fair price rules in European consumer contract law 
The discussion of the international model rules has focused on the position in 
general contract law in relation to the PECL, and international commercial contract 
law in relation to the PICC. Some commentators have noted that the European trend 
in relation to fair price rules seems to be in favour of rules that go beyond merely 
looking at objective disparity, and instead take account of the circumstances under 
which the contract has been concluded, i.e. if there has been some procedural defect 
in the conclusion of the contract.309 
The position seems to be somewhat different in the field of European consumer 
contract law, where there appears to be a greater willingness to engage in price 
control based predominately on objective disparity in the value of the respective 
performances. Two examples might be used to substantiate this proposition: The first 
relates to the European Court of Justice’s interpretation of the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive of 1993,310 which appears to have, in outcome if not in theory, created a fair 
price rule based predominantly on objective disparity.311 The second example relates 
to the amendments of the European Parliament to the European Commission’s 
proposal for a Common European Sales Law (“CESL”), which has had the effect of 
creating a fair price rule based only on objective disparity.312 
3 7 5 1 The Unfair Contract Terms Directive: The exclusion of price from fairness 
control  
Article 3(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive allows for the invalidation of 
non-individually negotiated contract terms that result in a significant imbalance in the 
rights and obligations of the respective parties.313 However, Article 4(2) of the same 
directive exempts the definition of the main subject matter (of the contract), as well as 
the adequacy of price, from the unfairness test, insofar as these terms are in plain 
                                            
309
 See for example H Eidenmüller “Justifying Fair Price Rules in Contract Law” (2015) 11 ERCL 220 
221. 
310
 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts. 
311
 This is discussed immediately below at 3 7 5 1.  
312
 Discussed below at 3 7 5 2. 
313
 Art 3(1): “A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair 
if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.” 
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intelligible language.314 These exemptions were not present in the first draft of the 
Directive, but instead were introduced after some writers commented that if control 
were extended to individually negotiated terms, as well as the core terms such as the 
price, it would be detrimental to both party autonomy and the functioning of the free-
market economy.315  
Many EU member states chose not to include these exemptions when transposing 
the Directive into national law meaning that price terms can be reviewed for fairness 
in these jurisdictions.316 More recently the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) has laid 
down very strict requirements for terms to be considered “in plain intelligible 
language”. The ECJ317 found in 2014 a dispute relating to the loan agreements 
denominated in foreign currencies, that “plain intelligible language” should be 
purposively interpreted so as to require not only that a term is grammatically 
intelligible to the consumer, but also that it is set out in a transparent fashion so that 
the consumer is “in a position to evaluate, on the basis of clear, intelligible criteria, 
the economic consequences” which derive from the term. The ECJ in reaching this 
conclusion placed emphasis on the position of weakness which the consumer 
typically finds himself in, relating to both his reduced bargaining power and level of 
knowledge, vis-à-vis the seller.318 According to the court position of weakness 
necessitates that a broader interpretation of the transparency requirements should be 
taken so as to satisfy the purpose of the directive in question, to protect the 
consumer.319 
This approach, which requires not only that the contract terms in question are 
merely formally and grammatically intelligible to the average consumer, but rather 
that the consumer is able to evaluate the economic consequences which derive from 
                                            
314
 Art 4(2): Assessment of the unfair nature of the terms shall relate neither to the definition of the 
main subject matter of the contract nor to the adequacy of the price and remuneration, on the one 
hand, as against the services or goods supplies in exchange, on the other, in so far as these terms are 
in plain intelligible language. 
315
 See M Dellacasa “Judicial Review of ‘Core Terms’ in Consumer Contracts: Defining the Limits” 
(2015) 11 ERCL 152 159; see also the original comments mentioned above: HE Brandner & P Ulmer 
“The Community Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: Some Critical Remarks on the 
Proposal Submitted by the EC Commission” (1991) 28 Common Market LR 647 652, 656.  
316
 See H Schulte-Nölke, C Twigg-Fleshner, & M Ebers (eds) EU Consumer Law Compendium (2008) 
226 who state that fifteen countries adopted the exclusion, while ten did not. 
317
 ECJ, 30.04.2014 - C-26/13, Árpád Kásler, Hajnalka Káslerné Rábai v OTP Jelzálogbank Zrt paras 
70-75; see also See Dellacasa (2015) ERCL 152. 
318
 See paras 39-40.  
319
 See paras 72, 39; see also Dellacasa (2015) 11 ERCL 157. 
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the term, was very recently confirmed in another similar dispute before the ECJ.320 In 
the case in question the court seemed to set even more onerous requirements for 
terms to be considered transparent.321 
These judgments are still relatively recent, and it is therefore difficult to say what 
their effect will be. However, if this approach were followed in future, it could lead to 
all but the clearest terms, including price terms, becoming reviewable for fairness 
under the Directive. This would have the effect that all non-individually negotiated 
(standard term) contracts that result in a significant imbalance in the value of the 
respective performances could theoretically be set aside by the court.  
3 7 5 2 The fair price rule in the CESL  
The CESL initially contained a substantially similar exclusion of price terms from 
fairness control to that discussed above in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive.322 However, the European Parliament in its first reading of the proposal 
adopted two amendments that in effect removed these exclusions and extended 
fairness control to the adequacy of price.323 The justification given in the report for 
these amendments indicated that it was the express intention of the European 
Parliament that fairness control should be extended to core terms (i.e. price), and 
was billed as a far reaching improvement for consumer protection.324 The amended 
unfairness test would require only that there be a significant imbalance in the rights 
and obligations of the parties, and that the imbalance was contrary to good faith and 
fair dealing, for the contract to be set aside.325  
                                            
320
 ECJ, 20.09.2017 - C-186/16, Ruxandra Paula Andriciuc v Banca Românească SA. 
321
 See especially paras 44-51. 
322
 See arts 80 and 83 of the CESL; see also M Hesselink “Unfair Prices in the Common European 
Sales Law” in L Gullifer & S Vogenauer (eds) English and European Perspectives on Contract and 
Commercial Law (2014) 225 227. 
323
 See Hesselink (2015) ERCL 187; see also Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of The Council on a Common European Sales Law (COM(2011)0635 – C7-
0329/2011 – 2011/0284(COD)) Amendments 153 and 155 (“CESL Report”). Available online at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2013-
0301&language=EN 
324
 See CESL Report (n 323) Amendment 153 Justification.  
325
 The amended provision determined that: “(1). In a contract between a trader and a consumer, a 
contract term supplied by the trader is unfair for the purposes of this Section if it causes a significant 
imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the 
consumer, contrary to good faith and fair dealing.” 
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Although the CESL proposal was ultimately withdrawn, it should serve as some 
evidence, together with that of the developments discussed above in relation to the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive, that there appears to be an increased willingness in 
European consumer law to engage in price control based predominantly on objective 
disparity. However, it remains to be seen whether the adoption of these amendments 
indicate a lasting change in the approach to the regulation of fairness in consumer 
contracts.  
3 8 Conclusion  
This chapter studied four national regimes in addition to a number of international 
model rules. These four national regimes represent four different ways of dealing with 
the issue of equality in exchange. Two of these systems, namely Louisiana and 
Austria, make use of fair price rules based almost exclusively on objective disparity in 
the value of performances. There are however important differences between these 
two versions of the doctrine of laesio enormis. While the doctrine of lesion beyond 
moiety in Louisiana is largely unchanged from the law as it was received from France 
at the turn of the 19th century,326 its counterpart in Austria has been adapted and 
modified to bring it into step with the modern commercial realities. The scope of 
application of § 934 ABGB is not restricted as in Louisiana, to any particular type of 
contract, and courts in Austria have taken a pragmatic approach allowing the remedy 
to be applied where the contract itself contains an element of chance.  
The current legal position in Austria goes the furthest to show that even a relatively 
traditional fair price rule is not incompatible with modern contract law. The contrast 
between these two systems should also serve to indicate that there is no one 
“doctrine of laesio enormis”, but rather a variety of fair price rules, which although all 
descended from the Lex Secunda, can function in quite divergent ways.  
The remedy in Germany, which relies on § 138 BGB, can be called a fair price 
rule, but functions somewhat differently to the doctrine of laesio enormis, which was 
abolished in most of Germany during the 19th century. Importantly for the purposes of 
this study, the rule relies on a discrepancy in the value of performance of the 
respective parties, which however needs to be combined with the intentional or 
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negligent exploitation of some form of weakness. As this study has pointed out 
above, the position has changed through the interpretation of open-ended norms to 
such an extent that German law is moving closer to the position where gross 
discrepancy is by itself enough to invalidate a contract.327 Through it might not have 
been the intention of the drafters of the BGB; Germany seems to have, in practice at 
least, a modern and useful fair price rule.  
Similar to the example in Germany, the international model rules studied, namely 
the PECL and PICC, employ fair price rules which take into account both objective 
disparity in the value of performances, and the conditions under which the contract 
were concluded. The model rules are wide in their scope of application, and flexible 
in their approach to determining whether the price is fair, and their approach to 
restitution; both of these aspects are arguably necessary for a modern fair price rule.  
It has also been noted that the strict transparency requirements of the ECJ under 
the Unfair Contract Terms Directive have in effect created a fair price rule in 
European consumer contract law. The amendments to the CESL which intentionally 
extended fairness control to price are similarly interesting in that both of these 
developments seem to indicate an increased willingness to engage in price control.  
Finally, it has been noted that no overarching doctrine or rule exists in England 
which can be called a fair price rule. It rather recognises a patchwork of different 
approaches, each of which has the effect of granting protection to the weaker party in 
a harsh bargain in specific circumstances.328 In this light the idea was discussed that 
a general doctrine of unconscionability might well be desirable, so as to provide a 
theoretical basis for what is already in effect happening in practice, and also to unify 
these disparate approaches and thereby increase legal certainty. 
Now that the comparative and historical overview is complete, the next chapter will 
examine whether such a fair price rule would in fact be a desirable development in 
South African law of contract. It will do so by testing the fair price rule against some 
fundamental values of contract law in an attempt to ascertain whether a fair price rule 
would be beneficial, and if so, at what cost it could come. 
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CHAPTER 4: AN EVALUATION OF FAIR PRICE RULES  
4 1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters focused on the historical development of the doctrine of 
laesio enormis, and the functioning of a variety of modern fair price rules. While this 
has provided some insight into the doctrinal development and application of these 
legal rules, less attention was paid to the more normative question of whether a fair 
price rule is at all desirable, measured against the values and principles important to 
South African contract law.  
In a judgment strongly critical of the doctrine of laesio enormis, Van den Heever 
JA stated in Tjollo Ateljees (Eins) Bpk v Small,1 (“Tjollo Ateljees”) that the doctrine is 
not in harmony with either immanent reason or public policy, as it entails that a 
contracting party whose judgement is “in no way impaired or restricted, seeks relief 
not against a wrong, but against his own lack of judgment, ineptitude or folly.” To 
what extent is this statement still true of modern fair price rules? The arguments of 
the judges in Tjollo Ateljees appear to have been persuasive, as the legislature 
subsequently decided to abolish the doctrine.2 However, as was shown in the 
previous two chapters, there is no single doctrine of laesio enormis, but rather a 
variety of fair price rules which in practice fulfil a similar function, often in very 
different ways.  
This chapter seeks to take a broader view by attempting to evaluate the 
desirability of fair price rules in general, with reference to certain fundamental values 
of contract law, namely, dignity and autonomy, economic efficiency, and legal 
certainty. These values were chosen because of their prominence in debates on fair 
price rules in historical and contemporary literature, as well as their importance in 
contemporary South African contract law.  
However, this chapter will take no particular stance regarding which of the fair 
price rules studied in the previous chapter (if any) is the most desirable, as this 
choice pre-empts the discussion in chapter 5 which studies the functioning of fair 
                                            
1
 1949 1 SA 856 (A) 871. 
2
 See s 25 of the General Law Amendment Act 32 of 1952; HR Hahlo & E Kahn “Two Important 
Changes in the Common Law” (1952) 69 SALJ 392.  
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price rules. The discussion in this chapter therefore relates to the more abstract 
question of whether fundamental values of contract law would support the adoption 
of a fair price rule, i.e. a rule which allows courts to set aside a contract based 
primarily on the discrepancy in the value of the respective performances.  
Debate and academic writing regarding the desirability of a fair price rule is 
relatively limited in South African literature; this is in all likelihood due to the abolition 
of the doctrine of laesio enormis, and the quiet existence which section 48(1)(a)(i) of 
the CPA has enjoyed thus far.3 By contrast, the topic of fairness of price has enjoyed 
considerable attention internationally. In addition to an abundance of academic 
writing on the topic in legal systems with fair price rules (such as Germany, Austria, 
France, and Louisiana) the process of harmonisation of European contract law has 
provided fertile ground for academic writing on the topic.4 Limited writing also exists 
in the common law on the topic of fairness in price, especially in relation to autonomy 
and economic efficiency.5 
4 2 Dignity and autonomy 
While it might seem at first to be rather unorthodox, this section deals with both 
dignity and autonomy under the same heading. The discussions of these two values 
overlap to a significant extent in academic literature and arguments regarding 
fairness of price. The argument is twofold, and the following distinction is central to it. 
On the one hand a fair price rule can function as a mechanism that combats 
exploitation and procedural unfairness, thereby protecting the autonomy of 
contracting parties, which is said to promote an empowerment conception of dignity.6 
On the other hand, a fair price rule that seeks a measure of equivalence between the 
parties’ respective performances promotes parties having a measure of regard for 
                                            
3
 On s 48 of the CPA see the discussion below at 6 3, as well as T Naudé “Section 48” in T Naudé & 
S Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (RS 2 2017) para 8; J Barnard 
“Unfairness of Price and the Doctrine of Laesio Enormis in Consumer Sales” (2013) 76 THRHR 521. 
4
 See most prominently H Eidenmüller “Justifying Fair Price Rules in Contract Law” (2015) 11 ERCL 
220 221; MW Hesselink “Could a Fair Price Rule or its Absence be Unjust?” (2015) 11 ERCL 185; MW 
Hesselink “Unfair Prices in the Common European Sales Law” in L Gullifer & S Vogenauer (eds) 
English and European Perspectives on Contract and Commercial Law (2014) 224; T Gutmann “Some 
Preliminary Remarks on a Liberal Theory of Contract” (2013) 76 Law and Contemporary Problems 39.  
5
 See for example SA Smith “In Defence of Substantive Unfairness” (1996) 112 LQR 138; P Benson 
“The Unity of Contract Law” in P Benson (ed) The Theory of Contract Law (2001) 184 184-195; 
FH Buckley “Three Theories of Substantive Fairness” (1990) 19 Hofstra LR 33. 
6
 See 4 2 6 below.  
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each other’s interests and ends, thereby promoting the conception of dignity as a 
“constraint”, a notion on which the chapter will expand presently.7 Suffice it to say 
that this notion also ties in with the idea that good faith and Ubuntu are underlying 
values in the South African law of contract, which need to find expression in concrete 
rules. 
4 2 1 Defining dignity 
Defining dignity is notoriously difficult. A large variety of different uses of the term 
emerge in historic and current practice,8 and many writers seem to avoid going 
further than regarding it as a value that demands respect for a person.9 Indeed one of 
the points of criticism that is levelled most often against the use of dignity, especially 
as a justiciable right, is that the term is vague or devoid of real meaning,10 or that it 
means nothing more than respect for persons or their autonomy.11 A further source of 
criticism is that it seems to be inspired by religious or metaphysical ideas from which 
it cannot be separated.12 
While the many different conceptions of dignity need to be acknowledged, it is not 
necessary, or indeed possible for purposes of this study, to engage in this debate. It 
will be assumed that there is at least some core meaning of the concept, which 
demands the recognition that all human beings possess some intrinsic value that 
cannot be violated.13 Furthermore, the focus will especially be on the above-
mentioned two different conceptions of dignity that are prevalent in the literature, 
                                            
7
 See 4 2 5 and 4 2 7 below.  
8
 For an overview of the different senses in which the term is used see: C McCrudden “In Pursuit of 
Human Dignity: An Introduction to Current Debates” in C McCrudden (ed) Understanding Human 
Dignity (2013) 1 8-10. 
9
 11. 
10
 See for example M Rosen “Dignity the Case against” in Understanding Human Dignity 143 143-145, 
149-150; LR Kass “Defending Human Dignity” in The President’s Council on Bioethics (eds) Human 
Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics (2008) 297, 306. 
SM Shell “Kant’s Concept of Human Dignity as a Resource for Bioethics” in Human Dignity and 
Bioethics 330.  
11
 See R Macklin “Dignity is a useless concept” (2003) British Medical Journal 1419-1420.  
12
 See Macklin (2003) British Medical Journal 1420, Kass “Defending Human Dignity” in Human 
Dignity and Bioethics 298; see contra: TE Hill “In Defence of Human Dignity: Comments on Kant and 
Rosen” in Understanding Human Dignity 313 324-325. 
13
 See for example M Nussbaum “Human Dignity and Political Entitlements” Human Dignity and 
Bioethics 351 352; H Botha “Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective” (2009) 20 Stell LR 171 217; 
see also Hill “In Defence of Human Dignity” in Understanding Human Dignity 315-317 on the 
unification of diverse ideas of dignity. 
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namely dignity as empowering value, and dignity as constraint.14 Both of these 
conceptions of dignity are ultimately based on a Kantian understanding of dignity.15 
While it is seldom explicitly stated by the Constitutional Court, it is clear from a 
number of its judgments that it also follows a Kantian understanding of dignity.16 
Before these two conceptions of dignity and how they relate to a fair price rule is 
discussed, it may be instructive to engage in a brief discussion of the conceptual 
underpinnings of Kantian dignity, as well as the role of dignity in the South African 
constitutional dispensation.  
Closely related to a Kantian understanding of dignity, is the ideal of personal 
autonomy, i.e. the notion that individuals should be authors of their own lives,17 and 
that they should accordingly be granted the freedom and self-determination 
necessary to pursue their own ends.18 The link between these understandings of 
autonomy and dignity will be discussed in more detail below.19 
4 2 2 The role of dignity in the South African constitutional framework 
Human dignity is recognised by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 (“Constitution”) as both a foundational value of South African society that 
informs the interpretation of all other rights, and a discrete right in the Bill of Rights.20 
Section 10 of the Constitution states that: “Everyone has inherent dignity and the 
right to have their dignity respected.” The right to dignity, though not absolute, is non-
derogable along with the right to life, even in states of emergency. Section 7(1) also 
states that the Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of South African democracy, and affirms 
the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom. The limitation of rights 
                                            
14
 See for example R Brownsword “Freedom of Contract, Human Rights and Human Dignity” in D 
Friedmann & D Barak-Erez (eds) Human Rights in Private Law (2001) 181 183; D Bhana & M Pieterse 
“Towards a Reconciliation of Contract Law and Constitutional Values: Brisley and Afrox Revisited” 
(2005) 122 SALJ 865 880, 881; D Bhana “The Development of a Basic Approach for the 
Constitutionalisation of our Common Law of Contract” (2015) 26 Stell LR 3 17; GF Lubbe “Taking 
Fundamental Rights Seriously” (2004) 121 SALJ 395 421.  
15
 Brownsword “Freedom of Contract” in Human Rights 191. 
16
 See below at 4 2 4; S Cowan “Can Dignity Guide South Africa’s Equality Jurisprudence” (2001) 17 
SAJHR 34 54; L Ackermann Human Dignity: Lodestar for Equality in South Africa (2012) 99; Botha 
(2009) Stell LR 207; HM Du Plessis The Harmonisation of Good Faith and Ubuntu in the South African 
Common Law of Contract LLD Thesis, University of South Africa (2017) 274-276.  
17
 See prominently J Raz The Morality of Freedom (1986) 370-372. 
18
 See GF Lubbe & CM Murray Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary 3 ed (1988) 20, 21. 
19
 See 4 2 3-4 2 5.  
20
 Sections 1, 7, and 10 of the Constitution; see E Cameron “Dignity and Disgrace: Moral Citizenship 
and Constitutional Protection” in Understanding Human Dignity 467 474. 
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in terms of section 36 can furthermore only occur to the extent that it is reasonable 
and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality, 
and freedom.  
The Constitutional Court recognised in S v Makwanyane21 (henceforth 
Makwanyane) that dignity and the right to life are the most important rights, and form 
the source or foundation for all other personal rights. Dignity also functions as a 
residual right that is used to interpret and give shape to other rights, and is applied 
where more specific rights do not find application.22 Dignity is therefore sometimes 
referred to as supreme value, and as an interpretative Leitmotiv of the Constitution as 
a whole.23 
4 2 3 Kantian dignity 
It has been noted by a number of academic commentators that the Constitutional 
Court often makes use of the Kantian “object formulation” in its dignity 
jurisprudence.24 The object formulation of dignity is derived from the Kantian 
categorical imperative25 that we should act in such a manner that we treat humanity, 
both in our own person and in others, as an end in itself, and never merely as a 
means.26 According to Kant, human beings are bearers of dignity because of our 
capacity as individuals to choose our own ends, and the rational means by which we 
pursue those ends.27 Our rational agency therefore constitutes an important part of 
what distinguishes us from objects. Therefore, when we treat other persons merely 
as ends, we deny them the capacity to shape themselves and their environment, in 
effect reducing them to nothing more than objects.28 
In the view of Kant, everything has either a price (Preis[s]), or it has dignity 
(Würde). Those things which serve to satisfy human needs and inclinations have a 
                                            
21
 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) paras 144 and 328. 
22
 See Botha (2009) Stell LR 198. 
23
 Botha (2009) Stell LR 197.  
24
 This is discussed below at 4 2 4. 
25
 A categorical imperative can be understood in simple terms as a rule which must be observed in all 
circumstances, no matter what the objective; see M Rohlf “Immanuel Kant” in EN Zalta (ed) The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 ed) 5.4. 
26
 On the Kantian object formulation see Botha (2009) Stell LR 183-186; Ackermann Human Dignity 
54-58.  
27
 See M Cholbi Understanding Kant’s Ethics (2016) 40, 110.  
28
 Botha (2009) Stell LR 183. 
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price; their value is relative, and they can be exchanged for other things. That which 
Kant considers to be elevated above any price, and is therefore absolute, has 
dignity.29 As the bearers of dignity, humans enjoy a special status.30  
Selling a human into slavery, for example, violates a person’s dignity, as it places 
a limitation on the ability of an individual to control their own lives, and therefore 
restricts the scope of their agency.31 In the same vein Kant argues that a false 
promisor, for example someone who borrows money from another with no intention 
of paying it back, violates their duty to respect the dignity of others, as the ends of the 
lender play no role in the decision of the false promisor (in choosing to misrepresent 
their intention to repay the loan). By doing so the false promisor treats the capacity 
for choice of the lender not as worthy of respect, but as a simple tool or instrument.32 
4 2 4 The Kantian object formulation in the Constitutional Court 
While the Constitutional Court does not explicitly refer to the object formulation, it 
is clear from a number of judgments that it understands dignity in Kantian terms.33 
This is illustrated best in Makwanyane where the Constitutional Court struck down 
the death penalty on the basis that it reduced the convicted person to an object to be 
eliminated by the state,34 objectifying them as a tool for crime control,35 or treating 
them as objects to be toyed with.36 Especially in the context of judicial sentencing, 
courts have reiterated this position that the accused should not be treated simply as 
an object.37 
In Coetzee v Comitis38 the court found similarly that the rules of the National 
Soccer League, in terms of which players were transferred between teams, stripped 
players of their dignity as they were treated like objects, no different from a motor 
                                            
29
 Cholbi Kant’s Ethics 112; see I Kant, J Timmermann (ed) & M Gregor (transl) Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals: A German–English Edition (2011) 96-99. 
30
 Cholbi Kant’s Ethics 113. 
31
 112. 
32
 46. 
33
 See the discussion in Ackermann Human Dignity 99-102.  
34
 Para 26 per Chaskalson CJ. 
35
 Para 316 per Mokgoro J. 
36
 Brennan J in Furman v Georgia 408 US 238 at 272-3 (1972); cited with approval by O’Regan J in 
para 328 of Makwanyane; see also Ackermann Human Dignity 100. 
37
 See Botha (2009) Stell LR 202. 
38
 2001 1 SA 1254 (C). 
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vehicle. In MEC for Education: Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay39 the court also stated in the 
context of religious expression that a necessary element of freedom and dignity is 
that an individual is entitled to respect for the unique set of ends which he chooses to 
pursue. The conception of dignity discussed above can therefore be said to entail 
respecting the ends of others, and refraining from reducing them to objects.  
4 2 5 Two conceptions of dignity in contract law 
As indicated earlier, two separate conceptions, or dimensions of dignity are 
especially prominent in literature on the role of dignity in contract law: dignity as an 
empowering value that gives expression to the autonomy of contracting parties, and 
dignity as a constraint, that places a check on the “obscene excesses” of autonomy 
by requiring that contracting parties have a measure of regard for the interest of their 
contracting partners.40  
The conception of dignity as an empowering value is often said to support 
individual freedom and a classical liberal theory of contract law, based predominantly 
on values such as consent, freedom of contract, and the binding force of contracts.41 
The first part of this section will deal with the manner in which a fair price rule can 
promote this dimension or conception of dignity through protecting the autonomy of 
contracting parties. The second part of the chapter in turn will discuss the second 
conception or dimension of dignity, that of dignity as a constraint. The argument here 
is that if every human being possesses a certain inherent worth that is inviolable, and 
if the state takes a particular view about what it means to live a dignified life, then a 
state that is committed to the protection of dignity should introduce restrictions to the 
freedom which people have to make choices that interfere with their dignity, the 
dignity of others, or the dignity of the human race as a whole.42 The question is then 
whether a fair price rule can act as such a restriction.  
                                            
39
 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para 64. 
40
 This distinction emerged first in D Feldman “Human Dignity as a Legal Value: Part 1" (1999) Public 
Law 682 685; see also Du Plessis Good Faith and Ubuntu 215.  
41
 See Lubbe (2004) SALJ 421, Bhana (2015) Stell LR 17; see also D Bhana Constitutionalising 
Contract Law PhD Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand (2013) 5, 71; Du Plessis Good Faith and 
Ubuntu 282-283. 
42
 See Feldman (1999) Public Law 685.  
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4 2 6 The empowerment conception of dignity 
4 2 6 1 Introduction 
The empowerment-based conception of dignity grounds it in the rational agency 
which humans possess.43 It places emphasis on the capacity of individuals to make 
decisions about their own lives, to choose the ends which they wish to pursue, and to 
contribute to decisions which affect them.44 This conception of dignity is promoted 
through protecting the autonomous choices of individuals,45 and is therefore 
described as being an autonomy-based conception of dignity.46 
An empowerment conception of dignity is also said to support a so-called classical 
theory of contract law.47 This theory of contract law demands that individuals should 
be allowed to enter into contracts on their own terms, with a minimum level of state 
interference, and that these terms should subsequently be enforced.48 The autonomy 
of contracting parties, expressed through principles of the law of contract such as the 
will of the parties, consent, freedom of contract, and the binding force of contract, 
forms a theoretical cornerstone of the law of contract both locally,49 and 
internationally.50  
The understanding of dignity as an empowering value in South African contract 
law is most apparent in the judgment in Brisley v Drotsky51 where the Supreme Court 
of Appeal emphasised the relationship between party autonomy and dignity by 
stating that:  
“The Constitutional values of dignity and equality and freedom require that the courts 
approach their task of striking down contracts or declining to enforce them with perceptive 
                                            
43
 See Bhana & Pieterse (2005) SALJ 880, 881.  
44
 Feldman (1999) Public Law 685. 
45
 Bhana & Pieterse (2005) SALJ 881. 
46
 Bhana Constitutionalising Contract Law 5.  
47
 Lubbe (2004) SALJ 421; Du Plessis Good Faith and Ubuntu 220, 282-283. 
48
 See Lubbe & Murray Contract 20, 21; LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke, & GF Lubbe Contract 
General Principles 5 ed (2016) 22-23; see also E McKendrick Contract Law 11 ed (2015) 2-3.  
49
 See Van Huyssteen et al Contract 10, 11, 22-23; see also Bhana (2015) Stell LR 4, 9-12.  
50
 See for example; Article 1:102 PECL, Comment; Article 4:109 PECL, Comment A; Art.II.-1:102 
DCFR; Art 1 CESL 1: Freedom of contract; (2015) ERCL 220 221; H Eidenmüller “Why Withdrawal 
Rights” (2011) ERCL 1 2; F Rödl “Contractual Freedom, Contractual Justice, and Contract Law 
(Theory)” (2013) 76 Law and Contemporary Problems 57 59; E McKendrick Contract Law 11 ed 
(2015) 2-3.  
51
 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 94; the translation is from Lubbe (2004) SALJ 420. 
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restraint … contractual autonomy is part of freedom. Shorn of its obscene excesses, 
contractual autonomy informs also the constitutional value of dignity.” 
In Barkhuizen v Napier,52 the Constitutional Court noted in a similar manner that: 
“self-autonomy or the ability to regulate one’s own affairs, even to one’s detriment, is 
the very essence of freedom and a vital part of dignity.” The minority judgment of 
Ackermann J in Ferreira v Levin53 is similarly supportive of an autonomy-based 
approach to dignity. He argues that dignity without freedom is “little more than an 
abstraction”, and that a wide scope for freedom is necessary for the full development 
of the humanity of individuals.  
The empowerment-based conception of dignity also seems to align well with the 
traditional approach in the South African common law of contract. South African 
courts have attached great weight to the understanding of freedom of contract, 
encapsulated in the maxim pacta sunt servanda, that contracts entered into freely 
should be enforced.54 Already in 1903 Innes CJ stated for example in Burger v 
Central South African Railways55 that:  
“[O]ur law does not recognise the right of a court to release a contracting party from the 
consequences of an agreement duly entered into by him merely because that agreement 
appears to be unreasonable.”  
This might explain why Van den Heever JA found the doctrine of laesio enormis so 
offensive,56 and lead him to assert in Tjollo Ateljees57 in relation to the doctrine that: 
“In my opinion the doctrine that persons of full legal capacity can resile from a contract 
into which they have solemnly entered in the absence of fraud, duress or excusable 
mistake, was never part of the law of South Africa, and in the few cases in which it was 
applied, it was done so by mistake."  
4 2 6 2 Fair price rules as a mechanism to protect party autonomy 
The doctrine of laesio enormis, and indeed any fair price rule which allows 
contracting parties to escape a prima facie validly concluded contract, seems, at least 
                                            
52
 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 57. 
53
 Ferreira v Levin NO and Vryenhoek v Powell NO 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para 49.  
54
 See D Moseneke “Transformative Constitutionalism: Its Implications for the Law of Contract” (2009) 
20 Stell LR 3 9; DD Tladi “Breathing Constitutional Values into the Law of Contract: Freedom of 
Contract and the Constitution” (2002) 35 De Jure 306 308. 
55
 1903 TS 571 576. 
56
 Tladi (2002) De Jure 310 argues that Van den Heever JA refused to recognise the doctrine of laesio 
enormis as valid law primarily because it is in conflict with pacta sunt servanda. 
57
 Tjollo Ateljees (Eins) Bpk v Small 1949 1 SA 856 (A) 871. 
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on a superficial basis, to be at odds with party autonomy and an autonomy-based 
conception of dignity. However, this position may be regarded as rather simplistic. 
While it is indeed the norm that contracting parties should be held accountable for 
their decisions, recognising the dignity and autonomy of contracting parties also 
demands that they should not be held responsible for actions or decisions that were 
not of their own free will.58  
The doctrines of fraud, duress, and undue influence, or the rules regarding 
capacity to contract, are not viewed as exceptions to a law of contract based on party 
autonomy or the will of contracting parties, but are rather an integral part of such a 
system of contract. Where a contract is concluded by a party who does not have the 
capacity to exercise his or her autonomy (such as an infant),59 or where a contract 
was concluded due to duress, mistake, or another procedural defect, the law does 
not enforce this contract as it is not viewed as a proper expression of the autonomy 
of the contracting party.60  
It is unclear why fair price rules that require a combination of objective disparity 
and evidence of some (lesser) procedural defect, i.e. a problem with the formation of 
a party’s will, could not function in a similar fashion to protect the autonomy of 
contracting parties.  
Gross discrepancy arises often (but not exclusively) in contractual negotiations 
where one of the parties is able to exploit the circumstances of weakness or 
ignorance of the other contracting party. This is clear both from the legal systems 
studied in chapter 3, and the history of the doctrine of laesio enormis. The doctrine 
had its origin as a legal remedy aimed at protecting sellers of land who had fallen on 
hard times and had been coerced into selling land below its value.61 During the 
                                            
58
 See A Barak “Human Dignity” in Understanding Human Dignity 361 369. 
59
 See for example the short chapter on contractual capacity which is not available in the updated 
edition, in K Zweigert & H Kötz An Introduction to Comparative Law 2 ed (transl T Weir, 1992) 372 
380. Zweigert & Kötz suggest that the function of such a restriction is essentially protective, as minors 
are deemed to unable to exercise their judgement in a proper manner: see Edelstein v Edelstein NO 
1952 3 SA 1 (A) for a discussion of the historical position in South African contract law.  
60
 See Lubbe & Murray Contract 20, 21; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 10 on autonomy and its 
limitations, see also 94-96 on the concept of a defective will; see G Wagner “Mandatory Contract Law: 
Functions and Principles in Light of the Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights” (2010) 3 
Erasmus LR 47 57 for an explanation of how rules on procedural fairness protect the autonomy of 
contracting parties.  
61
 See 2 3 2 above.  
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Middle Ages the doctrine of laesio enormis flourished because it was viewed as a 
remedy to combat mistake, the abuse of bargaining power, and the exploitation of 
weakness.62  
Historically a number of commentators associated the doctrine of laesio enormis 
with fraud, or viewed gross discrepancy in the value of the respective performances 
as evidence of a procedural defect.63 In the early modern ius commune, a contract 
could be avoided due to laesio enormis; in cases where the disproportion did not 
meet the threshold of laesio enormis, the disproportion could also serve as evidence 
of metus or dolus.64 A similar approach was taken by the erstwhile Prussian Civil 
Code, which held that while a gross discrepancy in the value of performances did not 
void a contract in and of itself, it did lead to a presumption of mistake.65 A similar 
argument was made by English and US jurists of the 19th and 20th century, who 
argued that the rationale for not enforcing harsh bargains lay therein that a disparity 
in price should be considered evidence of fraud.66  
The simplest manner in which the link between gross discrepancy and the 
impairment of a contracting party’s consent could be explained, is to ask why 
someone would enter into a contract that is excessively one-sided. Other than when 
intending to make a gift, it can usually be assumed that a rational and informed 
individual in a competitive market would not agree to pay significantly more than the 
normal or market price for the merx.67 This was recognised by Grotius;68 it is not in 
the normal intention of parties to a contractual exchange to make a donation, or to 
enrich their opposing contracting party, at their own expense. 
A contracting party might however voluntarily pay marginally more than the market 
price for a good for a variety of reasons, but the greater the disproportion between 
                                            
62
 See 2 6 above. W Decock Theologians and Contract Law: The Moral Transformation of the Ius 
Commune (ca. 1500-1650) (2013) 602; see Lubbe & Murray Contract 386. 
63
 See 2 4 1 2 and 2 5 1 above; see also J Gordley “Equality in Exchange” (1981) 69 CLR 1587 1598-
1599 for a discussion of “fraud theory”. 
64
 See J du Plessis & R Zimmermann “The Relevance of Reverence; Undue Influence Civilian Style” 
(2003) 10 Maastricht J of European and Comparative Law 345 356-357.  
65
 See 3 3 2 above; Gordley (1981) CLR 1593. 
66
 See Gordley (1981) CLR 1598-1599, and 1601 for a similar argument from French jurists of the 19
th
 
century. 
67
 Smith (1996) LQR 142, 143; PS Atiyah Essays on Contract (1986) 334-335; Benson “Unity” in 
Theory of Contract Law 192. 
68
 As discussed above at 2 5 1; see De Jure Belli ac Pacis 2 12 11 1. 
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the market price and the contract price, the greater the chance that the 
disadvantaged contracting party was not acting voluntarily in choosing to pay this 
mark-up.69 There are of course exceptions to this general proposition. One such an 
exception might be that of the reckless purchaser briefly discussed in chapter 3, 
where a contracting party does not pay more because he is in distress, but instead 
does so because he is so wealthy that he is completely indifferent towards the price 
of a thing, i.e. to him money is no object.70 Another might be where they purposefully 
pay more because of personal affection for a certain good.71 In these two examples, 
neither of the respective fair price rules studied in Germany nor Austria would find 
application, precisely because one cannot assume in these circumstances that the 
disadvantaged party was not acting completely voluntarily. 
However, in the absence of such considerations, a third party external to the 
contract, such as a court, might reasonably conclude that some form of procedural 
defect is present in cases of gross discrepancy, i.e. that the will of the disadvantaged 
party is somehow impaired,72 even without direct proof thereof.73  
4 2 6 3 Conclusion 
Contracting parties enter into a large number of nominally valid contracts, where 
the consent of a contracting party is nevertheless potentially severely impaired, for 
example through the exploitation of their ignorance, circumstances of weakness,74 
the manipulation of cognitive biases,75 and the ubiquity of standard term contracts.76 
The contract cannot realistically be said to be a manifestation of the party autonomy 
                                            
69
 See 3 3 3 4 above; see also the discussion in Eidenmüller (2015) ERCL 225-227 
70
 See 3 3 3 4 above.  
71
 See 3 4 3 3 and 3 3 3 4 above.  
72
 Benson “Unity” in Theory of Contract Law 186; 192.  
73
 Smith (1996) LQR 148. 
74
 S Lohsse “Art 4:109: Excessive Benefit or Unfair Advantage” in N Jansen & R Zimmermann (eds) 
Commentaries on European Contract Laws (forthcoming 2018) [1].  
75
 For a discussion in the South African context see: S Eiselen & T Naudé “Introduction and Overview 
of the Consumer Protection Act” in Commentary on the CPA (OS 2014) paras 23-24; see on this topic 
generally YM Atamer “Why Judicial Control of Price Terms in Consumer Contracts might not always 
be the Right Answer - Insights from Behavioural Law and Economics” (2017) 80 MLR 624; O Bar-Gill 
Seduction by Contract (2012); H Collins “Reviews: Oren Bar-Gill Seduction by Contract: Law, 
Economics, and Psychology in Consumer Markets” (2014) 77 MLR 1030. 
76
 See for example T Naudé “Introduction to ss 48-52 and reg 44: Structure and Purpose” in 
Commentary on the CPA (RS 2 2017) para 9, 15; see also RA Posner Economic Analysis of Law 8 ed 
(2011) 145.  
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in many of these cases,77 yet little recourse is provided to contracting parties in South 
African contract law.  
Why is it that the South African common law of contract provides relief when 
advantage is taken of the trust and confidence of a contracting party, but fails to 
provide relief when advantage is taken of the economic distress or circumstances of 
need of contracting parties?78 In both of these cases advantage is taken of the 
weakness or vulnerability of the disadvantaged contracting party, yet South African 
contract law differentiates between these forms of advantage-taking without it being 
clear what the qualitative difference is.79 It is similarly unclear why South African 
contract law provides relief to contracting parties who conclude extortionate or 
usurious credit agreements due to inexperience or financial distress, but not to 
contracting parties who conclude similarly disadvantageous agreements of sale due 
to the same forms of weakness.80 
It could be argued that the failure to provide relief to the disadvantaged party in 
these cases where a defective will is apparent subverts the notion of pacta sunt 
servanda, and the idea that the contract is an expression of the free will of the 
contracting parties.81  
A fair price rule could serve to protect the autonomy and empowerment conception 
of dignity of the contracting parties in cases where the disproportion in the value of 
performances reveals that a defect in consent was highly likely at the conclusion of 
the contract; but where the contract could otherwise not be invalidated, either 
because no direct evidence exists of such a defect, or because the nature of the 
defect is not material enough by itself to lead to the invalidation of the contract.82  
In a system of contract law based on party autonomy, a fair price rule might 
therefore lead to a more comprehensive law of contract that is better able to protect 
the autonomy of vulnerable contracting parties. While the demands of legal certainty 
                                            
77
 See Lohsse “Art 4:109” in Commentaries [1];  
78
 See J du Plessis “Threats and Excessive Benefits or Unfair Advantage” in HL MacQueen & R 
Zimmermann (eds) European Contract Law: Scots and South African Perspectives (2006) 151 166. 
79
 166. 
80
 166-167.  
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 JE du Plessis “Illegal Contracts and the Burden of Proof” (2015) 132 SALJ 664 685. 
82
 See Smith (1996) LQR 142, 143; see also Gordley (1981) CLR 1629. 
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might make it undesirable to scrutinise every contract, the law needs to provide for 
some way in which the autonomy of disadvantaged contracting parties can be 
protected in situations where they contract from a position of weakness.83 Seen from 
the perspective of the legal community, there needs to be some control mechanism 
to set aside contracts in cases where a grossly disproportionate contract typically 
cannot be regarded as a valid expression of the autonomy of the contracting parties 
concerned.84 A fair price rule allows us to assert with a reasonable level of certainty 
that this is the case.  
There are limits to this argument, however. It is arguably a matter of policy how 
much a court should be willing to intervene to protect the autonomy of contracting 
parties, or what impairments of autonomy the law finds material enough to set aside 
agreements. It is, for example, unclear to what extent simple inexperience, or a lack 
of bargaining skill, should be regarded as material defects in autonomy.85 The 
traditional position in our law of contract has always been that contracting parties 
should contract at arm’s length, and only be responsible for looking after their own 
interests.  
Ultimately, it therefore appears that the protection of the autonomy of the 
disadvantaged party could only partially justify a fair price rule. The second part of 
this chapter shifts the focus from the impaired will of the weaker party, to the effect on 
the dignity of such a party. It is argued that the exercise of party autonomy should be 
limited where the detrimental consequences of a contract, and the circumstances 
under which it was concluded, indicate that it would impair the dignity of the 
disadvantaged party in an unacceptable manner 
                                            
83
 See the discussion in M Habersack & R Zimmermann “Legal Change in a Codified System: Recent 
Developments in Germany Suretyship Law” (1999) 3 Edinburgh LR 272 277. 
84
 279. 
85
 See Lohsse “Art 4:109” in Commentaries [5] who argues that the drafters of the CESL were correct 
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4 2 7 Dignity as a constraint  
4 2 7 1 Introduction 
The second conception of dignity, that of a constraint, is often said to be at odds 
with the empowerment conception of dignity, because society should not tolerate 
those exercises of autonomy that infringe on our dignity, the dignity of others, or the 
dignity of humanity in general.86 This conception of dignity might thus subvert, rather 
than enhance freedom.87 Considering the difficulties discussed above in defining or 
delineating the concept of dignity, choosing exactly when the choice of an individual 
interferes with dignity (of others or themselves) is, however, quite controversial.88  
Central to the Kantian understanding of dignity discussed above, is the idea that 
as human beings with the capacity to be moral agents we must treat others with 
respect, restraint, and as ends in themselves.89 O’Regan J in Makwanyane90 noted in 
a similar fashion that the right to dignity is an acknowledgement that human beings 
are entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and concern. The conception of dignity 
as a constraint in contract law is prominent in the Constitutional Court judgment of 
Botha v Rich NO,91 in which Nkabinde J, writing for the majority, states:  
“The principle of reciprocity [of contracts] falls squarely within this understanding of good 
faith and freedom of contract, based on one's own dignity and freedom as well as respect 
for the dignity and freedom of others. Bilateral contracts are almost invariably cooperative 
ventures where two parties have reached a deal involving performances by each in order 
to benefit both. Honouring that contract cannot, therefore, be a matter of each side 
pursuing his or her own self-interest without regard to the other party's interests. Good 
faith is the lens through which we come to understand contracts in that way.” 
This understanding of dignity therefore seems similar to the Kantian understanding 
of respect for (the ends of) others as expounded above in the object formulation. The 
requirement that we have a measure of concern for the ends of other contracting 
parties might thus be seen as flowing from the injunction against treating others 
                                            
86
 See Feldman (1999) Public Law 685; Bhana & Pieterse (2005) SALJ 881.  
87
 Lubbe (2004) SALJ 421; Du Plessis Good Faith and Ubuntu 221-223. 
88
 See for example M Rosaria Marella “Human Dignity in a Different Light” in S Grundmann (ed) 
Consitutional Values in European Contract Law (2008) 123 128-129  
89
 See Nussbaum “Human Dignity” in Human Dignity and Bioethics 353, 354; Lubbe (2004) SALJ 421-
422. 
90
 Para 328. 
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 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 46; see also the judgement in Mort v Henry Shields-Chiat 2001 1 SA 464 
(C) 475. 
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merely as objects.92 Respecting the dignity of other contracting parties might 
therefore require that contracting parties refrain from the absolute pursuit of their own 
self-interest where it results in the destruction of the ends of their contracting 
partners.  
It should be noted that Kantian dignity does not preclude us from using others as a 
means, inasmuch as it precludes us using others purely as means.93 Indeed we use 
others as means to our ends in everyday commercial dealings, where the humanity 
of the other party is arguably of little interest to us.94 However, it is the essence of 
cooperative behaviour, such as when a mutually beneficial exchange occurs, that our 
actions also fulfil the ends of others.  
4 2 7 2 Fair price rules as a method to promote the dignity of contracting parties 
How does a fair price rule relate to these considerations? A fair price rule seeks to 
achieve a measure of proportionality between the values of the respective contractual 
performances. It thus seeks to avoid a situation where the content of a contract is so 
excessively one-sided, and in outcome so detrimental to the disadvantaged party, 
that it is completely destructive to their ends.  
A fair price rule thus implicitly requires that (stronger) contracting parties cannot 
have regard only for their own interests, thereby reducing their contracting partners to 
mere objects or instruments, but that they should instead have a measure of regard 
for the interests which other contracting parties seek to pursue by entering into a 
contract.  
It has already been noted to above that parties to bilateral contracts arguably 
intend to conclude exchanges of approximately equal value.95 Lubbe has also drawn 
attention thereto that in jurisprudence on the right to dignity and its implications for 
the law of contract, regard needs to be had for the end that is addressed by the 
specific contract, in pursuit of which the contracting parties enter into the contract in 
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 See Lubbe (2004) SALJ 421. 
93
 See Cholbi Kant’s Ethics 43-44; Du Plessis Good Faith and Ubuntu 289.  
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 See Botha (2009) Stell LR 184-185 for a critique of the object formula which follows this line of 
reasoning. 
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 See 4 2 6 2 above. 
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question, as well as to the principle of reciprocity, which parties seek to achieve with 
the conclusion of bilateral contracts.96  
Naudé has argued in similar fashion that the right to dignity in the contractual 
context might entail that contracting parties should temper the pursuit of their own 
self-interest by a reasonable measure of concern for the interests of their contracting 
partners.97 In the view of Naudé, the protection granted to consumers against unfair 
contract terms could similarly be seen as giving effect to their Constitutional right to 
dignity.98 
Some understandings of human dignity also place emphasis thereon that in order 
for people to live dignified lives, to develop their potential, and to exercise their free 
will and autonomy, they need to attain at least a minimum level of subsistence.99 In 
the South African context the Constitution, and especially the socio-economic rights 
contained therein, arguably serve as an indication of what can be considered the 
necessarily elements for a dignified life.100  
However, it should be kept in mind that the impact of an imbalanced contract on 
the dignity of contracting parties is necessarily contextual, and the concern which the 
law should have for the infringement of their dignity depends in part on the 
circumstances of the specific case. Consider again the example of the reckless 
purchaser discussed above,101 who is so wealthy that he is indifferent to the price of 
the thing which he is buying. As he pays more for a thing not because of some form 
of weakness, but rather because money is no object to him, an imbalanced contract 
will have little effect on his ability to live a dignified life. This means that in order for a 
court to properly consider the impact which an imbalanced contract has on the 
contracting parties, it might need to inquire into the relative positions of the parties 
involved, and the circumstances under which the contract was concluded.  
                                            
96
 Lubbe (2004) SALJ 422; see also G Lubbe “Bona Fides, Billikheid en Openbare Belang” (1990) 1 
Stell LR 1 23-24. 
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 Naudé “Introduction to ss 48-52 and reg 44” in Commentary on the CPA para 8.  
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(2005) 21 SAJHR 1 1-3; Barak “Human Dignity” in Understanding Human Dignity 369. 
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4 2 7 3 A case study from Germany: The Bürgschaft case 
A good example of the logic of dignity as a constraint is provided by the famous 
decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in 
the so-called Bürgschaft (surety) case, where the court refused to enforce a surety 
agreement because it would have been inconsistent with protecting the private 
autonomy of the guarantor.102 Human dignity is regarded as a foundational principle 
in German law, and is closely related to private autonomy, which is “regarded as 
giving expression to the substantive meaning of human dignity”.103 
When discussing this example, it should be kept in mind that suretyships tend by 
their very nature to be one-sided. Since it therefore cannot be argued that equality in 
exchange is intended in surety agreements, fair price rules would logically not find 
application to such agreements. Indeed it is stressed in some literature that rules 
which focus on defects in consent, and especially undue influence on the surety, are 
better able to provide relief to disadvantaged parties in these cases.104 The example 
therefore relates to the manner in which the court applied the logic of dignity as a 
constraint in refusing to enforce an excessively one-sided contract in order to protect 
the dignity and autonomy of the weaker contracting party.  
The case concerned a daughter who at age 21, with only meagre income and no 
professional training, entered into a surety agreement with a bank for the debts of her 
father.105 Although initially not an exorbitant sum, these debts increased within two 
years to an amount equal to more than a million euro; more than she would ever be 
able to pay back.  
The case was referred to the Bundesverfassungsgericht on the basis that the 
decision to enforce the contract had infringed on her basic rights to live a dignified 
life,106 and to party autonomy (“the right to free development of the human 
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personality”)107 guaranteed under articles 1(1) and 2(1) of the German Constitution 
(“Grundgesetz”) respectively,108 as well as going against the “Social State Principle” 
(Soziaalstaatprinzip) contained in articles 20(1) and 28(1) of the Grundgesetz,109 
which mandates that the actions of the state should be directed at the attainment of 
certain social-economic and social-political aims (such as ensuring that all citizens 
enjoy a minimum level of welfare).  
The guarantor argued that the economic burden placed on her by the contract 
violated her human dignity in that it would reduce her to an object, and severely 
restrict her ability to maintain a dignified existence.110 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht noted that, while the private autonomy of both 
parties could be raised in equal measure in private law disputes, if the will of one 
party dominates over the will of the other to such an extent that said party can 
unilaterally establish the content of the contract, and if the content is exceptionally 
detrimental to the other party, the law needs to intervene in order to protect the 
private autonomy of the structurally weaker party.111 This duty to “interfere 
correctively” stemmed from the need to protect a person’s private autonomy under 
article 2(1) of the Grundgesetz.112  
In the case at hand the Bundesverfassungsgericht found that the manner in which 
the contract was concluded, the one-sided nature thereof, and the exceptional risk 
assumed, placed a duty on the bank to inform the guarantor of the nature and scope 
of her obligations (despite no such a general duty existing).113 In denying such a duty 
to inform, the court from which the appeal was heard, the Bundesgerichtshof, had 
failed to protect the autonomy of the weaker party.114 After being redirected back to 
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the Bundesgerichtshof, the agreement was declared null and void under § 138 (1) 
BGB,115 since it was held to be contra bonos mores.116  
The conception of dignity as a constraint could be applied in similar fashion in the 
application of a fair price rule. The logic of dignity as a constraint might thus support 
the proposition that a court should set aside contracts if the detrimental 
consequences of the contract, and the circumstances under which it was concluded, 
indicate that it would impair the dignity of the disadvantaged party in an unacceptable 
manner.117  
Lubbe has argued in similar fashion that the conception of dignity as a constraint is 
reflected in the decision in Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes,118 where the court found that a 
contract which was so one-sided, and its terms so oppressive, that it would have the 
effect of depriving the disadvantaged party of his income and means of supporting 
his family, in effect reducing him to a slave, was contrary to public policy.119  
A fair price rule might therefore give expression to the conception of dignity as a 
constraint through limiting the “obscene excesses” of the exercise of party autonomy. 
It has been argued above that respecting the dignity of other contracting parties 
requires the curtailment of self-interest, in favour of showing a measure of regard for 
the interests of other contracting parties.  
In extreme circumstances such an approach might justify the setting aside of a 
contract based merely on the grossly disproportionate nature of the price. In the 
majority of cases it would, however, be more appropriate for a court to take into 
account the circumstances under which the contract was concluded in order to better 
understand the effect which the contract has on the ability of the disadvantaged party 
to live a dignified life.  
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 See 3 3 3 above. 
116
 Mak Fundamental Rights 79. 
117
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 1989 1 SA 1 (A). 
119
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4 2 7 4 Fair price rules as a manifestation of the concept of Ubuntu 
It is sometimes stated that contract law seems to be resistant to the notion of 
Ubuntu,120 and that it is highly desirable and necessary that the law of contract 
should be infused with constitutional values such as Ubuntu.121 The meaning of the 
concept Ubuntu, and close relationship which it has with human dignity, have been 
elaborated on in a number of Constitutional Court cases, and especially in the dicta 
of Justice Mokgoro.122  
A more comprehensive discussion of the meaning of Ubuntu, and the role it can 
play in South African contract law is beyond the scope of the current study. The 
second part of this chapter has argued that a fair price rule can give expression to the 
conception of dignity as a restraint, which requires that we should have a respect and 
a measure of regard for the interests of other contracting parties. It would seem that 
an understanding of Ubuntu, which places an emphasis on mutual respect, and the 
recognition of the humanity and dignity inherent in others,123 would support the 
institution of a fair price rule, as a concrete manifestation of this duty to respect the 
humanity of others.  
4 2 7 5 Fair price rules as a manifestation of good faith 
Although calls for a greater role for good faith abound in the South African contract 
law,124 it has been the standard position, reflected in judgments like Brisley v 
Drotsky,125 that good faith does not function as an independent or free-floating basis 
which can be used to escape from, or set aside, contractual agreements that appear 
                                            
120
 TW Bennet “Ubuntu: An African Equity” in F Diedrich (ed) Ubuntu, Good Faith & Equity: Flexible 
Legal Principles in Developing a Contemporary Jurisprudence (2011) 3 13; Du Plessis Good Faith and 
Ubuntu 175. 
121
 See for example Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 
(CC) para 71; D Cornell “A Call for Nuanced Constitutional Jurisprudence: Ubuntu, Dignity, and 
Reconciliation” (2004) 19 SAPL 666. 
122
 For an overview of these judgments see Bennet “Ubuntu” in Ubuntu, Good Faith & Equity 5-12; see 
also Cornell (2004) SAPL 669-673 on the interrelation of a Kantian approach to dignity and Ubuntu, as 
well on the approach of Mokgoro J, to Ubuntu; see also Du Plessis Good Faith and Ubuntu 95-98.  
123
 See for example the explanation provided by Justice JY Mokgoro writing extra-judicially in: JY 
Mokgoro “Ubuntu as a Legal Principle in an Ever-Changing World” in F Diedrich (ed) Ubuntu, Good 
Faith & Equity: Flexible Legal Principles in Developing a Contemporary Jurisprudence (2011) 1.  
124
 See for example AM Louw “Yet Another Call for a Greater Role for Good Faith in the South African 
Law of Contract” (2013) 16 Potchefstroom Electronic LJ 44; D Bhana & M Pieterse “Towards a 
Reconciliation of Contract Law and Constitutional Values: Brisley and Afrox Revisited” (2005) 122 
SALJ 865 889-890.  
125
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to be unfair on unreasonable.126 Good faith, it is argued, is too abstract and 
indeterminate, and therefore too dependent on the subjective values of the judge to 
function by itself as a substantive legal rule.127 Rather it is usually submitted that 
good faith is a principle or ethical value that underlies and informs our law of 
contract.128 It can fulfil a creative function in the development of substantive rules of 
contract, a controlling function through already established rules of contract law, and 
a legitimising function in relation to existing legal rules.129 
Good faith as a legal norm has been described as a standard of honest, open, and 
considerate behaviour, characterised by acting with due regard,130 or a minimum 
degree of respect for the interests of opposing contracting parties.131 It was similarly 
stated in the passage from Botha v Rich NO132 quoted above, that the understanding 
of good faith of the court entails respect for the freedom and dignity of others. The 
judgment in Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd,133 
placed renewed emphasis on the importance of good faith and suggested that good 
faith might in fact attain a more prominent role in future in South African contract 
law.134  
Good faith has functioned historically to infuse the South African law of contract 
with an equitable spirit,135 and has been closely tied with concepts of justice, 
                                            
126
 For an analysis of the position with regards to the role of good faith in contract law after this 
judgment see Lubbe (2004) SALJ 396-399; see also D Hutchison “Non-Variation Clauses in Contract: 
Any Escape from the Shifren Straitjacket?” (2001) 118 SALJ 720 743; FDJ Brand “The Role of Good 
Faith, Equity and Fairness in the South African Law of Contract: The Influence of the Common Law 
and the Constitution” (2009) 126 SALJ 71 80-83; see also the judgment in Bredenkamp v Standard 
Bank of SA Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) para 39. 
127
 See for example Lubbe & Murray Contract 390, 391. 
128
 Hutchison (2001) SALJ 743; D Hutchison “Good Faith in Contract the South African Law of 
Contract” in R Brownsword, NJ Hird, & G Howells Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context (1999) 
213; see also Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) 
para 22.  
129
 See Van Huyssteen et al Contract 313; see Brand (2009) SALJ 82; Hutchison (2001) SALJ 744; 
see also South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 3 SA 323 (SCA). 
130
 See S Whittaker & R Zimmermann “Good Faith in European Contract Law: Surveying the Legal 
Landscape” in R Zimmermann & S Whittaker (eds) Good Faith in European Contract Law (2000) 7 31.  
131
 See R Zimmermann “Good Faith and Equity” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern Cross: 
Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 217 259-260; Naudé “Introduction to ss 48-52 and 
reg 44” in Commentary on the CPA para 8; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 313; Bhana & Pieterse 
(2005) SALJ 890; see also the definition of good faith and fair dealing in DCFR I.-1:103 (1), and 
Art 2(b) CESL, which define “good faith” in a similar fashion.  
132
 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 46. 
133
 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) para 22. 
134
 See in this regard: Du Plessis Good Faith and Ubuntu 170-175. 
135
 See Zimmermann “Good Faith and Equity” in Southern Cross 218-220. 
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reasonableness, and fairness.136 It was also noted above that the medieval civilians 
viewed the prohibition against overreaching (i.e. against exacting a harsh bargain) as 
flowing from the general principle of good faith.137 As discussed in chapter 2, the 
Roman-Dutch jurist Voet seems to have similarly viewed the doctrine of laesio 
enormis as an expression of the general action based on good faith.138 It has similarly 
been stated that the fair price rule in Article 3.2.7 PICC is an expression of the 
principle of good faith and fair dealing.139 
All of these characterisations of good faith, both locally and internationally, have in 
common that they require that contracting parties should show some regard or 
respect for the interests of other contracting parties. It would seem therefore that a 
fair price rule, based in part on the argument explained above, that contracting 
parties should have a measure of regard for the interests of other contracting parties 
and therefore refrain from the conclusion of grossly disproportionate contracts, could 
function to give concrete expression to the abstract principle and value of good faith.  
4 2 7 6 Conclusion 
While it is often argued that values such as dignity, good faith, and Ubuntu should 
play a greater role in South African contract law,140 there seems to be a lack of entry 
points for such normative values to find expression in legal rules. Construed and 
understood as set out above, a fair price rule can serve to promote and protect the 
dignity of contracting parties; both within an empowerment conception of dignity, 
where it serves to protect the autonomy of contracting parties in situations where it is 
likely that their will was somehow impaired at the time of contract conclusion, and 
within a constraint conception of dignity, where it can give effect to the Kantian 
imperative that we should not act in such a way that others are reduced to mere 
                                            
136
 See Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis 1980 1 SA 645 (A) 651; Botha v 
Rich NO 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 45; Brand (2009) SALJ 73. 
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 J Gordley “Good Faith in the Medieval Ius Commune” in Good Faith in European Contract Law 93 
102.  
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 See 2 5 1 above; see also Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 18 5 4; RWM Dias “Laesio Enormis: 
The Roman Dutch Story” in D Daube (ed) Studies in Roman Law of Sale (1959) 46 47. 
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 JE du Plessis “Grounds for Avoidance” in S Vogenauer (ed) Commentary on the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2 ed (2015) 511. 
140
 See for example: D Davis “Private Law after 1994: Progressive Development or Schizoid 
Confusion?” (2008) 24 SAJHR 318; see also the citations above in nn 124 and 121.  
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objects. In a similar fashion, it is argued that a fair price rule can give concrete 
expression to the abstract values of Ubuntu and good faith.  
4 3 Legal certainty 
It is often argued that granting courts the equitable discretion to set aside contracts 
on the basis of unfairness or unreasonableness would lead to a greater degree of 
legal and commercial uncertainty.141 Judges might be tempted to set aside contracts 
merely because it offends against their idiosyncratic sense of justice or fairness.142 
This would in turn lead to vexatious and opportunistic litigation as contracting parties 
attempt to escape bad bargains.143  
However, a fair price rule must be clearly distinguished from some broad rule that 
grants judges blanket discretion to strike down contracts which they deem to be 
unfair. Properly construed, a fair price rule will only grant parties an opportunity to 
escape a contract under a specific set of circumstances, which should not apply to 
the overwhelming majority of contractual agreements.  
A comparative perspective reveals that as more binding case law is created on the 
topic of a fair price rule, judges would increasingly rely on guidelines and precedent 
laid down by the courts. In this sense the introduction of a fair price rule might be 
compared to the introduction of undue influence as a ground for setting aside a 
contract in Preller v Jordaan.144 Any such a change initially creates a measure of 
uncertainty, which is mitigated as the legal position becomes clearer over time.  
There is also evidence that, in the absence of a mechanism such as a fair price 
rule that gives courts a clear metric for setting aside grossly unfair contracts, courts 
tend do so anyway by making use of a variety of non-systematic and blurry 
concepts,145 or by stretching traditional grounds of procedural unfairness,146 such as 
fraud,147 economic duress,148 undue influence,149 or inequality of bargaining power.150  
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 See for example M Wallis “The Common Law’s Cool Ideas for Dealing with Ms Hubbard” (2015) 
132 SALJ 940 958-960; Hutchison (2001) SALJ 743-744; Brand (2009) SALJ 81. 
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It can be observed that fair price rules exist in a number of foreign jurisdictions as 
discussed in chapter 3, yet there is little evidence, for example, that an untenable 
degree of legal uncertainty has been created in Germany through use of courts of the 
power to strike down unfair agreements in terms of § 138 (1) BGB. In Austria, an 
amendment of § 935 ABGB in 1979151 prohibited the contractual exclusion of 
§ 934 ABGB, which had the effect that the application of the doctrine of laesio 
enormis went from being excluded routinely by standard contract terms, to being 
available (to consumers) in all transactions. However, Austrian literature from the 
period reveals little indication of the great upheaval which many suggest would follow 
from the sudden introduction of such a stringent fair price rule based almost 
exclusively on disproportion.152  
It can also be noted that much of the legal uncertainty caused by the doctrine of 
laesio enormis before its abolition in South Africa was arguably due to a number of 
open questions regarding its application, and not by uncertainty inherent in the rule 
itself.153 Since the promulgation of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008, South 
African consumer contract law has also had a type of fair price rule in section 
48(1)(a)(i) of the Act,154 without any obvious indication of wide-spread abuse or 
opportunistic application of the provision.  
While it is difficult to estimate ex ante, it would seem that the introduction of a fair 
price rule might not necessarily have the dire effect on legal certainty which is 
                                                                                                                                        
that substantive fairness plays no role in judging the validity of a contract, they do indeed take the 
substantive fairness of the contract price into account in practice.  
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 See A Fleming “The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the ‘Law of the Poor’” (2014) 102 
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sometimes attributed to other remedies which afford judges an equitable discretion. 
As with any change of a legal rule, and especially with the introduction of a rule which 
requires a measure of discretion to be exercised, there is bound to be, at least 
temporarily, some increase in uncertainty.155 If the rule is properly construed, and the 
courts are transparent in setting out how the rule functions, this uncertainty could be 
mitigated.156  
Lastly it should be noted that while legal certainty is an important pragmatic 
consideration that should not be belittled, it is not paramount. There might therefore 
be cases where the interests of justice should prevail over the maintenance of legal 
certainty when these two values do come into conflict.157 
4 4 Economic efficiency 
4 4 1 Introduction 
It is sometimes asserted that a fair price rule is unfit for the modern market 
economy,158 or that it is in the interest of the functioning of the free market economy 
that courts not become involved in price control.159 The knowledge that freely-
concluded contracts will be enforced, regardless of whether or not they are fair, 
promotes legal and economic certainty, which is essential for the functioning of the 
free-market economy.160  
However, it is difficult to find empirical evidence on a macro-economic level of the 
effect of fair price rules. As was noted above in relation to certainty, there are many 
jurisdictions in which a variety of fair price rules exist, and yet there appears to be 
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 See for example the discussion in the judgment of Sachs J in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 
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little indication that § 138 BGB, or § 934 AGBG have had adverse economic effects 
in Germany or Austria.161  
Standard economic theory in relation to price formation operates on the 
assumption that prices do not need to be controlled as market forces are adequate 
for achieving an efficient allocation of resources.162 The market is supposedly 
populated by rational and well-informed contract parties who enter into contracts in 
order to maximise their utility.163 These utility-maximising consumers on the one side, 
and profit-maximising producers on the other, operate in a perfectly competitive 
market, and will therefore agree on the most economically efficient equilibrium 
price.164 The standard position is therefore that all contracts that are entered into 
voluntarily, and do not produce negative externalities, should be enforced.165 
However, this model depends on a number of assumptions that are constantly 
challenged in practice.166 Not only are markets routinely full of imperfections,167 but 
consumers are also routinely ill-informed and seemingly irrational in their choices.168 
It should also be noted that where the ability of contracting parties to make a rational 
choice is somehow impaired (such as in situations where they are acting under the 
influence of fraud or duress) their promises should not necessarily be enforced as 
they might not lead to an efficient resource allocation.169  
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4 4 2 The economic efficiency of fair price rules 
Against this background, Eidenmüller has engaged most recently and directly with 
the question of whether a fair price rule would be economically efficient.170 According 
to him, legal rules can be considered economically efficient if they maximise or 
increase societal welfare.171 Eidenmüller has earlier adopted the view that a contract 
is inefficient if the cost (usually the price in a competitive market) exceeds the benefit 
that accrues to the consumer (or the disadvantaged contracting party in our case).172 
He comes to the conclusion that a fair price rule as proposed in the CESL,173 which 
requires only objective disproportion between the value of the respective 
performances in order for the contract to be set aside, would be inefficient.174 He 
advances two primary arguments for this conclusion:  
He argues firstly that the objective discrepancy required by the fair price rule in the 
CESL is simply too little, as it merely refers to a “significant imbalance” between the 
value of the performances.175 By contrast, if the objective discrepancy required had 
been great, for example 100% of the market price of the good (as with the doctrine of 
laesio enormis), this would in his view establish at least a rebuttable presumption that 
the disadvantaged party had acted against his interest by concluding a transaction 
that resulted in a net welfare reduction, and is therefore inefficient.176 Both the late 
scholastics and the Roman-Dutch authorities similarly recognised that minor 
deviations from the market price are to be unavoidable in a market economy, and 
that contract law is therefore only able to correct significant deviations from the 
market price.177 However, the greater the deviation from the market price, the less 
likely it becomes that the benefit that accrues to the disadvantaged party is greater 
than the cost, and in this sense the contract is more likely to be inefficient.  
Eidenmüller argues secondly that if a fair price rule only looks at objective 
disproportion, and not at the contract conclusion, it is not possible to assert with 
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reasonable certainty that the contract was inefficient.178 He highlights that there may 
be a variety of reasons why one party would voluntarily pay more than the market 
price, even if it is just incrementally more.179 The excess might for example be 
intended a partial donation, or as a signal to the other party that they will take good 
care of the merx.180 It is therefore difficult to assert based only on objective 
disproportion that a contract is inefficient. If by contrast there is evidence of a 
procedural defect in the conclusion of the contract, such as the abuse of 
circumstances, economic duress, information asymmetries, or an inability of one of 
the parties to understand the benefits of a complex contract, it could be asserted that 
the circumstances under which the contract was concluded create a significant 
likelihood that the disadvantaged party was not able to act in their best interest.181  
While it is difficult to assert that all contracts of a certain type will necessarily be 
efficient, or vice versa, the position that excessive contract prices which are induced 
by the exploitation of circumstances should not be enforced seems to be supported 
by almost all academics who engage with the topic.182  
This example can best be understood within the context of rescue at sea. Suppose 
a rescue ship operated by a salvage company finds a distressed ship at sea, and 
offers to tug it back to shore for an excessive price, many times above the customary 
market price for such a service, equal to almost the entire value of the ship and its 
cargo.183 Both parties are in this case better off if they choose to enter into the 
contract; prima facie it is therefore not a disadvantageous or inefficient contract.184 
The captain of the ship would lose his ship and his cargo if he does not enter into the 
contract. Any price below the total worth of that would therefore be beneficial to him. 
The question then is whether this excessive price should later be enforced? The 
answer in admiralty law,185 French law,186 and the US law187 is that the excessive 
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price should not be enforced. The rescuer should instead be awarded a reasonable 
fee for their services.188  
A number of reasons are provided for why the excessive price should not be 
enforced. Shavell argues that allowing excessive prices imposes a high risk on 
individuals that their circumstances might be exploited, which necessitates taking 
excessive and often socially costly precautions, while a modest or reasonable fee 
might also have effected rescue.189 Landes and Posner have shown in similar 
fashion that enforcing the excessive price would lead to an inefficient allocation of 
resources spent both on precautionary measures on the side of those in risk, and to 
excessive resources being allocated to rescue operations by parties wishing to 
extract extortionate terms from those in distress.190 Eidenmüller argues that allowing 
an excessive price to be charged in such cases might even incentivise rescuers to 
create such “rescue situations” so that they might exploit them for their own gain.191  
There may therefore be two primary reasons why grossly disproportionate 
contracts might be inefficient. First, the grossly disproportionate nature of the 
contract, and the circumstances under which it was concluded, may reflect a 
significant likelihood that the disadvantaged party acted against his best interest. 
Secondly, such contracts might create inefficient incentives for the contracting 
parties, or for third parties as demonstrated in the example regarding rescue 
situations above.192  
A number of other theories have been advanced that might be said to support the 
economic efficiency of fair price rules. Eric Posner has attempted to show for 
example that doctrines which prohibit unconscionable or usurious contracts serve a 
desirable social function as they deter or mitigate socially costly behaviour such as 
the extension of high risk debt to those in a vulnerable position, and especially to the 
poor.193 Buckley has also tried to show that unconscionability doctrines can be 
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justified in terms of incentive theories, as well as in terms of cooperation theories. 
Buckley, relying on the assumption that price control by courts will change the 
expectations of contracting parties in bargaining situations,194 argues that while a fair 
price rule might lead to the setting aside of some efficient contracts over the short 
term, it may in fact lead to a significant increase in the number of contracts being 
concluded, since contracting parties will react to the introduction of fairness norms by 
adopting a more co-operative, or less extreme bargaining approach.195  
Smith has attempted to show that excessive prices lead to a deadweight loss as 
potential contracting parties are priced out of the market and contracts which would 
otherwise have been mutually beneficial are never concluded.196  
4 4 3 Conclusion 
In this section it has been argued that the economic effect of a fair price rule is 
ambiguous. It is clear from the number of jurisdictions with a fair price rule that it is by 
no means fatal to the modern market economy. Nevertheless it may lead to efficiency 
losses where and if efficient contracts are set aside. Properly construed, however, 
such a rule might lead to some efficiency gains where it functions to allow parties to 
escape from economically inefficient contracts, or to prevent rent-seeking behaviour 
by those wishing to exploit the circumstances of others.  
4 5 Conclusion 
Would the recognition of a fair price rule be a desirable development in our 
common law of contract?  
This chapter has demonstrated that a fair price rule is not incompatible with a 
theory of contract that values the dignity or autonomy of contracting parties, as some 
of its detractors would suggest. On the contrary such a rule would arguably lead to a 
more comprehensive law of contract that is better able to protect the autonomy of 
vulnerable contracting parties where the disproportion in the value of contractual 
performances reveals that a defect in consent was highly likely at the conclusion of 
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the contract, and that the contract therefore cannot be regarded as a valid expression 
of the autonomy of the contracting parties concerned. In this way, a fair price rule 
promotes the empowerment conception of dignity.  
The protection of autonomy is, however, only part of the justification of a fair price 
rule. Through setting aside grossly disproportionate contracts, especially where they 
are destructive to the ends of weaker contracting parties, and thereby limiting the 
“obscene excesses” of the exercise of party autonomy, a fair price rule can also give 
expression to the conception of dignity as a constraint. In similar fashion, the implicit 
duty to respect the ends of opposing contracting parties can be viewed as a 
manifestation of the values of good faith, and Ubuntu.  
The effect which the introduction of a fair price rule would have on both legal 
certainty and economic efficiency is rather more ambiguous. While it needs to be 
conceded that it will lead to both a measure of legal uncertainty, as well as the 
avoidance of at least some economically efficient contracts, it is argued that the 
presence of fair price rules in a number of prominent foreign jurisdictions suggests 
that it is neither fatal to legal certainty nor economic efficiency. It could also be 
argued on the contrary, that properly construed a fair price rule might in fact lead to 
efficiency gains through setting aside inefficient contracts, and through removing 
incentives which lead to inefficient behaviour on the part of contracting parties.  
The extent to which fair price rules can give effect to these values will ultimately be 
a function of how these rules will be construed and applied in practice. It is to this 
question that the study will now turn.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE APPLICATION OF FAIR PRICE RULES  
5 1 Introduction 
Perhaps the most common criticism of a fair price rule is that it is difficult to 
determine how it should function.1 Thomasius famously compared the doctrine of 
laesio enormis to a hydra, with every question answered giving rise to another two.2 
Prior to its abolition, the doctrine of laesio enormis was similarly criticised in South 
Africa due to the many questions regarding its application. Was it for example 
applicable to contracts other than sale, and could it be applied to movables, and if so, 
to all movables, or only to expensive movables? Could it be applied where 
speculation was inherent in the sale?3 And so forth. These considerations led 
Watermeyer CJ, to remark in Tjollo Ateljees (Eins) Bpk v Small (“Tjollo Ateljees”)4 
that it was virtually impossible to arrive at any certainty with regard to the legal 
principles underlying the application of the doctrine.  
However, it may be questioned whether these problems are indeed so serious that 
they stand in the way of the recognition of a fair price rule in modern South African 
contract law. Much of the criticism in legal literature relates specifically to the doctrine 
of laesio enormis, and the very apparent shortcomings in its application. If the 
legislator and the courts are pro-active and transparent in setting out how a fair price 
rule functions, many of these challenges could potentially be avoided. How could a 
fair price rule be construed so as to avoid these familiar pitfalls? This chapter will 
seek to provide some answers to this question, mainly by examining how fair price 
rules function comparatively in the legal systems studied in chapter 3, and by 
assessing these approaches against the values studied in chapter 4.  
                                            
1
 See for example H Eidenmüller “Justifying Fair Price Rules in Contract Law” (2015) 11 ERCL 220 
222; R Zimmermann The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 263. 
2
 See the discussion in Zimmermann Obligations 263. 
3
 See for example the discussion on the doctrine in HR Hahlo & E Kahn “Two Important Changes in 
the Common Law” (1952) 69 SALJ 392 393-396; see also J Barnard “Unfairness of Price and the 
Doctrine of Laesio Enormis in Consumer Sales” (2013) 76 THRHR 521 524-526 for a brief overview of 
cases involving the doctrine of laesio enormis in South African before its abolition; see also Cotas v 
Williams 1947 2 SA 1154 (T) 1162. 
4
 1949 1 SA 856 (A) 860. 
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5 2 What is a fair price / iustum pretium? 
5 2 1 What should be used as the guideline for the fair price? 
The preceding comparative and historical chapters revealed a general 
understanding that the fairness of a price is usually determined with reference to 
market prices.5 The fair price is defined as the market price by law in Austria,6 and 
Louisiana,7 and is understood as such by courts in Germany.8 This also seems to 
have been the practice of courts in South Africa before the doctrine of laesio enormis 
was abolished.9  
However, just because the market price traditionally is used as the guideline for a 
fair price, it does not follow that it is necessarily the best approach, or that a number 
of other approaches cannot be considered in the determination of a fair price. The 
next section will briefly consider various approaches which are prominent in historical 
and comparative literature, and consider what value these approaches might have for 
modern South African law.  
5 2 1 1 Metaphysical or intrinsic value 
The idea (often wrongly) associated with medieval jurists that the doctrine of laesio 
enormis (or any fair price rule for that matter) conceived of a fair price as some 
metaphysical, intrinsic, or natural value inherent in a thing still persists despite the 
fact that there is little evidence of such a practice ever existing, and that it has seldom 
been advocated by anyone.10 Viewing price as a product of the metaphysical 
properties of a thing is fundamentally incompatible with modern economic thinking, 
as it is recognised today that price is a function of a variety of factors such as the 
                                            
5
 See 2 6 above. 
6
 See § 304 AGBG as discussed in 3 4 2 above, as well as B Eccher & O Riss in H Koziol, P Bydlinski, 
& R Bollenberger (eds) ABGB Kurzkommentar 5 ed (2017) § 304 [1]. 
7
 See 3 5 4 1 above.  
8
 See 3 3 4. See also M Winner Wert und Preis im Zivilrecht (2008) 222-223.  
9
 See below at 5 2 2 1; see also Barnard (2013) THRHR 524-525.  
10
 See A Perrone “The Just Price Doctrine and Contemporary Contract Law: Some Introductory 
Remarks” (2014) 125 Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali 217 222-223; SA Smith “In Defence of 
Substantive Unfairness” (1996) 112 LQR 138 142. 
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cost, scarcity, and demand for a certain good or service.11 Metaphysical or intrinsic 
value therefore cannot serve as the guideline for a just price.12 
5 2 1 2 Cost of production 
While the market price was generally understood as the fair price, many prominent 
writers referred to the cost of production in determining a fair price. The Roman-
Dutch writer Grotius, for example, favoured using the market price of a good as a 
guideline for the fair price, but also recognised that account should be taken of the 
labour and expenses involved in the production of a thing.13 Thomas Aquinas, 
especially in his earlier work, similarly advocated for an understanding of just price 
that took account of the production cost of a good.14  
It makes intuitive sense that some or other relationship should exist between the 
cost to produce a thing, and the cost to acquire it on the open market (i.e. its market 
price). This position is corroborated by standard economic theory. Under conditions 
of perfect competition a firm maximises profit through producing a certain good up to 
the point where the economic cost the firm incurs in producing one more of the good 
is equal to the revenue which it receives from selling it (i.e. the market price of the 
product).15 In a perfectly competitive market, the market price should in theory 
therefore be equal to the marginal cost of production. It is therefore considered 
conventional knowledge that a firm cannot charge more than the cost of producing 
the product in a perfectly competitive market.16  
However, while the cost of production seems promising as a guideline for the just 
price, it presents a number of difficulties in practice. On the demand side, prospective 
buyers often do not possess the necessary information or perfect rationality ascribed 
to them in theory, and therefore do not always respond as expected to increases or 
                                            
11
 See the discussion directly below in 5 2 1 2. 
12
 See Smith (1996) LQR 142; J Gordley “Equality in Exchange” (1981) 69 CLR 1587 1604-1605. 
13
 See GF Lubbe “Taking Fundamental Rights Seriously” (2004) SALJ 395, 400. 
14
 See 2 4 2 3 2 above.  
15
 See P Sutherland & K Kemp Competition Law of South Africa (2017) 1.4.1 for an explanation of the 
behaviour of a single producer in a perfectly competitive market. If the market price is higher than the 
cost of producing one more product, then the producer will increase his profit by increasing production; 
see also L Kelly, D Unterhalter, I Goodman, P Smith, & P Youens Principles of Competition Law in 
South Africa (2017) 23.  
16
 See YM Atamer “Why Judicial Control of Price Terms in Consumer Contracts Might Not Always Be 
the Right Answer – Insights from Behavioural Law and Economics” (2017) 80 MLR 624 627.  
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decreases in price.17 More relevant for the purposes of this discussion however, the 
standard economic rationale is constantly challenged by monopolies, oligopolies, and 
all manner of firms exercising market power on the supply side.18 A few examples 
from the perspective of producers should suffice to show why using only the cost of 
production as a measure for the fair price cannot work in practice. 
Assume for example that you have a market with two producers of a generic and 
fully substitutable good. Due to some trade secret, Producer A is able to produce the 
good significantly cheaper than Producer B. If only the production cost is used as a 
guideline, the “fair” price of A’s good would be much lower than the fair price of B’s 
good, despite them serving exactly the same purpose. Should A therefore be forced 
to sell his good for cheaper, rather than allowing him to use his competitive 
advantage to receive a higher mark-up on the product?  
What would happen if due to some external event, the demand for the product 
surges? If only the production cost was used as a guideline, the fair price would stay 
the same, as the production cost stays the same. Would both A and B be forced to 
keep their price low, and not be allowed to profit from the surge in demand? The late 
scholastics identified that such a solution was untenable in a market economy: 
traders should be allowed to benefit from an increase in demand, as they also carry 
the risk of demand for the goods collapsing.19  
Using the cost of production as the guideline for a fair price also necessitates 
making value judgements about what types of costs, and what margins of profit are 
reasonable (and which are not).20  
These examples all serve to illustrate suggest that making use of the production 
cost as the primary guideline for the fairness of a price would not be feasible or 
economically desirable. This does not mean there can be no role for production 
costs. As the cost of production is one of the input factors reflected in the market 
                                            
17
 See Sutherland & Kemp Competition Law 1.4.1 for the theoretical assumptions and preconditions 
on which neo-classical price theory is built; see Atamer (2017) MLR 626-628 for a brief description of 
the theory of price formation in perfectly competitive markets (and shortcomings thereof).  
18
 See Atamer (2017) MLR 628.  
19
 See 2 4 3 2 above. 
20
 Winner Wert und Preis 105. 
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price,21 there might be circumstances where it can provide a useful guideline for what 
a fair price should theoretically be. It might for example be reasonable in the context 
of rescue at sea to look at the costs incurred by the rescuer, in addition to a modest 
premium (or profit), to calculate what a fair price might be. In situations of clear 
market failure, or where a price is strikingly disproportionate, cost of production could 
provide similarly valuable guidance.22 
5 2 1 3 Subjective personal value 
Another prominent approach to determining the fairness of the price refers to the 
value that contracting parties attach to the goods, or the welfare which they derive 
from it.23 Adherents of this approach, which relies on a subjective theory of value, 
might argue that you cannot determine a fair price with reference to any standard 
external to the contracting parties:24 “The value of all things contracted for, is 
measured by the appetite of the contractors: and therefore just value is that which 
they have consented to give.”25 Thomasius argued similarly that the price depends 
only on the free will of the parties,26 and accordingly that no just price can exist 
outside of that agreed upon by the parties.27 As discussed above, these arguments of 
Thomasius and Hobbes were considered to be persuasive by continental lawyers 
during the 18th and 19th century.28 However, relying only on the subjective value the 
parties attach to the merx presents a number of practical difficulties as well.  
It is impossible for a court to determine reliably what value the parties subjectively 
place on a good, as this information is available only to the parties themselves, and 
depends on their state of mind.29 Although courts would be able to regard some 
claims as more probable than others, it is nearly impossible to prove conclusively, or 
to falsify a party’s claims about the value they place on a thing. The value that parties 
                                            
21
 Gordley (1981) CLR 1609.  
22
 Winner Wert und Preis 105; see the discussion at 5 2 4 below. 
23
 See for example IH van Loo Vernietiging van Overeenkomsten op Grond van Laesio Enormis, 
Dwaling, of Misbruik van Omstandigheden LLD Thesis, Open Universiteit (2013) 36. 
24
 PS Atiyah Essays on Contract (1986) 347.  
25
 T Hobbes Leviathan 1 15 quoted in Zimmermann Obligations 265. 
26
 De Aequitate Cerebrina 2 15 quoted in Anhert (1997) Ius Commune Zeitschrift für Europäische 
Rechtsgeschichte 157-158. 
27
 De Aequitate Cerebrina 2 16 quoted in Anhert (1997) Ius Commune Zeitschrift für Europäische 
Rechtsgeschichte 158. 
28
 See 3 2 above.  
29
 See Smith (1996) LQR 141. 
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place on a good or service might also be prone to changing easily. In cases where 
parties regret their decision, they would have an incentive to lie about how much they 
valued the merx.30 This is part of the reason why Voet, like Aquinas before him, held 
that the value of a thing should generally not be determined with regard to the 
subjective value which one person places on a thing.31 
While it therefore cannot serve as the primary guideline for a fair price, there are 
situations where it can arguably assist in determining whether the contract price is 
unfair. In Austria, the functioning of § 934 ABGB can be excluded where the 
disadvantaged party declares that he accepts the extraordinarily high price due to 
personal affection for the merx (besondere Vorliebe).32 Aquinas also recognised that 
it was permissible to sell a thing for more than its worth if both parties subjectively 
attached a higher value to it. Consider for example a merx which both parties attach 
high sentimental value to, but the prospective buyer does more so than the seller.33 
The seller might not be willing to sell at the fair market price, while the buyer might be 
willing to pay much more. In this case the law should not stand in the way of parties 
freely and willingly making an exchange that is beneficial to both, even if it is done at 
a price generally considered to be unfair. 
Courts should however be careful to infer from the circumstances that one of the 
parties purposefully overpaid. Conversely, courts should also be hesitant in accepting 
standard clauses to this effect too readily. Such clauses could otherwise be used to 
circumvent the functioning of a fair price rule, rendering it nugatory.34  
5 2 1 4 Market price 
As has been mentioned above, the market or customary price has been the basis 
for fair price rules historically,35 as well as in modern times.36 It is also the guideline 
advocated by many modern proponents of a fair price rule.37 Romanists and 
                                            
30
 141. 
31
 See 2 5 3 above. 
32
 See 3 4 3 3 above.  
33
 See 2 4 2 3 2 above; J Finnis Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory (1998) 202, 206; Van Loo 
Vernietiging 36. 
34
 See 5 5 2 below, see also Zimmermann Obligations 269. 
35
 See 2 4 2 3 and especially 2 4 2 3 2 above. 
36
 See 3 3 4 (Germany), 3 4 2 (Austria), and 3 5 4 2 (Louisiana) above. 
37
 Smith (1996) LQR 141; see Gordley (1981) CLR 1609; P Benson “The Unity of Contract Law” in P 
Benson (ed) The Theory of Contract Law (2001) 184 185, 189-190. 
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scholastics in the Middle Ages did not share our nuanced understanding of market 
economics, and therefore used different terms to describe essentially the same 
phenomenon.38 While they understood that price was a function of factors such as 
production cost, need and scarcity, they did not understand demand and supply as 
two separate functions, the intersection of which would indicate an equilibrium price. 
They knew therefore what factors played a role in price formation, but not how these 
came together to determine the price.  
Lacking such a mechanism for price determination, they consequently believed 
that the price at which things were sold (the current or usual price) was determined 
by the communis aestimatio, the judgement of buyers and sellers as to what 
something is worth.39 Once this price is determined by the judgement of the market 
as a whole, it becomes objective (or external) to each individual participant in the 
market.40 Understood in modern economic terminology this current price is equivalent 
to what we understand today as the market price,41 or more precisely the long-run 
equilibrium market price.42 It will differ depending on place and time, and importantly 
it will fluctuate.43 It should be noted however that the long run equilibrium market 
price is not necessarily a competitive market price. Every market, even a 
monopolistic market, can reach a long-run equilibrium. 
The notion that the market price is the best guideline for determining a fair price 
also enjoys the benefit of familiarity. It is not only the norm internationally, which 
means that there is a wealth of literature and decisions available on the subject, but 
is also a familiar standard in South African contract law.44 It was also used as the 
standard for a fair price in South African law before the abolition of the doctrine of 
laesio enormis.45 It is therefore a term which courts are familiar with, and it is 
arguably also relatively easy to determine.  
                                            
38
 See in this regard Gordley (1981) CLR 1606-1608. 
39
 1607. 
40
 Zimmermann Obligations 265; Gordley (1981) CLR 1607. 
41
 See W Decock Theologians and Contract Law: The Moral Transformation of the Ius Commune (ca. 
1500-1650) (2013) 602; Perrone (2014) Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali 220, 226. 
42
 See Gordley (1981) CLR 1609.  
43
 Smith (1996) LQR 142, see also for example 2 4 3 2 above.  
44
 See 5 2 2 1 below.  
45
 See 5 2 2 1 below.  
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Given these benefits, it may therefore be concluded that, at least when compared 
to the alternatives, the market price is indeed the most appropriate measure to 
establish whether a price is fair. It is not a perfect standard, however. There are times 
where determining the market price is very difficult if not impossible, such as where 
the merx is unique, or where no real market exists for the merx. A rare painting being 
auctioned off might serve as an example.46 In many of these cases a fair price rule 
based on market price could logically not find application.47 Using the market price 
also assumes that judges are able to identify the relevant market, something which 
has presented many challenges in the field of competition law.48 Finally, the market 
price sometimes leads to unsatisfactory results where the market itself is structurally 
defective or non-competitive.49 These problems will be considered below.  
5 2 2 Determining the market price 
In the majority of cases, determining the market price will require evidence which 
is relatively easy to obtain (for example the price typically paid for a certain good, or 
the average rental price of an apartment in the same apartment building). A similar 
approach was followed in South African law prior to the abolition of the doctrine of 
laesio enormis. In Botha v Assad,50 for example, the court states that: “In the case of 
sale the justum pretium can be established by the evidence of valuers having 
experience of similar transactions in the neighbourhood.”  
A court might also rely on evidence generally available in the market, such as the 
prices charged for similar goods by competitors. The more generic a product is, the 
easier it might therefore be to determine the market price. One could for example 
simply compare what a certain good or service costs at different stores to determine 
whether the contracting party in question paid an unfair price  
But this still leaves the more difficult cases. Here a number of ways exist in which 
a court could go about its task. In legal systems such as Austria and France, an 
expert witness is used to help the court to estimate the value of the merx.51 Expert 
                                            
46
 See for example Smith (1996) LQR 142; Eidenmüller (2015) ECLR 224. 
47
 See 3 4 2 above. 
48
 See 5 2 3 below. 
49
 See 5 2 4 below.  
50
 1945 TPD 1 6. 
51
 See for example 3 4 2 above.  
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evidence is admissible in contract law disputes in South African courts, as long as the 
court is satisfied that the expert is sufficiently qualified.52 Since the burden of proof 
rests on the party seeking to avoid the contract,53 the risk of not being able to 
establish the market price lies on him, as he would need to adduce evidence 
regarding the fair price to show that the contract price is unfair. In this situation the 
role of the court is merely to determine if the evidence adduced by the party seeking 
avoidance is persuasive.  
The standard of the “market price” of a good or service is already applied as a 
standard in South African law, and might therefore be a fitting and practicable 
guideline for establishing a fair price.  
For example, South African law requires that the content of a contract should be 
certain, or at least ascertainable under the maxim id certum est quod certum reddi 
potest – that which can be rendered certain is certain. South African law under this 
approach accepts that parties can enter into an agreement to render a service at an 
unspecified reasonable price, although the sale of a thing at a reasonable price has 
been held to be void for vagueness.54  
However, it is interesting to note that while courts consider a reasonable price to 
be too vague, they consider market price, by contrast, to be a certain enough 
standard. This is clear from the decision of the court in Adcorp Spares PE (Pty) Ltd v 
Hydromulch (Pty) Ltd,55 which held that, where it is readily ascertainable, the market 
price of a thing is a standard which is in itself certain.  
Apart from sales at an unspecified price, there is a variety of contexts in which 
courts already make use of the market price as a guideline. One example of such has 
already been mentioned in chapter 2. The actio quanti minoris, one of the aedilitian 
actions available in the case of latent defects or dictum et promissum, allows the 
                                            
52
 LF van Huyssteen & CJ Maxwell Contract Law in South Africa 4 ed (2015) para 183; see also the 
quote from Botha v Assad 1945 TPD 1 above at 5 2 2.  
53
 See 5 4 below. 
54
 See LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke, & GF Lubbe Contract General Principles 5 ed (2016) 225; 
JE du Plessis “Possibility and Certainty” in D Hutchinson & C-J Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in 
South Africa 3 ed (2017) 213 223. 
55
 1972 3 SA 663 (T) 668. 
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court to reduce the purchase price to the market value of the merx.56 In other words 
the purchaser is able to claim the difference between the contract price and the 
market price,57 which would of course necessitate judicial estimation of the market 
price of the merx in question.  
An overview of prominent cases concerning the doctrine of laesio enormis before 
its abolition in South Africa also establishes clearly that market price was used by 
courts as a reference for the fair price. Already in 1875 in Levisohn v Williams,58 De 
Villiers CJ stated that: “I am quite satisfied on the evidence that the fair marketable 
value of the ring is only £20, and that therefore the sale for £45 was for more than 
double its value …”. In Katzoff v Glaser59 the court, citing Voet, also approved of 
using the market price as the measure of the fair price. The court notes though that 
market value, although widely used, might not be the only test, nor is it conclusive. In 
Tjollo Ateljees,60 Van den Heever JA stated that the contract price should be 
compared to the “true market value” of a thing. Botha v Assad61 seems at first to be 
the exception to this general trend, as the court refers only to the “true rental value”. It 
becomes clear from the judgment, however, that the court still envisions a market 
rental price when the court states that: “[V]aluations [of the iustum pretium] will 
ultimately rest on the supply of and demand for similar premises or articles.”62 
The concept of market price is not only found in case law, but also in the 
Constitution itself. Section 25 of the Constitution, which entrenches the right to 
property, also determines the conditions under which property may be expropriated. 
Section 25(2) determines that property may be expropriated only if it is in the public 
interest, and subject to compensation, the amount of which has to be agreed to by 
the parties, or if no agreement can be reached, must be decided or approved by a 
court. Section 25(3) determines that this amount must be just and equitable, 
reflecting a balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected, 
having regard to all the relevant circumstances including the market value of the 
                                            
56
 See 3 3 3 1 above, as well the famous case of Phame (Pty) Ltd v Paizes 1973 3 SA 397 (A). The 
functioning and history of the actio quanti minoris are explained at 409-412. 
57
 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 110, 141, 142. 
58
 1875 5 Buch 108.  
59
 1948 4 SA 630 (T) 636-637.  
60
 See 1949 1 SA 856 (A) 868, 873. 
61
 1945 TPD 1. 
62
 7. 
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property. Market value is therefore expressly regarded as an indicium of 
reasonableness, albeit that one has to appreciate that this provision is aimed at 
pursuing particular policy objectives that need not apply in the contractual context.  
When the abovementioned groups of cases are considered together, it becomes 
clear that market price is a standard which courts are well acquainted with, which is 
considered to be sufficiently certain, which is already used in a number of existing 
legal actions, and which is constitutionally mandated in others. In theory at least, 
courts should therefore not have a problem with using market price as a standard to 
judge whether the contract price is fair. Where the market price is not ascertainable, it 
could logically not be the guideline for the fairness of the price.  
5 2 3 Determining the relevant market  
Using the market price as a guideline for a fair price requires that the relevant 
market must be defined. The definition of the market is a central part of almost all 
competition law enquiries,63 yet despite recent advances in the field of economics, 
the definition of the market remains challenging and at times controversial.64  
In some cases this enquiry will not be particularly complex, as a court might, for 
example, simply compare the price of a certain good at a number of different retailers 
in a certain area. Even then the question arises, which retailers to include for 
example, and during which time frame the prices should be compared. The question 
will at other times become more complex, especially in relation to non-generic 
products or services where a court has to decide which products to include in this 
comparison.  
Determining the relevant market is therefore a question which has a temporal,65 
and spatial (or geographic),66 and product dimension.67 The late scholastics and 
Roman-Dutch writers might not have shared our modern understanding of how a 
                                            
63
 Kelly et al Competition Law 27. 
64
 See WH Boshoff Conceptual and Empirical Advances in Antitrust Market Definition with Application 
to South African Competition Policy PhD Thesis in Economics, Stellenbosch University (2011) 2. 
65
 Winner Wert und Preis 110 n 508. 
66
 See Kelly et al Competition Law 28; see also Winner Wert und Preis 110. 
67
 See generally Kelly et al Competition Law 27-33 on market definition.  
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market functions, but they similarly recognised that the iustum pretium of a thing 
depends on the time and place where the sale was concluded, as well as its quality.68  
A court has to accord a measure of latitude with regard to the temporal and spatial 
dimensions, while taking into account possible reasons for fluctuations of demand 
and supply. Consider the example of a fir tree on Christmas day. It might reasonably 
be compared to the price of a fir tree a day before Christmas, but it cannot be 
compared to the price of a fir tree the day after Christmas, as the use of and demand 
for the fir trees would have plummeted. Since the value of a thing can appreciate or 
depreciate after the conclusion of a contract, it was recognised by both the old 
authorities,69 and the contemporary systems studied in chapter 3,70 that the value of 
the thing must generally be judged as it was at the time and place of contract 
conclusion. 
Interpreting this requirement too narrowly would, however, lead to undesirable 
results. Consider, once again the example of rescue at sea, as discussed in the 
chapter 4.71 At the exact time and place where the contract for rescue is concluded, 
the market consists of one buyer (the distressed party) and one seller (the rescuing 
party). Any price that the parties agree on would therefore constitute the market price 
(and consequently the fair price). How much latitude should be accorded may 
ultimately be a matter for expert evidence, rather than a determination of law. 
The third dimension of market determination, which relates to the question of 
which goods to include in the market is generally the most important yet challenging 
dimension. In most cases the contract price of one thing can simply be compared to 
the price at which the same product is readily sold on the market. For example, 
comparing the price of a specific brand of premium German automobile parts at one 
retailer to the price at which it is sold at others is a relatively simple task.72 However, 
the broader the product market is defined, the more difficult it becomes. Should less 
expensive or generic replacement parts be included in this comparison as well? Or 
should the enquiry go one step further and compare the price to that of equivalent 
                                            
68
 See 2 4 3 2 and 2 5 3 above; see also Commentarius ad Pandectas 18 5 7. 
69
 See for example Voet in Commentarius ad Pandectas 18 5 7. 
70
 See for example the position in Austria at 3 4 3, and Louisiana at 3 5 4 4 above.  
71
 See 4 4 2 above. 
72
 Winner Wert und Preis 111 makes the same point using a different product. The analysis here 
follows the analysis provided in that example.  
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parts for other automobiles? If a very narrow view of the market is taken where only 
premium German automobile parts are included, this will result in a much higher 
market price. If a broad view is taken where generic substitutes are included, the 
market price will in this case be much lower. This reflects the general trend where the 
narrower the market is defined the higher the “market price” it usually results in.73 
The most important consideration in this regards should be whether two different 
products are close substitutes for each other.74 If consumers regard goods or 
services as substitutes for one another, in the sense that they are theoretically willing 
and able to switch between them, then these goods should generally be considered 
to fall in the same market.75 Winner argues similarly that for the price of goods or 
services to be comparable, the most important consideration should be that they are 
substantially equivalent for satisfying a certain need in the eyes of the average 
informed contracting party.76 In many cases such as with fungibles and generic 
goods (especially consumer goods), products will often be almost perfect substitutes.  
As stated above the definition of the relevant market is a central part of almost all 
competition law enquiries in South Africa.77 While the Competition Act 89 of 1998 
does not provide formal guidelines or principles that should be applied to define the 
market,78 a number of analytical and empirical approaches have developed in 
practice which might be used in difficult cases to assist the court in determining the 
relevant market. The most prominent of these both locally and internationally is the 
hypothetical monopolist or SSNIP79 test, which inquires what effect an increase in the 
price of a product has on the demand for it.80 The dominant approach to market 
definition in South African competition law thus focuses on the demand-side 
substitutability of the good.81  
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 Winner Wert und Preis 111.  
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 See Kelly et al Competition Law 28.  
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 See Winner Wert und Preis 112. 
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 See Boshoff Market Definition 8; Kelly et al Competition Law 27. 
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In our context this approach could for example be used to determine if an increase 
in the price of one product would lead to consumers purchasing more of another 
product. If this is the case, then these products are arguably functional substitutes in 
the eyes of consumers, and therefore form part of the same market.  
Where different products have substantially different properties, however, they will 
not form part of the same market.82 So for example: while the different varieties of 
flight tickets available within economy class serve roughly the same function, they 
have different properties with regards to comfort, expedience, and the flexibility which 
they allow the traveller. Therefore one might say that they do not form part of the 
same market.83 Even the prestige associated with a certain product might be a 
relevant characteristic in this case.84 Prestige in the view of the contracting parties 
might for example explain why consumers are willing to pay exorbitant amounts of 
money for electronic products, such as cellular phones or tablets of a certain brand, 
while they could buy materially similar, if somewhat less prestigious, products for 
much cheaper. 
5 2 4 The limits of market price  
When a market is structurally defective, such as where the market is dominated by 
a monopolist, a fair price rule based on market price can only provide limited 
assistance to disadvantaged parties.85 Since the monopolist determines the market 
price, any price that he charges, no matter how high, would theoretically be the 
market price, and therefore the fair price.86 It makes little sense in these 
circumstances to make use of the market price as a guideline for fairness. On one 
level this poses the question what should be used as a guideline for the fair price in 
the absence of a competitive market price? Should a court in these cases simply 
make use of one of the other measures discussed above, such as the cost of 
production? On another level it can be asked whether a fair price rule should play a 
role at all when it comes to uncompetitive markets. Would it not be better if 
uncompetitive markets were regulated through competition law?  
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The promotion of competitive market conditions and the prevention of the abuse of 
dominance are more typically seen as objects or aims of competition law.87 
Specialised courts and well-resourced competition authorities are arguably better 
equipped to handle such issues, as opposed to actions brought by individuals based 
on a fair price rule. Prima facie the answer to the second question above would 
therefore be that a fair price rule should not play a role when it comes to 
uncompetitive markets. 
However, it is clear that a monopolist (or oligarch) intentionally exploits contracting 
parties by abusing his dominant position to charge an unfair price. Why then should 
inequality in exchange caused by the exploitation of monopoly power be treated any 
differently to other forms of inequality in exchange caused by exploitation of 
weakness?88 Is there any reason why the respective remedies in competition and 
contract law should be mutually exclusive? In cases where the market is 
uncompetitive (in part due to the shortcomings of the competition authorities), why 
should the disadvantaged contracting party be denied a remedy, and the monopolist 
afforded such a privileged position?89 This argument is all the more cogent since the 
prohibition of excessive pricing is rarely applied in South African competition law,90 
due to the complex and technical nature of the enquiry.91 And why can there be no 
role for private law, if it can help achieve the goals of competition law?92  
5 2 4 1 Excessive price in South African competition law 
In South Africa, limited statutory control of price already exists in the abuse of 
dominance provisions of the Competition Act. Section 8(a) of the Act prohibits a 
“dominant firm” from charging an “excessive price” to the detriment of consumers. An 
excessive price is defined in section 1(ix) of the Act as a price for a good or service 
which (aa) bears no reasonable relation to the economic value of that good or 
service; and (bb) is higher than the value referred to in subparagraph (a).  
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91
 RD McKerrow “Excessive Pricing in South African Competition Law: Elucidating the Nature and 
Implications of the Consumer-Detriment Requirement” (2017) 29 SA Mercantile LJ 173 176. 
92
 Winner Wert und Preis 119. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
   142 
 
While the Act includes no definition of “economic value”, the Competition Appeal 
Court stated in Mittal Steel South Africa Limited v Harmony Gold Mining Company 
Limited93 that “[w]hat the legislature must be taken to have intended by ‘economic 
value’ is the notional price of the good or service under assumed conditions of long-
run competitive equilibrium.”  
To determine whether a given price is an “excessive price”, a court therefore 
needs to construct a hypothetical market in order to simulate competitive market 
conditions, and through economic analysis attempt to determine what the notional 
long-run equilibrium price would have been in this competitive market in order to 
determine the economic value of the merx in question. This factual enquiry thus 
presents the competition authorities with a number of extremely complex and 
technical economic questions.94  
Once the factual enquiry is complete, the court then needs to make a value 
judgement as to whether this difference in price between the actual and notional 
long-run competitive equilibrium price is reasonable.95 According to some writers, this 
value judgement is similarly problematic to the factual enquiry.96 Finally, a value 
judgement needs to be made as to whether the charging of an excessive price is to 
the detriment of the consumer.97  
This enquiry is further complicated by the fact that section 8(a) of the Act only 
applies to firms that qualify as “dominant firms” in terms of section 7 of the Act, which 
therefore necessitates another factual enquiry. 98 
A number of important differences therefore exist between a fair price rule based 
on market price, and the excessive price enquiry in terms of the Competition Act. The 
most important difference between these two inquiries is arguably the fact that the 
latter uses the notional long-run competitive equilibrium price as a guideline for a fair 
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price, while the former looks at actual prices in the market. Although notional long-run 
competitive equilibrium price is arguably a more accurate guideline, which is able to 
work in structurally-defective markets as well, it is also a far more complex enquiry for 
a court to use, as opposed to simply comparing the contract price to other actual 
prices in the market.  
However, it could be argued that regular courts (as opposed to competition 
authorities) simply do not have the necessary resources and technical expertise to 
determine what the fair price would be.99  
Allowing a court to diverge from using the market price as the guideline for a fair 
price also poses the danger that courts will intervene too readily where they perceive 
a market to be non-competitive. While the theory of perfect competition present us 
with a good theoretical model for understanding market structure, markets are very 
rarely, if ever, perfectly competitive in the real world.100 If a court is able to intervene 
in every dysfunctional market, it might lead to too much intervention. The goal of a 
fair price rule should not be that the courts become price commissars,101 where it is 
assumed that the courts are better able to calculate the fair price in every contract.102  
This begs the question in which circumstances a court should be able to divert 
from the market price where there is market failure, and if so what guideline they 
should use for the fair price in the absence of a market price?  
5 2 4 2 The approach of German courts to defective credit markets 
The approach which the German courts take to the regulation of consumer credit 
financial institutions (referred to as Teilzahlungsbanken) can provide some interesting 
insights in this regard. 
These Teilzahlungsbanken predominantly serve a specific sector of the credit 
industry for short and medium term consumer loans, often serving clientele who are 
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not able to acquire credit at traditional financial institutions.103 Because of the cost 
structure and risk profile of such credit agreements, the cost of credit at these 
institutions is usually higher than at a normal bank.104  
When assessing whether the interest rate in credit agreements concluded with 
these institutions is fair, German courts have in the past taken the view that they do 
not need to compare the contract interest rate to the market interest rate offered by 
other Teilzahlungsbanken, but could instead compare it to the commercial interest 
rate for the banking sector as a whole, as designated by the German Bundesbank 
(central bank), plus the typical fees and service costs associated with such credit 
agreements.105  
In terms of the determination of the relevant market, the court in question chose 
not to view the market for consumer credit as a special or separate market. It was 
argued that since these Teilzahlungsbanken do not serve exclusively a clientele 
which are not creditworthy, they compete, at least in principle, with traditional 
financial institutions.106  
In terms of the determination of what constitutes a fair price, the court chose not to 
use the market interest rate for consumer credit as a guideline for a fair interest rate, 
but chose instead to calculate what they consider a fair interest rate. One could argue 
that the market for consumer credit was in this case structurally exploitative. Parties 
who were in a weak bargaining position (due to being unable to access credit at a 
traditional financial institution) were exploited through being charged higher interest 
rates in these credit agreements. Comparing the contract interest rate to other 
exploitative interest rates to determine its fairness would be futile – one exploitative 
rate being compared to another does not give you a better idea of what is fair to 
begin with. The court stated that in the assessment of fairness it is necessary to look 
at all the relevant circumstances and that it should therefore also take into account 
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major price setting factors in the market for credit (in this case the commercial 
interest rate for the banking sector) as opposed to just the market price.107  
The decision of the court in this matter might provide a template for the type of 
situation in which a court could deviate from using the market price as the guideline 
for a fair price. In this case it was clear that the agreements were exploitative, and it 
was relatively simple for the court to calculate what a non-exploitative/competitive 
interest rate would be, as this was based on a measure that is objectively 
determinable and publicly available (the commercial interest rate).  
This example suggests that courts should be invested with the discretion to 
deviate from using the market price as a guideline for the fair price, but only in 
exceptional circumstances; typically those where it is clear that the market is 
defective and that using the market price will therefore only lead to further injustice, 
and where the court has the capacity and means to determine what a fair price would 
be with relative ease.  
For this determination a court could make use of the measures such as the cost of 
production, taking into account all of the practical challenges and limitations 
associated with this approach as outline above.108 Another approach would be to 
compare the price, and the margins achieved by the contracting parties, to the 
conduct of similar firms in comparable spatial or product markets; taking into account 
reasons why prices might be different in two markets.109 It needs to be emphasized, 
however, that such discretion should be used sparingly and cautiously.110  
5 3 Calculating disproportion 
The discussion thus far has focused on what measure the contract price should be 
compared to in order to ascertain whether it is unfair. While the general conclusion 
has been reached that the market price of a good or service is the best indication for 
what should be considered the fair price, this still gives us little idea of when exactly a 
contract price should be considered unfair. This section attempts to answer two 
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questions in this regard. What divergence between the contract and the market price 
justifies the court concluding that the contract price is unfair, and should such an 
objective discrepancy be enough by itself for the contract to be set aside?  
5 3 1 Should a fixed or flexible threshold be used to determine whether price is fair? 
Traditionally the doctrine of laesio enormis made use of a fixed ratio or 
discrepancy between the market price and the contract price in order to determine 
whether the contract price was fair. If the contract price was more than twice the 
market price, the prejudice suffered by the disadvantaged party (measured by the 
difference between the contract and market price) was considered large enough that 
the contract could be invalidated solely on that basis, hence the term laesio enormis, 
literally a large harm. Whereas the doctrine of laesio enormis survived in this form 
into some legal systems, others apply a more flexible fair price rule.111 
In systems where the doctrine of laesio enormis was codified into modern law, 
such as France, Louisiana, and Austria, its basic functioning has remained largely 
unchanged from the Middle Ages. It relies only on gross discrepancy to determine 
whether the contract price is fair, and it measures discrepancy between the 
respective performances with a fixed ratio or threshold. Why these legal systems 
choose to maintain the remedy in its traditional form, despite its apparent flaws, is in 
itself an interesting question.112 
In legal systems that adopted or developed a modern fair price rule, such as 
Germany,113 Switzerland,114 and Italy,115 as well as in the international model rules,116 
contracts can generally only be invalidated if the gross discrepancy in the value of 
performances is accompanied by evidence of some procedural defect. A flexible 
approach is used to determine discrepancy, which does not require a specific ratio 
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between the market price and the contract price. In Germany for example, unfairness 
is determined by the courts on a case-by-case basis.117 Since courts have historically 
been strongly influenced by the doctrine of laesio enormis, they often make use of 
the traditional ratio of 2:1 between the contract price and the market price as a 
guideline when determining whether a price is fair, but they are in no way bound by 
it.118  
As stated above, these modern fair price rules go beyond simple price scrutiny, 
and instead require evidence of some or other defect in the bargaining process.119 In 
Germany, for example, this defect entails the exploitation of the circumstances of 
weakness of a disadvantaged party. This procedural defect is often referred to as the 
subjective requirement, as opposed to the disproportion itself, which is considered 
the objective requirement. In a similar fashion some consumer law regimes such as 
the Unfair Contract Terms Directive120 impose aspects of procedural fairness, such 
as inquiring whether the contract terms were individually negotiated, and whether the 
terms in question were transparent, as part of fairness review.121  
We are therefore confronted with a series of interrelated questions in attempting to 
choose the most appropriate fair price rule. The first question is whether an approach 
that makes use only of objective discrepancy, or an approach which requires a 
procedural defect in addition to the objective discrepancy, is to be preferred. Since 
both these approaches make use of objective discrepancy, the question is then 
raised whether there should be a fixed or flexible threshold, beyond which the 
objective discrepancy between the contract price and the market price, is considered 
unfair.  
These questions are interrelated because the answer to one might affect the 
answer to the other. Fair price rules that make use of only gross disparity seem to 
prefer fixed thresholds that are generally higher. By contrast fair price rules that 
require evidence of some procedural defect in addition to the gross discrepancy 
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seem far more willing to use a flexible and generally lower threshold for the 
determination of the objective discrepancy.  
This is illustrated particularly well in the Austrian legal system, which contains no 
less than two fair price rules. The doctrine of laesio enormis in § 934 ABGB, based 
only on objective discrepancy, requires a disproportion of 2:1 between the contract 
price and the market price. By contrast, § 879 (2)4 ABGB, which declares contra 
bonos mores grossly disproportionate contracts that are concluded through the 
exploitation of the strained financial situation, lack of experience, or excited state of 
mind of the disadvantaged party, contains no fixed threshold. This provision generally 
requires a smaller disparity in the values of the respective performances than the 
doctrine of laesio enormis contained in § 934 ABGB.122 
Making use exclusively of objective discrepancy in the value of performances has 
the advantage that it is simpler and more mechanical to apply, and might therefore 
lead to less legal and commercial uncertainty. Assuming that the market price is 
certain and stable, parties are able to determine with relative ease whether they run 
the risk of the contract being invalidated on the basis of the price being unfair. The 
simple and rigid nature of such an approach can, however, also lead to undesirable 
results, and it is not without practical problems. Particularly vexing is the question of 
what exactly the threshold should be for a discrepancy to be classified as unfair.  
When considering what the ideal threshold should be, there is unfortunately little 
empirical evidence to guide us. When a fixed threshold is required, whether it is one 
half, two-thirds, or five-twelfths of the market price of the good, it will inevitably lead to 
some arbitrary results.123 Yet, this question has important consequences. A threshold 
that allows (too) great discrepancy between the contract price and the fair price 
would deny the remedy to many prejudiced contracting parties. By contrast, a 
threshold that allows only marginal discrepancy would inadvertently lead to (too) 
many validly-concluded contracts being invalidated.  
The rigid nature of a fixed ratio approach is arguably unsuited to achieving a fair 
result in some cases, as it denies the court the ability to treat unlike cases 
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differently124 through taking individualising factors into account.125 In Botha v 
Assad,126 the court noted for example that the doctrine of laesio enormis, “resting as 
it does upon an arbitrary mathematical formula … appears to be crude and wanting in 
the elasticity requisite if equitable results are to be achieved.” An approach which 
allows for no discretion heightens the risk of injustice in individual cases,127 and might 
deprive the court of the ability to develop the common law in an incidental manner to 
achieve equitable goals.128 
A flexible approach by contrast provides the court with more discretion to 
determine whether the objective discrepancy is unfair, taking into account a host of 
considerations. Some might argue that too much judicial discretion is undesirable, as 
it will allow judges to strike down contracts based on nothing more than their 
idiosyncratic sense of justice.129  
As Lubbe has argued, however, the perception that elasticity and flexibility based 
on open norms should be restricted in judicial decision-making is misconceived, 
especially in matters of public policy.130 By their very nature, decisions in matters of 
public policy involve open-ended value-judgements, which should be made in line 
with recognised principles and policy considerations.131 A price that is unfair in a 
given context might be fair in another. So for example courts in Germany treat 
commercial parties and consumers differently when considering whether a price is 
fair; the threshold across which the objective discrepancy is considered unfair is 
much lower in relation to consumers than with commercial parties.132  
It is also evident that disadvantage can be expressed in ways other than just the 
relationship between contract price and market price. The flexible approach used in 
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Germany has allowed courts to investigate for example not only the relationship 
between the contract and market price, but also to relate the prejudice to other 
yardsticks, such as the average monthly income, or the financial means of the 
prejudiced party.133 Another consideration might be the nature of the merx, especially 
in cases where parties contract in respect of basic needs, such as housing, 
education, and healthcare.134  
It has been noted in the German context that general provisions such as 
§ 138 (1) BGB have served as gateways for constitutional values, and especially for 
the protection of fundamental rights.135 If a South African court were to follow the 
flexible German approach, it could find for example that a price is unfair, even if the 
discrepancy between the market and contract price is not that great, if the prejudice 
suffered by the disadvantaged party was very great in relation to his meagre income, 
or if he was contracting to meet a basic need or right. This would give a very direct 
entry point for equitable considerations and constitutional rights. Such a role cannot 
be fulfilled if a fixed threshold is used. These considerations would suggest that a 
flexible threshold for objective disparity might be more appropriate generally, and 
especially in the South African context.  
It can also be argued that if a more flexible approach is used, where the 
relationship between market price and contract price is not the only deciding factor 
(as was traditionally the case with the fixed threshold approach followed by the 
doctrine of laesio enormis), then neither the determination of the relevant market, nor 
the market price, need to be as precise.136 When a judge is invested with the 
discretion to take a host of factors into account, it is not as centrally important 
whether the contract price is 1.9 or 2.1 times the market price.  
5 3 2 Is objective disproportion enough, or should there be a procedural defect as 
well? 
The preceding analysis suggests that, on balance, a flexible threshold for objective 
disparity may be preferable to a rigid one. It was further pointed out that jurisdictions 
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that make use of such a flexible threshold usually require that the disparity should be 
accompanied by evidence of some procedural defect. In this regard it is noticeable 
that whereas some similarity generally exists between the different legal systems in 
the approach to measuring objective disparity between the value of the respective 
performances, the nature of the procedural defect required differs greatly.  
The inclusive approach followed by the Article 4:109 PECL might be said to reflect 
best the prevailing view in contract law systems in Europe.137 It requires, in addition 
to objective disparity, that the disadvantaged party was either dependent on or had a 
relationship of trust with the advantaged party, was in economic distress or had 
urgent needs, was improvident, ignorant, inexperienced or lacking in bargaining skill. 
Many of these grounds are not recognised as independent procedural defects in 
South African contract law. This is indeed the point: if some independent procedural 
defect were required when applying a fair price rule, it would just beg the question 
why the contract should not be avoided on the basis of that procedural defect in the 
first place. These should therefore be considered lesser forms of procedural defects, 
which are only material enough to avoid the contract where they are accompanied by 
some evidence that they were exploited to the gross disadvantage of one of the 
contracting parties.138 
5 3 2 1 Procedural defects as a justification for providing relief 
It is a core tenet of freedom of contract, especially from the perspective of 
autonomy-based will theories of contract, that contracting parties should be free to 
choose on what terms they wish to contract.139 Rules of contract law which require 
the enforcement of contracts, such as the maxim pacta sunt servanda, exist in this 
view to give expression to the private autonomy of contracting parties.140 It is 
assumed that contracting parties know what is in their best interest, and that they are 
therefore best positioned to decide whether a certain price is fair or not.141  
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However, when the decision-making capacity of contracting parties is impaired 
through the presence of some procedural defect, the contract arguably cannot be 
seen as a true expression of their autonomy. Moreover, requiring evidence of some 
procedural defect allows us to assert with a greater certainty that the contract is likely 
to be inefficient, in the sense that it is concluded under circumstances where one of 
the parties likely acted against their best interest.142  
Requiring evidence of some procedural defect thus helps explain why relief is 
provided in these cases: it is not merely given because of the disproportion, but 
rather because this disproportion is the result of the intentional or negligent 
exploitation of the circumstances of weakness of the disadvantaged party.143 
Requiring evidence of some form of procedural defect as part of the enquiry into 
whether relief should be provided therefore seems sensible from a dogmatic or 
theoretical perspective. 
5 3 2 2 Procedural defects as a method to limit abuse of a fair price rule 
Requiring that some procedural defect be present arguably serves an important 
gatekeeper function in order to limit abuse of fair price rules by denying the remedy to 
parties who were in a strong enough position to look after their own interest. If 
contracting parties are considered for reasons of autonomy and economic efficiency 
to be best suited to choose the terms of the contract,144 contract law should 
encourage them to do so. It is therefore undesirable that the court needs to step in to 
protect parties where there is no apparent reason why they were not able to look 
after their own interests when concluding the contract.145 It is therefore pertinent that 
courts ask, as part of this procedural enquiry, what disadvantaged parties could have 
done to protect themselves.146 Where contracting parties where in a strong 
bargaining position, yet still chose to enter into the disadvantageous contract, courts 
should be more hesitant to provide relief. 
                                            
142
 226-227. 
143
 See Gordley (1981) CLR 1631. 
144
 See for example O Lando & H Beale Principles of European Contract Law I & II (2000) Art 4:109 
Comment A.  
145
 See Art 4:109 PECL Comment B.  
146
 See Gordley (1981) CLR 1629-1630. 
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A similar consideration is present in German law, where the procedural dimension 
of the enquiry under § 138 (1) BGB147 allows a court to deny the remedy where it is 
clear that disadvantaged contracting parties were in a strong enough position to 
protect themselves. German courts have found, for example, that a contract price is 
not unfair, even where the disadvantaged contracting party proved that the contract 
price was two and a half times higher than the market price.148 The court ruled in the 
case in question that it was entirely possible for the disadvantaged party, as a 
businessman, to evaluate the benefits and disadvantages of the transaction. Since 
he nevertheless chose not to exercise his proper judgement and still entered into the 
transaction for speculative reasons, the court was not prepared to infer that he was 
exploited in any way.  
§ 935 ABGB arguably excludes the application of § 934 ABGB where the 
disadvantaged party knew the true value of the merx, and nevertheless entered into 
the contract at the prejudicial price, for the same reason. As Austrian contract law 
deals with the abuse of circumstances in a separate provision,149 the doctrine of 
laesio enormis functions primarily in Austria as a remedy protecting parties who err or 
are ignorant with regards to the value of the merx.150 Therefore, when contracting 
parties know the value of the merx and nevertheless enter into the contract, a court 
could not allow them to escape the contract on that basis as this would allow 
contracting parties to abuse the remedy to escape validly concluded contracts.  
5 3 2 3 A trend towards an approach based predominantly on objective disparity? 
Although these procedural requirements are arguably an important component of 
the fair price rule for both the dogmatic and pragmatic reasons as set out above, 
there seems to be a tendency or shift in European contract law (and especially in 
consumer law) towards fair price rules based predominantly on objective disparity.151 
In chapter 3 the examples of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, and the CESL were 
discussed briefly.152 In relation to the former it was argued that the strict interpretation 
of the transparency requirements contained in the directive by the ECJ has in effect 
                                            
147
 See 3 3 3 and 3 3 4 above.  
148
 BGH, NJW-RR 1998, 1065. 
149
 See § 879 ABGB. 
150
 See Van Loo Vernietiging 211. 
151
 See also Finkenauer in Max Planck Encyclopedia 1031. 
152
 See 3 7 5 above. 
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lead thereto that all non-negotiated terms (including price terms) which result in a 
significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties could be set aside by 
the court.153 In relation to the CESL it was argued that the willingness of the 
European Parliament to adopt amendments with the intention of extended fairness 
control to the adequacy of price might signal a change in approach to judicial control 
of price.154 
In relation to national law within the EU, the elevation of the doctrine of laesio 
enormis to mandatory law for consumer contracts in Austria might serve as the 
clearest example of a readiness to regulate the fairness of price.155 Although the 
change did not occur as expressly (or intentionally) in Germany as it did in Austria, 
the clear majority of German writers also seem to agree that German law is moving 
towards the position where objective disparity in the value of performances is by itself 
enough for a contract to be set aside by the court.156 It remains to be seen however, 
whether these examples are really indicative of a trend towards an approach based 
on objective disparity.  
5 4 The burden of proof  
The general rule in South African law, and indeed many other jurisdictions, is that 
the party alleging that the contract is illegal bears the burden of proof in the dispute. 
In this way, effect is given to the value of pacta sunt servanda: ostensibly valid 
contracts must be enforced.157 In the jurisdictions studied in chapter 3, a similar 
approach is revealed in relation to the respective fair price rules. In all of these cases, 
the burden of proof of unfairness rests on the party seeking rescission of the contract 
through alleging that the contract is illegal and ultimately invalid due to such 
unfairness.158 In decisions before the abolition of the doctrine of laesio enormis in 
                                            
153
 See 3 7 5 1 above.  
154
 See 3 7 5 2 above. 
155
 See 3 4 2 above.  
156
 See Kötz Contract Law 194; Zimmermann Obligations 269; Gordley (1981) CLR 1631, 1648-1649; 
This is discussed at length above at 3 3 3 3; for more examples of writers agreeing with this view see 
Armgardt “Laesio Enormis” in Inhaltskontrolle 13; BS Markesinis, H Unberath, & A Johnston The 
German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise 2 ed (2006) 254.  
157
 See JE du Plessis “Illegal Contracts and the Burden of Proof” (2015) 132 SALJ 664 668-669. 
158
 This is discussed explicitly at 3 5 4 2 and 3 4 2 above in relation to Louisiana and Austria 
respectively; the same is true in Germany in relation to § 138 (1) BGB; see 3 3 3 above as well as Du 
Plessis (2015) SALJ 669. This was also the position with regard to laesio enormis in the Roman-Dutch 
law, see 2 5 2 3 above.  
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South Africa, courts also favoured locating the burden of proof on the party trying to 
escape the contract.159 Placing the burden of proof on the party seeking to escape 
the contract arguably plays an important role to reduce the likelihood of excessive 
intervention.160  
However, some systems have modified the application of the general rule under 
certain circumstances in order to assist the party alleging illegality. So, for example, 
German courts regularly infer that the subjective requirement of a reprehensible 
character is met once the gross disparity is proven.161 Similarly, an advantaged party 
raising an exception to the application of § 934 ABGB, bears the burden of proving 
that the prejudiced party knew the true value of the merx.162 An analogy might also 
be drawn to case of presumed undue influence in English law. In general the burden 
of proof rests on the party trying to escape the contract. However, if they are able to 
show that the contract in question “calls for explanation” an evidential presumption 
arises that the contract was concluded due to undue influence. If this presumption is 
not rebutted by the advantaged party, the contract may be set aside.163  
A tendency is therefore apparent from the systems studied in that the burden of 
proof generally lies on the party alleging illegality, but that this party is sometimes 
assisted by special presumptions once they have proven that the contract was 
substantively imbalanced.  
In relation to fair price rules that require a procedural defect in addition to objective 
disparity, it might therefore be reasonable to hold that once the disadvantaged party 
has proven a gross disparity between the contract price and market price, a 
presumption should arise that this was caused by abuse of their position of 
weakness. Such a presumption would play a role to assist disadvantaged parties, 
especially structurally weaker parties such as consumers, in meeting the 
abovementioned burden of proof. 
                                            
159
 See for example Mcgee v Mignon 1903 TS 89 98; Katzoff v Glaser 1948 4 SA 630 (T) 636 citing 
Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 18 5 7. 
160
 Perrone (2014) Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali 227; see 3 5 4 2 above. 
161
 Du Plessis (2015) SALJ 669. 
162
 See 3 4 3 4 above. 
163
 See HG Beale “Duress and Undue Influence” in HG Beale (ed) Chitty on Contracts I (2015) 749 
[8-001] [8-057] – [8-062]; Smith (1996) LQR 146; see also 3 6 4 above. 
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5 5 The scope of application of the fair price rule 
A number of situations exist where it might be undesirable, or impractical for fair 
price rules to find application. In chapter 3, it was noted for example that the 
application of § 934 ABGB is excluded in relation to contracts involving an element of 
chance, or contracts which are gratuitous in nature.164 It was also noted in chapter 2, 
that many differences in opinion existed between scholars of Roman and Roman-
Dutch law as to the proper scope of application of the doctrine of laesio enormis.165 A 
few of the more contentious examples of situations where it might be desirable that 
fair price rules do not find application are briefly discussed below. 
5 5 1 Market price cannot be ascertained 
A fair price rule could logically not be applied in cases where the value (or market 
price) of a performance cannot, or can no longer, be ascertained. An example of 
such a situation might be a unique good, for which no true market exists.166 Another 
example might be if a non-generic merx is destroyed, and it therefore is impossible to 
estimate its value. Where no real market price can be determined, there is nothing 
against which the contract price can be measured for fairness. In such cases fair 
price rules can do little to assist parties seeking to escape a contract. 
5 5 2 Donations 
A fair price rule also cannot find application where contracts are partially or wholly 
gratuitous.167 By their nature donations are not intended to be exchanges of equal 
value. It would be illogical if a fair price rule could be used to invalidate donations 
where the donor later regrets making the donation.  
However, courts should refrain from granting any power to standard contractual 
clauses which declare any amount paid or received in excess of a fair price to be a 
                                            
164
 See 3 4 3 1 & 3 4 3 2 above.  
165
 See for example 2 5 2. 
166
 See Smith (1996) LQR 142; see also 3 4 3 above.  
167
 As is indeed the case in Austria (3 4 3 2) and Louisiana (3 5 4 4); see also the position in the ius 
commune at 2 5 1 above.  
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donation, as such clauses could otherwise be used to circumvent the functioning of 
the rule.168  
Courts in both Austria and Louisiana seem to be hesitant to conclude any amount 
in excess of the fair price should be considered a donation. A cautious approach in 
this regard is to be commended.169 Courts should consider the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the contract to determine if an intention 
to make a donation was apparent.170 In cases where such an intention is clear, the 
remedy should not be applied.  
5 5 3 Contractual exemption of the remedy 
The late scholastics recognised that the same weakness which compels a party to 
conclude a contract at a disadvantageous price could simply be used by the stronger 
party to insert a term into the contract expressly excluding the application of the 
remedy.171 The experience in Austria has similarly shown that allowing the 
contractual exclusion of a fair price rules rather unsurprisingly leads to the remedy 
being excluded in all standard term contracts.172 The remedy therefore cannot be 
excluded to the detriment of the consumer in Austria,173 and Article 2589 of the 
Lousiana Civil Code similarly determines that a party can invoke the remedy of lesion 
beyond moiety even if he has explicitly renounced it.174 Neither can any of the 
respective remedies found the model rules studied be excluded.175 The inevitable 
conclusion is therefore that the contractual exception of fair price rules should not be 
possible. 
5 5 4 Contracts involving an element of chance  
Contracts involving an element of chance, such as annuities, have historically also 
been excluded from the operation of the doctrine of laesio enormis.176 In more 
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 See 3 4 3 2 above.  
169
 See 3 5 4 3 and 3 4 3 2 above.  
170
 See the discussion on Austrian law above at 3 4 3 2. 
171
 See Decock Theologians 590; J Gordley The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine 
(1991) 102; see also 2 4 3 4 above. 
172
 See 3 4 2 above. 
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 See 3 4 2 above.  
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 See 3 5 4 3 above.  
175
 See 3 7 3 above. 
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modern times, such contracts have proven to be less of an obstacle, as courts are 
able to determine through the use of actuarial tables and expert evidence the 
likelihood of a given event occurring, and thus the actuarial value of the contract.177 
Where a flexible approach is used to determine fairness, contracts involving an 
element of change tend to present less of an obstacle.178 Taking into account that the 
burden lies on the disadvantaged party to prove the value of the merx, it does not 
seem necessary to exclude the operation of fair price rules in these cases. 
5 6 The nature of the relief: restitution and adaptation 
The somewhat crude and arbitrary approach that the traditional doctrine of laesio 
enormis followed with regard to restitution has attracted considerable criticism.179 No 
adaptation by the iudex was possible, and if the discrepancy was anything less than 
the required ratio, then no remedy was available at all. The remedy was simplistic, 
but it was fit for its purpose. The sale of land, and the recovery thereof, at which the 
Lex Secunda was aimed, is a discrete once-off transaction (as opposed to a contract 
which lasts over a duration of time). If the prejudiced party were to be restored to the 
status quo ante, he would to a large extent be in the best position possible.  
The same cannot be said, for example, in a long-term contract of hire, or a 
contract for the supply of an important input of production. If the contract were to be 
invalidated, and mutual duties of restoration arose, the prejudiced party might be in 
an even poorer position; for example if there were costs involved in moving to a new 
location, in acquiring a new supplier, or simply in concluding a new contract. In these 
cases the approach followed by the traditional doctrine of laesio enormis proves to be 
extremely unsatisfactory.180  
In the light of these considerations, the flexible approach to restitution followed by 
the model rules such as PECL and PICC, and to some extent by German law, 
appears to be preferable.181 Since judicial adaptation of the contract price allows the 
contract to continue operating, it often presents the optimal solution for both parties 
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 See 3 4 3 1 and 3 3 4 above in this regard.  
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 See Van Loo Vernietiging 272. 
179
 See for example Zimmermann Obligations 264, 270. 
180
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involved. In this regard the approach of the model rules, which allow the contract to 
be adapted at the request of both the advantaged and the disadvantaged parties, 
should be commended. 
South African law also allows for contracting parties whose consent was obtained 
in an improper fashion to claim compensation for damage suffered as a result of 
entering into the contract, irrespective of whether they choose to affirm the contract. 
An example of such damage might be the loss a party incurs when they pay more for 
a thing than it is worth.182 It has also been noted above that the actio quanti minoris 
allows for the reduction of a contract price to the market price (even) in the case of 
innocent misrepresentation.183 
Article 4:117 PECL and Article 3.2.1.6 PICC also allow for the recovery of 
damages (in addition to avoidance of the contract) by the disadvantaged party in 
order to place him in the position before the conclusion of the contract. Allowing for 
the recovery of damages seems desirable, and would function in a slightly less 
haphazard fashion than restitution in German law. The “all or nothing” nature of 
restitution in that system has been criticised184 due to the fact that, in some 
circumstances, it leaves disadvantaged parties in an even better position than they 
were in before the conclusion of the contract, while possibly having quite severe 
consequences for the (initially) advantaged party.185  
A more flexible approach which invests the court with the discretion as to whether 
to adapt the contract price, or to avoid the contract and award damages to the 
disadvantaged party, might therefore better protect the legitimate interests of all the 
parties involved. Such an approach avoids the rigidity of restitution under the 
traditional doctrine of laesio enormis, while still functioning in a more predictable 
fashion than restitution under German law.  
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 See D Hutchison “Improperly Obtained Consent” in D Hutchison & C-J Pretorius (eds) The Law of 
Contract in South Africa 3 ed (2017) 117 119.  
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 See in this regard Phame (Pty) Ltd v Paizes 1973 3 SA 397 (A) 416. 
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5 7 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to explore various considerations that could potentially 
influence the application of a fair price rule in the South African law of contract. It was 
argued that a flexible, case-by-case approach should be followed in determining 
whether a price is fair; this approach should require an objective (substantive) 
discrepancy between the contract price and the market price, and should also 
consider the (procedural) circumstances under which the contract was concluded, 
especially if any defect in consent, or exploitation of a form of weakness, is apparent. 
The exact forms of weakness or defects of consent are a matter of further debate, 
which might best be determined by the courts themselves. However, some guidance 
is provided in instruments such as Articles 4:109 PECL and 3.2.7 PICC. 
Many commentators, especially in the Germanic legal systems, have expressed 
strong support for the idea of a flexible or movable system (“bewegliches System”), 
or sliding scale, whereby the smaller the disproportion in price, the greater the need 
for some evidence of a procedural defect in consent, or exploitation of need and 
weakness.186 Conversely, in cases of truly extreme gross disproportion it would be 
possible to avoid the contract with little or even no evidence of a defect in consent, 
although such cases should be exceedingly rare.  
As has been suggested above, such a flexible approach would provide room for 
the courts to take into account factors such as the relationship between the 
contracting parties, and the nature of the goods or services being contracted for. 
Courts might then also take into account the form of the price term itself, whether it is 
for example set out in plain language, or a transparent manner.187 Such an approach 
would be flexible enough to provide thorough protection to vulnerable or structurally 
weaker contracting parties, while being able to deny the remedy to those contracting 
parties who were in fact in a strong enough position to protect their own interests.  
                                            
186
 See JE du Plessis “Grounds for Avoidance” in S Vogenauer (ed) Commentary on the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2 ed (2015) 511 512; Armgardt “Laesio Enormis” in 
Inhaltskontrolle 15-16; JP Dawson “Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version” (1976) 89 HLR 
1041 1064; see Bollenberger in Kurzkommentar § 879 [18] who states that this is the position in 
Austria under § 879 ABGB. 
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 See the considerations discussed in relation to the Unfair Contract Terms Directive at 3 7 5 1; see 
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The burden of proof of unfairness should be on the disadvantaged party alleging 
invalidity, but as was discussed above, this could be alleviated by presumptions of 
certain forms of procedural defects.188 
A flexible approach should also be taken towards restitution, which invests the 
court with the discretion as to whether to adapt the contract price at the request of 
one of the contracting parties, or to avoid the contract and award damages to the 
disadvantaged party. 
                                            
188
 See 5 4 above.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
   162 
 
CHAPTER 6: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM AND CONCLUSIONS  
6 1 Introduction 
This study commenced with the question how a legal system can address the 
problem of substantively unfair contract prices, i.e. contracts where a large 
discrepancy exists in the value of the respective performances of the contracting 
parties. The historical and comparative overview in chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated 
that a variety of approaches address this problem, each with its own merit, but not all 
equally suitable for the South African law of contract.1  
Chapters 4 and 5 concluded in turn that a fair price, if appropriately construed, 
would not only be consonant with a law of contract based on party autonomy, but 
would lead to a more comprehensive law of contract that is better able to provide 
relief to vulnerable contracting parties, and give expression to a number of 
fundamental values of our law of contract.  
While there are a number of ways in which a fair price rule could be introduced to 
the South African law of contract, two avenues in particular are addressed in this 
chapter. A fair price rule might become part of South African contract law either 
through the adoption of a statutory remedy, which is to some extent already the case 
with section 48(1)(a)(i) of the CPA, or through the judicial development of the 
common law, and specifically the rule that contracts may not be contrary to public 
policy.  
This concluding chapter briefly discusses the merits of these two avenues, both in 
terms of giving expression to the foundational values of the South African law of 
contract studied in chapter 4, and also in terms of giving effect to the 
recommendations regarding the functioning of fair price rules in chapter 5.  
                                            
1
 See T Finkenauer “Laesio Enormis” in J Basedow, KJ Hopt, R Zimmermann, & A Stier (eds) The 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of European Private Law II (2012) 1029 1030 for a brief overview of these 
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6 2 Developing the common law doctrine of illegality 
6 2 1 The statutory abolition of the doctrine of laesio enormis 
Before considering how the common law can be developed to introduce a fair 
price rule, it is necessary to confront the question whether this is at all possible, given 
the statutory abolition of the doctrine of laesio enormis in 1952.2 Would it not be 
necessary for the provision abolishing the doctrine first to be repealed or declared 
unconstitutional? The relevant provision of the Act, which used the exact same 
wording as earlier statutes abolishing the doctrine in the other former provinces,3 
reads: 
“In the provinces of Natal and the Transvaal no contract shall be void or voidable by 
reason merely of laesio enormis sustained by either of the parties to such contract.” 
There is no doubt that the provision in question sought to bring an end to the 
doctrine of laesio enormis, which allowed prejudiced contracting parties to escape a 
contract if the price was less than half or more than double the fair market price. 
However, considering that is has been recognised in a number of prominent South 
African court cases that a contract can be so manifestly unfair as to be contrary to 
public policy,4 it would lead to an incongruous result if a court were to hold that 
contracts can be set aside due to an extremely unfair term, but not due to an 
extremely unfair price. Such an absurd result might in fact be open to constitutional 
challenge, considering the development of the public policy rule in light of the 
Constitution that took place in Barkhuizen v Napier5 (“Barkhuizen”) discussed below.  
6 2 2 Avenues for relief under the common law 
The simplest avenue through which a fair price rule could be provided under the 
common law might be a revival of the doctrine of laesio enormis. However, the 
                                            
2
 See s 25 of the General Law Amendment Act 32 of 1952; HR Hahlo & E Kahn “Two Important 
Changes in the Common Law” (1952) 69 SALJ 392 395. 
3
 See Hahlo & Kahn (1952) SALJ 395; see also the brief discussion on the abolition of the doctrine at 
1 1 above.  
4
 See in particular the cases of Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A); Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 
SA 323 (CC), discussed below in 6 2 2; as well as Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 
(SCA) para 10. 
5
 2007 5 SA 323 (CC). 
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somewhat rigid and arbitrary functioning of this doctrine has been criticised a number 
of times in the current study and in South African case law.6  
Chapter 5 furthermore stressed the importance of fair price rules being properly 
constructed if a legal system is to avoid the doctrinal and practical uncertainty that 
plagued the doctrine of laesio enormis,7 and to minimise the risks of legal uncertainty 
which sometimes are ascribed to fair price rules.8 Chapter 5 concluded therefore that 
a fair price rule for the South African context should consider both the objective 
disparity in the value of performances, as well as the procedural fairness of contract 
conclusion; the greater the objective disparity is proven to be, the less evidence 
would have to be presented of a defect in consent, and vice versa.9 Such a rule 
should ideally take a flexible approach to both the determination of when a price is 
unfair, as well as to restitution, if it is to effect equitable results.10 These 
considerations cannot be given effect to through a simple reintroduction of the 
doctrine of laesio enormis, and this route would therefore be unsatisfactory. 
Another possibility would be to attempt to set aside contracts with unfair prices 
through relying directly on equitable values such as good faith or fairness. However, 
as was discussed in the introductory chapter, the judgment of the court in Brisley v 
Drotsky11 (“Brisley”) and a number of subsequent cases have made clear that 
abstract values such as good faith, fairness, and reasonableness are values that 
underlie our law of contract rather than technical rules that can directly be relied on 
by contracting parties seeking relief from harsh bargains.12  
Nor can disadvantaged contracting parties resort directly to the Constitution, and 
the rights contained therein, in order to escape from an unjust contract;13 this is clear 
from the judgments in Brisley14 and Barkhuizen.15 In the former judgement Cameron 
                                            
6
 See above at 2 3 2, 5 1, and 5 3 1 above; see also Hahlo & Kahn (1952) SALJ 393. 
7
 See 1 1 and 5 1 above. 
8
 See the discussion in 4 3 and 4 4 above.  
9
 See 5 3 1-5 3 2, and 5 7 above.  
10
 See 5 6 above. 
11
 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA). 
12
 See for example Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) paras 50-53; South 
African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 3 SA 323 (SCA) para 27; African Dawn Property 
Finance 2 (Pty) Ltd v Dreams Travel & Tours CC 2011 3 SA 511 (SCA) para 28.  
13
 See D Hutchison “The Nature and Basis of Contract” in D Hutchison & C Pretorius (eds) The Law of 
Contract in South Africa 3 ed (2017) 3 30, 31. 
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 Para 93.  
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JA stated that neither the Constitution nor value system it embodies grant the court a 
general jurisdiction to strike down contracts on the basis of unjustness. In the latter 
Ncgobo J clarified that the proper approach for Constitutional challenges to 
contractual terms is to determine whether the term in question is contrary to public 
policy with reference to the values which underlie the Constitution.16 
One route which duly remains, which does indeed show some promise, is to rely 
on the public policy rule. The rule that a court will not enforce a contract that is 
against public policy is well-established in our law.17 Although this rule has its origin 
in classical Roman law,18 the modern South African rule finds early expression in the 
following dictum of Innes CJ in Eastwood v Shepstone19:  
“Now this Court has the power to treat as void and to refuse in any way to recognise 
contracts and transactions which are against public policy or contrary to good morals. It is 
a power not to be hastily or rashly exercised; but once it is clear that any arrangement is 
against public policy, the court would be wanting in its duty if it hesitated to declare such 
an arrangement void.”  
Chapter 3 pointed out that § 138 (1) BGB, the prohibition against legal acts that 
are contrary to public policy, is routinely used in German law as an instrument to 
invalidate and adapt substantively unfair contracts.20 The possibility of developing the 
public policy rule to similar effect in South African law was hinted at in Bank of Lisbon 
and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas.21 While the majority abolished the exceptio doli 
generalis, Jansen JA22 stated the following in his dissenting judgment:  
“The exceptio doli generalis constitutes a substantive defence, based on the sense of 
justice of the community. As such it is closely related to the defences based on public 
policy (interest) or boni mores … Conceivably they may overlap: to enforce a grossly 
unreasonable contract may in appropriate circumstances be considered as against public 
policy or boni mores.”  
                                                                                                                                        
15
 Para 30. 
16
 See in this regard Hutchison “The Nature and Basis of Contract” in The Law of Contract 30-32.  
17
 RH Christie “The Law of Contract and the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium (online ed, 
2006) para 3H8.  
18
 See R Zimmermann The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 
706-712; J Plescia “The Development of the Doctrine of Boni Mores in Roman Law” (1987) 34 RIDA 
265. 
19
 1902 TS 294 302; see also Christie “Law of Contract” in Bill of Rights Compendium para 3H8. 
20
 See 3 3 above.  
21
 1988 3 SA 580 (A). 
22
 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 617; see also the discussion in FDJ Brand “The Role of Good Faith, Equity and 
Fairness in the South African Law of Contract: The Influence of the Common Law and the 
Constitution” (2009) 126 SALJ 71 74-75. 
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The indication that courts could use public policy as the basis on which to refuse to 
enforce manifestly unreasonable contracts came to fruition shortly thereafter in Sasfin 
(Pty) Ltd v Beukes23 (“Sasfin”).24 The case concerned a deed of cession which in 
effect deprived a medical professional of control over his entire income. In 
deliberating whether the contract was contrary to public policy, the court stated while 
public policy generally favours the utmost freedom of contract, it should also properly 
take account of doing simple justice between persons. When considering the effect of 
the contract the court found that the relevant clauses were so “grossly exploitative” 
and offensive to the mores and interests of the public that they had to be struck 
down.25  
This proposition that public policy would preclude the enforcement of a term if its 
enforcement were manifestly unfair, received unequivocal endorsement by the 
Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen,26 which is now considered the locus classicus on 
public policy in the law of contract.27  
The court in Barkhuizen28 laid down a two-stage approach to the determination of 
whether a contractual term is contrary to public policy. The first enquiry asks whether 
the term itself is so manifestly unreasonable on its face or, ex facie, as to be contrary 
to public policy. If the term is held to be reasonable ex facie the second enquiry asks 
whether the term should be enforced in light of the particular circumstances which 
prevented compliance with the term.29 This study is primarily interested in the first 
enquiry, as this part of the enquiry can best be applied to test the reasonableness or 
fairness of price. The following sections briefly enquire whether the approach used by 
the court in Barkhuizen can give effect to the recommendations made in chapters 4 
and 5.  
                                            
23
 1989 1 SA 1 (A); see also Brand (2009) SALJ 74-76 for a summary of the facts of the case.  
24
 See Brand (2009) SALJ 75.  
25
 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 14-15.  
26
 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 59, 73. 
27
 See for example Hutchison “The Nature and Basis of Contract” in The Law of Contract 31-33.  
28
 See paras 55-58. 
29
 See PJ Sutherland “Ensuring Contractual Fairness in Consumer Contracts after Barkhuizen v 
Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) – Part 2” (2009) 20 Stell LR 50 55. 
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6 2 2 1 The first stage of the first Barkhuizen enquiry 
The first stage of the Barkhuizen test was again divided into two parts. The first 
part asks whether the objective terms of the contract, were ex facie contrary to public 
policy.30 In the example of the court, a provision which requires that a claim be 
instituted within 24 hours would be an example of such an ex facie unfair term.31 
Similarly it could be asked if some contract prices are so manifestly unfair that no 
“further information would be required” for the court to make a finding that the 
contract is contrary to public policy.32  
This is conceivable, for example, where the price paid by a disadvantaged 
contracting party for a normal consumer good is many multiples of the normal market 
price. It should be kept in mind however, that the goal of a fair price rule should not 
be to paternalistically prevent parties from concluding detrimental agreements where 
they freely and autonomously choose to do so.33  
Many cases might exist where contracting parties willingly and knowingly overpay. 
Think once again of the examples discussed in the previous chapters, such as the 
reckless purchaser, who is so wealthy as to be indifferent to the price of a thing, or 
the sentimental purchaser who knowingly overpays due to placing high personal 
value on the merx.34 In chapter 2 it was observed that even the moral theologian 
Aquinas, with his strict adherence to just price doctrine, recognised that the contract 
price could not be considered unfair in the latter case.35 Some glossators and late 
scholastics also denied the remedy of laesio enormis to parties who willingly and 
knowingly overpaid.36 Voet similarly denied the remedy to those who knew the true 
value of the good, and nevertheless sold it, or bought it, consciously incurring laesio 
enormis.37 
The comparative overview in chapter 3 seemed to reach a similar conclusion. 
Even in Austria, where a contract can be avoided solely on the basis of a discrepancy 
                                            
30
 Paras 57, 59. 
31
 Para 60. 
32
 Sutherland (2009) Stell LR 55-56.  
33
 See the discussion above at 5 3 2 2. 
34
 See 4 2 6 2 above.  
35
 See 2 4 2 3 2, J Finnis Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory (1998) 202. 
36
 H Kalb Laesio Enormis in Gelehrten Recht (1992) 115, 167; see 2 4 1 2 above.  
37
 Commentarius ad Pandectas 18 5 17. 
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in the value of performances, the application of § 934 AGBG is excluded both where 
the disadvantaged party knew the true value of the merx and nevertheless overpaid, 
as well as where the disadvantaged party overpaid due to placing a higher value on 
the merx for personal reasons.38 The same is true in Germany.39  
It seems therefore that one of the lessons learned from the historical and 
comparative chapters, is that it is very difficult to declare a contract price unfair 
without considering the circumstances under which the contract was concluded. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from this, is that while cases might conceivably 
exist where a court following the Barkhuizen approach sets aside a contract because 
the price is ex facie unfair (without any consideration for procedural issues or the 
circumstances of contract conclusion), these cases should be exceedingly rare. 
6 2 2 2 The second stage of the first Barkhuizen enquiry 
According to the second part of the first Barkhuizen40 enquiry, it then has to be 
determined if the term was contrary to public policy in light of the relative situation of 
the contracting parties. This entails a weighing up of sanctity of contract against the 
relevant competing considerations of public policy.41 On the one hand public policy 
requires that parties should comply with contractual obligations freely undertaken, as 
expressed by the maxim pacta sunt servanda. This should be weighed up against the 
specific rights and values that could be impacted through applying the application of 
the public policy rule (in our case to set aside contracts with unfair prices).  
The determinants of public policy are not static but rather change over time, and 
so do not constitute a closed list.42 Since the advent of the Constitution it is also 
possible for the courts to develop the common law to give effect to constitutional 
imperatives, either indirectly through section 39(2) or directly through section 8. 
These imperatives include specific constitutional rights, such as dignity, constitutional 
values, for example, good faith, Ubuntu,43 and pacta sunt servanda,44 as well as 
                                            
38
 See 3 4 3 3 and 3 4 3 4 above.  
39
 See 3 3 3 4 above.  
40
 Paras 57, 59.  
41
 See Hutchison “The Nature and Basis of Contract” in The Law of Contract 32. 
42
 See Magna Alloys & Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 4 SA 874 (A) 891; Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v 
Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 8. 
43
 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 51. 
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other policy considerations that are compatible with the Constitution, although not 
necessarily expressly recognised.45 It has been recognised by the courts and a 
number of academics that Constitutional rights and values should be central to public 
policy analysis, and that public policy should be used as a doctrinal gateway for the 
introduction of these values into the common law of contract.46  
A number of these rights and values were considered in chapter 4, which 
evaluated the desirability of a fair price rule. The role which these values play in the 
weighing up of the relevant considerations contemplated in the second stage of the 
first Barkhuizen enquiry can now be considered.  
6 2 2 2 1 Pacta sunt servanda 
The importance attached by South African courts to the idea that voluntarily 
concluded contracts should be enforced, encapsulated in the maxim pacta sunt 
servanda, was considered in chapter 4.47 The centrality of pacta sunt servanda to 
public policy was again recognised by the court in Barkhuizen, where it was noted 
that the enforcement of contracts gives effect to the constitutional values of freedom 
and dignity.48 Ngcobo J stated further that pacta sunt servanda is a profoundly moral 
principle, but also recognised that the general rule that agreements should be applied 
does not apply to agreements which violate public policy.49  
The court in Barkhuizen also noted that the extent to which the contract in 
question was voluntarily concluded needs to be taken into account when considering 
how much weight should be attached to pacta sunt servanda.50 In this regard, the 
court placed particular emphasis on the relative situation and circumstances of the 
contracting parties and specifically on inequality of bargaining power.51 However, it is 
                                                                                                                                        
44
 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 57; Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite 
Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC) paras 22-23. 
45
 See Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) paras 38-39. 
46
 See Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) paras 91 & 92; Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) 
paras 6 and 7; Brand (2009) SALJ 84; Lubbe (2004) SALJ 404; Christie “Law of Contract” in Bill of 
Rights Compendium para 3H8; S Laing & D Visser “Principles, Policy and Practice: Human Rights and 
the Law of Contract” in E Reid & D Visser (eds) Private Law and Human Rights (2014) 330 336. 
47
 See 4 2 6 1 above.  
48
 Para 57. 
49
 Para 87. 
50
 See paras 87, 57.  
51
 Para 64. 
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submitted that other aspects of procedural fairness can also be considered here,52 as 
courts have indeed done in the past as part of the public policy enquiry,53 and as 
other aspects of procedural unfairness could also serve to indicate the extent to 
which a contract was voluntarily concluded. 
In chapter 4 it was argued that contracts with a gross discrepancy in the value of 
the respective performances are more often than not the result of a procedural defect 
or some form of unconscionable conduct in the conclusion of the contract.54 
Examples of such might be the exploitation of weakness, economic duress, or 
circumstances of need of the disadvantaged party, the presence of standard form 
contracts, the manipulation of cognitive biases, or any number of defects in 
consent.55  
Sutherland noted similarly in his analysis of the judgment in Barkhuizen that it is 
unlikely that a contracting party in a truly equal bargaining position would voluntarily 
accept unfair terms.56 The greater the discrepancy between the value of the 
performances, and the more unfair the contract price, the more so this is arguably 
true.57  
The extent to which such manifestly unfair contracts can be considered a 
manifestation of party autonomy and dignity is therefore doubtful.58 It is for this 
reason that is was argued in chapter 4, that setting aside contracts with unfair prices 
could serve to protect the party autonomy of weaker contracting parties, and advance 
the empowerment conception of dignity. Setting aside contracts where the 
substantive unfairness of the contract indicates that a defect in consent might have 
                                            
52
 See Sutherland (2009) Stell LR 57. 
53
 See for example M Kruger “The Role of Public Policy in the Law of Contract, Revisited” (2011) 128 
SALJ 712 722; Magna Alloys & Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 4 SA 874 (A) 894-895; Basson v 
Chilwan 1993 3 SA 742 (A) 762-763; African Dawn Property Finance 2 (Pty) Ltd v Dreams Travel & 
Tours CC 2011 3 SA 511 (SCA) paras 19-21. 
54
 See 4 2 6 2 above. 
55
 This is discussed at 4 2 6 3 above. 
56
 Sutherland (2009) Stell LR 60. 
57
 See H Eidenmüller “Justifying Fair Price Rules in Contract Law” (2015) 11 ERCL 220 227. 
58
 See also Gerolomou Constructions (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 2011 4 SA 500 (GNP) para 24. 
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been present at the time of conclusion might therefore promote rather than detract 
from the principle of pacta sunt servanda.59  
6 2 2 2 2 Dignity as a constraint 
Chapter 4 also argued that applying the public policy rule to set aside contracts 
with an unfair price can also support the conception of dignity as a constraint, both 
through promoting the idea that contracting parties have a measure of regard for the 
interests of their contracting partners, and by setting aside those contracts where it is 
clear that the disproportionate nature of the contract will affect the ability of the 
disadvantaged party to live a dignified life.60  
6 2 2 2 3 Good faith and Ubuntu 
The court also recognised in Barkhuizen61 that values such as good faith and 
Ubuntu are also relevant to the determination of public policy. In chapter 4 it was 
argued that the good faith as a legal norm can be described as a standard of open, 
honest, and considerate behaviour characterised by acting with a degree of respect 
or consideration for the interests of opposing contracting parties.62 The court in 
Barkhuizen stated in similar fashion that good faith as a value is related to concepts 
of justice, reasonableness, and fairness.63 It was therefore argued in chapter 4 that 
setting aside contracts with unfair prices, and thereby requiring that parties should 
show a measure of regard for the interests of their contracting parties in the 
bargaining process, might give expression to good faith as a value in our law. It was 
similarly argued in chapter 4 that setting aside contracts with unfair prices can 
promote the concept of Ubuntu, which places an emphasis on mutual respect and 
the recognition of the humanity and dignity inherent in others.64  
                                            
59
 See 4 2 6 2 above; see also Sutherland (2009) Stell LR 62-63; JE du Plessis “Illegal Contracts and 
the Burden of Proof” (2015) 132 SALJ 664 685.  
60
 See 4 2 7 2 above; in relation to the role of dignity as a constraint in the determination of public 
policy see Coetzee v Comitis 2001 1 SA 1254 (C) paras 34-41.  
61
 See paras 51, 79-82. 
62
 See 4 2 7 5 above.  
63
 Para 79 
64
 See 4 2 7 4 above.  
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6 2 2 2 4 Legal certainty 
The argument was discussed in chapter 4 that setting aside contracts on the basis 
of an unfair price might lead to an untenable degree of legal and economic 
uncertainty.65 It was noted however that while the point is often raised by opponents 
of fair price rules, it does not seem to be the case in practice. Fair price rules with a 
comparative functioning to that proposed in chapter 5 exist in a number of foreign 
jurisdictions – most notably in Germany, where the rule is also based on public policy 
– and yet no clear case can be made out that a much greater degree of legal 
uncertainty exists in these countries than in South Africa.  
Since South African courts have already taken the position in cases such as 
Sasfin,66 that an agreement can be so manifestly unfair as to be contrary to public 
policy, it could even be argued that it would lead to an increase in legal certainty if a 
court were to clarify how this applies to unfair prices, and transparently set out what 
considerations it would take into account to determine the fairness of price.  
Lastly it was noted, that while certainty is important, it cannot by itself serve as a 
reason for a court to enforce an immoral or unjust contract.  
6 2 2 2 5 Economic efficiency 
As was noted it chapter 4, it is sometimes held that the control of process is not in 
the public interest, as it endangers the efficient functioning of the economy.67 
However, it was argued in chapter 4 that contracts with excessive prices are often 
economically inefficient contracts, especially where the excessive price was induced 
by a procedural defect in the conclusion of the contract, such as the abuse of 
circumstances, economic duress, information asymmetries, or an inability of one of 
the parties to understand the benefits of a complex contract.68 It was further argued 
that enforcing contracts with unfair prices can also create inefficient incentives for 
                                            
65
 See 4 3 above.  
66
 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 14-15. 
67
 See 4 4 1 above. 
68
 See 4 4 2 above.  
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contracting parties or third parties.69 Setting aside contracts with an unfair price might 
thus advance rather than endanger economic efficiency.  
6 2 3 Conclusion 
The second stage of the first Barkhuizen enquiry therefore seems to be well suited 
to the consideration of the fairness of price. Through the use of the public policy rule, 
the court is able to both take into account the substantive fairness of the contract 
price, as well as a host of considerations of procedural fairness in the balancing of 
the relevant rights and values impacted by the application of the public policy rule.  
This approach can also be compared to the approach of German courts to fair 
prices as discussed in chapter 3. In both of these cases the courts follows a flexible 
approach that is able to take into account both the objective terms of the contract, 
and the relative situation of the contracting parties when deciding whether the 
contract price is fair.70 
Such a flexible approach aligns well with the idea of a movable system, or sliding 
scale, whereby the less substantively unfair the price is held to be in the first stage of 
the first Barkhuizen enquiry, the greater the need for some evidence of a procedural 
defect in consent, or exploitation of need and weakness, in the second stage of the 
first Barkhuizen enquiry. 
There is of course the argument to be made that such a rule should more 
appropriately be implemented by the lawgiver, who should be the “major engine” for 
law reform.71 A number of commentators have however pointed out that there seems 
to be little chance of reform originating from the legislature in this regard,72 as the 
preference of the legislature seems to be to intervene with more specific legislation 
aimed at particular fields such as consumer protection.73  
                                            
69
 See 4 4 2 above.  
70
 See 3 3 3 above.  
71
 See Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 36; Wallis (2015) SALJ 
934.  
72
 See Brand (2009) SALJ 77; J du Plessis “Threats and Excessive Benefits or Unfair Advantage” in 
HL MacQueen & R Zimmermann (eds) European Contract Law: Scots and South African Perspectives 
(2006) 151 167. 
73
 Brand (2009) SALJ 77. 
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Furthermore, South African courts have always had the inherent ability to develop 
the common law to bring it into step with the development of society, even by bold 
steps.74 It is also trite that the law of contract should give expression to constitutional 
demands,75 yet it is often bemoaned that the impact of the Constitution on the 
development of the common law of contract has been too limited.76  
In the absence of meaningful action, or prospects therefor, on the part of the 
lawgiver to develop the common law in line with constitutional imperatives and to 
bring the common law of contract into step with modern commercial reality, the courts 
should not hesitate to step in to do so. To give effect to the values discussed above, 
the introduction of a fair price rule into our common law of contract through the 
application of the public policy rule would be both appropriate and desirable. 
6 3 A fair price rule in the Consumer Protection Act.  
Thus far this chapter has discussed the introduction of a fair price rule through the 
development of the common law of contract. A more limited form of judicial price 
control can, however, already be found in the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 
(“CPA”). Section 48 of the Act, under Part G labelled “Right to fair, just and 
reasonable terms and conditions” contains a general prohibition against unfair, 
unreasonable, or unjust contract terms. Section 48(1)(a)(i) prohibits a supplier from 
entering into an agreement at a price that is unfair, unreasonable, or unjust.  
A number of commentaries deal much more comprehensively with the functioning 
of section 48(1)(a)(i).77 This is not the aim here; it will rather be sought to provide 
some brief remarks regarding the proposed functioning and interpretation of 
section 48(1)(a)(i), taking into account the lessons learned from the comparative and 
evaluative chapters above.  
                                            
74
 See for example Blower v Van Noorden 1909 TS 890 905; Phame (Pty) Ltd v Paizes 1973 3 SA 397 
(A); Hurwitz v Taylor 1926 TPD 81; see also the discussion in Janse van Rensburg v Grieve Trust CC 
2000 1 SA 315 (C) 324; Lubbe (2004) SALJ 402, 410.  
75
 See for example Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 
(CC) paras 22-23, 71; Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 35. 
76
 See for example D Davis “Private Law After 1994: Progressive Development or Schizoid 
Confusion?” (2008) SAJHR 318 324; Lubbe (2004) SALJ 410; see the discussion in M Wallis “The 
Common Law’s Cool Ideas for Dealing with Ms Hubbard” (2015) 132 SALJ 940 942. 
77
 See T Naudé “Section 48” in T Naudé & S Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection 
Act (RS 2 2017). 
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6 3 1 Does the CPA contain a fair price rule?  
A number of authors have questioned to what extent section 48(1)(a)(i) constitutes 
a price control mechanism.78 According to Van Eeden, no strong argument can be 
made that section 48(1)(a)(i) was intended to serve as a price control mechanism,79 
and the section should therefore only be “appropriately applied” where in addition to 
unfair price, other unfair terms, or forms of procedural unfairness such as for 
example, those indicated in section 40(2) of the Act, are present.80  
However, such an interpretation arguably ignores the ordinary meaning of section 
48(1)(a)(i) of the Act.  
The approach of South African courts to the interpretation of statutes, as laid down 
by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni 
Municipality,81 and recently confirmed in Sigcau v Minister of Cooperative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs,82 is as follows:  
“Whatever the nature of the document, consideration must be given to the language used 
in the light of the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context in which the provision 
appears; the apparent purpose to which it is directed and the material known to those 
responsible for its production.”  
Wallis JA further endorsed the proposition that the inevitable point of departure 
when interpreting a provision is the language of the provision itself, and noted that 
courts need to guard against the temptation to substitute what they regard as 
reasonable or sensible for the words actually used.83  
If this approach is followed, it is difficult to infer from the language used, in light of 
the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax, that section 48(1)(a)(i) is not intended to 
be a price control mechanism, or should only apply when some form of procedural 
                                            
78
 See for example EP van Eeden A Guide to the Consumer Protection Act (2009); EP van Eeden 
Consumer Protection Law in South Africa (2013) 263; J Barnard “Unfairness of Price and the Doctrine 
of Laesio Enormis in Consumer Sales” (2013) 76 THRHR 521 535.  
79
 Van Eeden A Guide to the CPA 186-187. 
80
 Van Eeden Consumer Protection Law 263. 
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 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) para 18.  
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 2017 3 All SA 608 (SCA) para 21. 
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unconscionability is present, as no such limitation is apparent from the text of the 
provision itself.  
Neither could such a conclusion be reached when following a more purposive 
interpretation of the provision in terms of the purposes of the Act.84 Section 2(1) of 
the Act determines that it must be interpreted in a manner that gives effect to its 
purposes set out in section 3.85 De Stadler and Du Plessis argue that when 
section 2(1) is read together with the purposes of the Act in section 3(1), as well as 
section 4(3) of the Act, following a purposive interpretation will inevitably lead to the 
result that any ambiguous provisions in the Act must be interpreted in favour of the 
consumer.86 It is in their opinion difficult to envision a persuasive argument for the 
interpretation of an ambiguous term against the consumer.87 An interpretation of 
section 48(1)(a)(i) which requires both some form of procedural unconscionability, in 
addition to an unfair price, limits the redress available to the consumer and arguably 
cannot be considered an interpretation in favour of the consumer.  
It therefore seems that a court following a reasonable interpretation of 48(1)(a)(i) 
could invalidate a contract due to an unfair price, without any proof of procedural 
unfairness in the conclusion of the contract. The question of whether this is desirable 
mirrors the discussion above, of whether a court should ex facie declare a price to be 
unfair in the first stage of the public policy enquiry.88  
However, an important distinction needs to be made here. The fact that section 
48(1)(a)(i) does not require that the disadvantaged party prove unconscionable 
conduct, does not mean that considerations of procedural fairness cannot be taken 
into account in determining whether a price is fair. On the contrary, the mandatory 
nature of section 52(2) of the CPA discussed below necessitates that a court does 
so. Courts applying section 52 should make use of the broad powers and discretion 
vested in it by the provision to deny the remedy to those contracting parties who were 
                                            
84
 See E de Stadler & E du Plessis “Section 2” in Commentary on the CPA (RS 2 2017) paras 9-14 on 
the purposive interpretation of the Act.  
85
 Section 2(1) of the CPA. 
86
 See De Stadler & Du Plessis “Section 2” in Commentary on the CPA paras 11, 12. 
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in fact in a strong enough position to protect their own interest, but nevertheless 
consented to the excessive price.89 
In this way a court can strike the balance recommended in chapter 5, where it is 
able to provide thorough protection to the most vulnerable contracting parties 
envisaged in section 3(b) of the Act, while limiting abuse of the Act by denying the 
remedy to those parties who were in fact in a strong enough bargaining position to 
look after their own interest.90  
6 3 2 The functioning of the fair price rule in section 48(1)(a)(i) 
A number of commentators have pointed out that the CPA provides little guidance 
as to what constitutes a price that is “unfair, unreasonable or unjust”.91 The wording 
of section 48(1)(a)(i) itself is not very helpful, since the terms unfair, unreasonable, 
and unjust are arguably synonyms.92 Section 48(2) seeks to provide more guidance 
as to the meaning of “unfair, unreasonable and unjust”, but only the first two 
paragraphs relate to content control.93 The wording of section 48(2) also indicates 
that it does not limit the generality of section 48(1), meaning that the considerations 
listed under section 48(2) are arguably not a closed list.94  
Section 48(2) determines that:  
Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), a transaction or agreement, a term or 
condition of a transaction or agreement, or a notice to which a term or condition is 
purportedly subject, is unfair, unreasonable or unjust if:  
(a) it is excessively one-sided in favour of any person other than the consumer or 
other person to whom goods or services are to be supplied;  
(b) the terms of the transaction or agreement are so adverse to the consumer as to 
be inequitable; of the Act provides scant guidance  
 
Naudé points out that section 48(2)(b) also provides little guidance as “inequitable” 
is arguably just another synonym for unfair. By contrast, paragraph (a) does provide 
some guidance by referring to “excessively one-sided”, which Naudé argues would 
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 See for example, 5 3 2 2 & 5 5 3 above.  
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 Van Eeden A Guide to the CPA 186; Naudé “Section 48” in Commentary on the CPA paras 1, 12, 
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necessitate the weighing up of the rights and obligations of the parties to determine 
one-sidedness.95  
Despite no such limitation being apparent from the text of the provision, a number 
of commentators seemingly agree that the provisions contained in section 48(2) do 
not apply to contract price(s), and that they therefore cannot be used to interpret 
unfairness in terms of section 48(1)(a)(i). However, these writers offer very little by 
way of justification for such a claim. Sharrock,96 Barnard,97 and (HM) Du Plessis98 all 
cite Van Eeden99 to substantiate the claim that the guidelines in section 48(2) do not 
apply to prices, without providing any justification of their own. Van Eeden in turn 
simply states that “The basic unfairness standards in section 48(2) do not apply to 
prices”, and that reference therefore needs to be made to the general unfairness 
standard in section 52(2), without providing any further justification.  
Elsewhere Van Eeden substantiates the same claim by arguing that this is the 
effect of the operation of section 48(2), which refers to a: “transaction or agreement, 
a term or condition of a transaction or agreement” but not to a “price”.100 However, it 
is self-evident that the contract price forms part of the terms of a contract, both from 
the explanation of contract price provided by Van Eeden,101 and from the definition of 
“price” provided in the Act itself (“…the total amount paid or payable by the consumer 
to the supplier in terms of that transaction or agreement…”).102 It therefore seems 
reasonable to interpret that section 48(2), which explicitly refers to the terms of the 
agreement, does in fact apply to price. 
The Act also provides no guideline for what constitutes a “fair price” as opposed to 
an unfair price.103 The question of what the appropriate guideline is for a fair price 
was discussed at length in chapter 5, where it was submitted that as it is the norm 
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 Sharrock (2010) SA Mercantile LJ 308.  
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 Barnard (2013) THRHR 530. 
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both historically and internationally,104 and as it is a standard that is familiar to South 
African courts,105 the market price should generally be used as the guideline for a fair 
price,106 taking into account the challenges and shortcoming of such an approach 
discussed in chapter 5, especially in relation to defective markets.107  
Naudé has also suggested that courts should only intervene where the contract 
price is “manifestly unjust” or where there is a “gross disparity” in the value of the 
performances (as was in fact the case in the original form of the bill introduced to 
Parliament), rather than where price is simply “unfair”.108 Naudé’s suggestion in this 
regard should be supported. In chapters 4 and 5 it was argued that a threshold for an 
“unfair price” that is very low (i.e. a threshold that does not require great discrepancy 
between the contract and the market price), might lead to a large amount of validly 
concluded contracts being invalidated.109 Eidenmüller also criticised the proposed fair 
price rule in the CESL on a similar basis, noting that if threshold required for an unfair 
price were too low, it would potentially lead to great legal uncertainty, and arguably 
not constitute an economically efficient rule.110 
Section 52 of the Act regulates the powers of the court to ensure fair contract 
terms. For purposes of the current discussion, it sets out the list of factors which a 
court must consider when a contravention of section 48 is alleged in section 52(2), as 
well as the orders that a court may make if it determines that a contract is in whole or 
in part unconscionable or unfair in section 52(3).  
Section 52 is problematic for a number of reasons.111 Firstly, section 52 only finds 
application if the Act does not otherwise provide a sufficient remedy to correct the 
relevant prohibited conduct or unfairness.112 However, it is unclear which remedies 
are contemplated in this section, and how it is to be assessed whether these 
                                            
104
 See 5 2 1 4 above; s 2(a) of the CPA determines that appropriate foreign and international law may 
be taken into account when interpreting or applying the Act. 
105
 See 5 2 2 1 above. 
106
 This also appears to be the suggestion of Van Eeden A Guide to the CPA 186; Sharrock (2010) SA 
Mercantile LJ 310.  
107
 See 5 2 4 above.  
108
 See T Naudé “Introduction to ss 48-52 and reg 44” in Commentary on the CPA (RS 2 2017) para 5; 
T Naudé “The Consumer's Right to Fair, Reasonable and Just Terms under the New Consumer 
Protection Act in Comparative Perspective” (2009) 126 SALJ 505 532-533.  
109
 See 4 4 2 and 5 3 1 above.  
110
 This is discussed in 4 4 2 above; see Eidenmüller (2015) ERCL 227.  
111
 See in this regard, Naudé “Introduction to ss 48-52 and reg 44” in Commentary on the CPA para 6.  
112
 See s 52(1)(b).  
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remedies are sufficient.113 When read with section 69, which sets out the ways in 
which a consumer may seek to enforce his rights, and especially section 69(d), it 
seems that a consumer would only be able to approach a court after a number of 
other remedies provided for in the CPA such as alternative dispute resolution, and 
making a complaint to the National Consumer Commission, have been exhausted.114 
This places a substantial obstacle in the way of consumers seeking redress against 
unfair terms, and arguably contradicts the purpose of the Act, which is to provide 
consumers with effective relief.115  
Secondly, in contrast to the list provided in section 48(2), the provision does not 
make clear whether or not the list in section 52(2) is exhaustive.116 However, it does 
not seem to prohibit the court from considering other factors either.117 
Some commentators have gone as far as to suggest that the list of factors should 
be deleted, leaving it to the courts to develop the list of relevant considerations for 
the assessment of fairness.118 This is to be preferred to a closed list. As it has been 
argued above, a flexible test which invests discretion in the court to take into account 
all the factors which they consider to be relevant is arguably most appropriate for 
achieving equitable results.119 
The factors in the list have been analysed in great detail.120 Only two of these can 
however be related to substantive fairness, and are, for our purposes, rather 
unsatisfactory. These are: paragraph (a) the fair value of the goods or services in 
question; and (i) the amount for which, and circumstances under which, the 
consumer could have acquired identical or equivalent goods or services from a 
                                            
113
 See Van Eeden A Guide to the CPA 191; Sharrock (2010) SA Mercantile LJ 316. 
114
 Sharrock (2010) SA Mercantile LJ 324. 
115
 324.  
116
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118
 Naudé & Koep (2015) Stell LR 109. 
119
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120
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309-314. 
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different supplier. As has been argued above,121 fair value should be interpreted as 
referring to the market price of the goods.  
The majority of the factors on the list relate to considerations of procedural 
fairness, such as the nature of the parties to the agreement, the circumstances that 
existed or were foreseeable at the time of conclusion of the contract, the conduct of 
the consumer and the supplier respectively, and to the extent of negotiations 
between the parties.122  
Since the court is mandated to take this list into account when a contravention of 
section 48(1)(a)(i) is alleged, the procedural fairness of the contract conclusion 
should indeed play a role in determining whether a price is fair, despite the fact that 
section 48(1)(a)(i) arguably does not require that the consumer prove procedurally 
unconscionable conduct.  
6 3 3 Restitution in terms of the CPA 
In the event that a court determines that an agreement was in whole or in part 
unconscionable, section 52(3)(a) and (b) grant wide ranging powers to make an order 
that the court considers just and reasonable in the circumstances, which includes but 
is not limited to the restoration of money to the consumer, and an order 
compensating the consumer for losses relating to the agreement.123  
Section 52 refers only to the power of “courts”, which seems to imply that other 
bodies (including provincial consumer courts as they are explicitly excluded from 
being considered “courts” in terms the definition provided in section 1 of the Act) 
would not have the jurisdiction to provide relief for unfair prices.124 While the wide-
ranging powers granted to the court to effect restitution should be applauded, as this 
concurs with the flexible approach to restitution suggested above,125 the barriers to 
the application of section 52 do present a significant challenge for consumers 
seeking redress. 
                                            
121
 See 5 2 1 4 above. 
122
 Paras (b), (c), (d), and (e) respectively.  
123
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6 3 4 Conclusion 
While it is in theory possible for section 48(1)(a)(i) to function as the type of fair 
price rule envisaged in chapters 4 and 5, its ability to realise its potential is hampered 
by the manifold barriers in the way of consumers approaching the courts. Problems 
presented by a lack of guidelines as to what constitutes a fair or an unfair price, are 
not insurmountable, as they could otherwise be mitigated through being further 
developed by the courts. However, there is a paucity of cases where a party is able 
to approach the court and raise section 48(1)(a)(i): it is unclear whether there has 
been a single reported case where a consumer has successfully done so.126 It would 
seem therefore that reform to the CPA is desirable, in order to allow consumers much 
easier access to the court to avail themselves of the protection of this provision. 
6 4 Conclusion  
The medieval civilians, late scholastics, and the natural lawyers of the ius 
commune may have had different conceptions of what constitutes a just price, but it 
is evident that they all viewed an unjust price as an evil that deserved to be 
remedied. This idea fell out of favour during the 18th and 19th century, as 
enlightenment thinking and economic liberalism denied the existence of a iustum 
pretium, considering it to be a fanciful idea, based on metaphysical concepts, and 
infringing on individualistic notions of freedom of contract.127 According to these 
jurists, the contents of contracts depend only on the free will of the parties, and 
accordingly no just price can exist outside of that agreed upon by the parties 
themselves.128 This view would prevail during the age of codification, and would 
eventually lead to the complete abolition of the doctrine of laesio enormis in South 
Africa in 1952.129  
                                            
126
 In Doyle v Killeen (NCT/12984/2014/75(1)(b)CPA) 2014 ZANCT 43 (25 September 2014) there 
was no reason for the court to consider s 48(1)(a)(i), though it was raised, as the court found that the 
Act did not find application. In City of Johannesburg v National Consumer Commission 
(NCT/2667/2011/101(1)(P), NCT/2081/2011/101(1)(P)) 2012 ZANCT 6 (30 March 2012), the 
Respondent raised s 48(1)(a)(i), but in doing so seemingly confused an unfair price and an unfair 
practice. 
127
 See also 3 2 above; Zimmermann Obligations 264-265. 
128
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129
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However, as is often argued, there appears to be life after death for the fair price 
rule.130 It has become increasingly clear with the resurgence in interest in fair price 
doctrines since the latter half of the 20th century,131 that protecting weaker contracting 
parties and preserving contractual justice requires addressing the problem of 
substantively unfair contract prices more directly.132 In South Africa the need for 
some form of intervention in order to protect weaker contracting parties and ensure 
greater fairness in contract was similarly recognised, and repeatedly expressed,133 
especially after the abolition of the exceptio doli in Bank of Lisbon and South Africa 
Ltd v De Ornelas.134 
While a number of foreign jurisdictions studied in chapter 3 provide relief to 
prejudiced contracting parties through doctrines such as laesio enormis, 
unconscionability, or public policy, disadvantaged parties are by contrast left with little 
recourse from unfair contract prices in the South African common law of contract as it 
currently stands.  
The most significant development in this regard, section 48(1)(a)(i) of the CPA, 
which in theory amounts to a fair price rule, appears to have failed in its task of 
providing relief to contracting parties prejudiced by unfair prices, arguably due to the 
impediments to accessing the courts which disadvantaged parties seeking relief need 
to surmount. It should also be kept in mind, as discussed above, that the scope of 
application of section 48(1)(a)(i) is limited to those transactions which are governed 
by the Act.135  
The concluding chapter has proposed that a fair price rule should be introduced 
into South African common law of contract through the further development of the 
public policy rule. It has argued that doing so can give expression to a number of 
foundational values of our law of contract, such as party autonomy, dignity, good 
                                            
130
 See for example Zimmermann Obligations 268.  
131
 See the sources cited above in chapter 1, nn 28, 29. 
132
 See for example A Perrone “The Just Price Doctrine and Contemporary Contract Law: Some 
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133
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135
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faith, and Ubuntu. Furthermore, the development of the public policy rule in such a 
manner arguably leads to a more comprehensive law of contract that is better able to 
protect and give effect to the will of contracting parties. Moreover, such a rule 
corrects injustice which is plain for all to see; injustice that more often than not comes 
at the cost of the most vulnerable members of our society.  
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